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The world is a slightly better place for having improvisation in it than it was before.
There’s something about it that says something positive about the human spirit, that a
bunch of people can get together and by following a few simple traffic rules can create art
and can entertain an audience and can thrill and exalt each other.
Del Close
The rules of improvisation apply beautifully to life. Never say no - you have to be
interested to be interesting, and your job is to support your partners.
Scott Adsit
To Bridget, my deepest source of strength and hope.
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SUMMARY
Improvisation is an essential skill for co-creative agents to develop for successful per-
formance despite resource constraints, time pressure, open-ended problems, and ill-defined
goals. An important subset of improvisation that has diverse applications is embodied nar-
rative improvisation, i.e., collaborative improvisation of narratives with other agents using
the various modalities of its body situated within a virtual or physical environment. Un-
constrained human-computer embodied narrative improvisation is a challenging problem
since it requires the incorporation of many cognitive faculties including narrative intel-
ligence (the ability to tell and understand stories), social cognition (reasoning about the
goals, plans, desires of other beings), performance of linguistic/non-linguistic action (the
physical ability to enact a set of actions), and commonsense reasoning (reasoning about
how the world works at a naive level).
Unconstrained embodied narrative improvisation is too complex to address at present,
as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Therefore, this dissertation aims to explore the
initial steps in a path toward improvisational agents that can eventually perform uncon-
strained embodied narrative improvisation with people. I focus on improvisation within an
object-based gestural proto-narrative problem domain in this dissertation that falls under
the set of problem domains that I collectively refer to as movement improv domains due to
their focus on gestural and environmental interaction. My research addresses the improvi-
sational action selection problem, which is a crucial challenge to creating improvisational
agents in movement improv domains.
I study the improvisational action selection problem (the challenge of performing action
selection from an open-ended action space with an ill-defined goal space in near real-time
based on the agent’s knowledge and the improvisational context, in order to avoid incoher-
ent behavior, decision paralysis, and unexpressive responses) in this dissertation and how
to address it within the Robot Improv Circus interactive virtual reality installation and the
xvi
CARNIVAL agent architecture. In this domain, object-based gestural proto-narrative im-
provisation takes place between non-expert human and virtual characters through the Props
game. The CARNIVAL agent architecture uses affordance-based action variant genera-
tion, improvisational response strategies, and computational evaluation of creativity of
perceived or generated actions to perform creative arc negotiation as a form of intrinsically
motivated action selection in order to address the improvisational action selection problem.
Creative arc negotiation is the process of selecting actions over time to best follow a given
creative arc, i.e. a continuous target trajectory for generated responses to follow through
an agent’s creative space (the space of actions with different degrees of novelty, surprise,
and value).
My dissertation has the thesis statement, “embodied agents that address the improvi-
sational action selection problem using ‘creative arc negotiation’ increase perceptions of
enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence in both observers and participants while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts.” Through the evaluation performed in this
dissertation, it was found that this thesis statement is valid to different extents as follows.
It is valid to conclusively state that embodied agents addressing the improvisational action
selection problem using creative arc negotiation can perform movement improv with non-
experts so that perceptions of agent creativity and coherence increase for both participants
and audience members, but that perceptions of enjoyment only increase conclusively for
observers. More study and data is required to show a conclusive increase in perceptions of
enjoyment for participants of the installation.
The contributions of my research in this dissertation are as follows.
• A model of affordance-based action variant generation for the parameterized gener-
ation of action variants based on a given objects physical attributes.
• A formalized set of improvisational reasoning strategies for guiding an agents action
space search based on previous experience and the current improvisational context.
xvii
• Computational models for evaluating the creativity of perceived and generated action
variants in terms of their novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and
quality (as a measure of value).
• A model of creative arc negotiation for improvisational action selection while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts that increases both participant and ob-
server perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence.
• A publicly disseminated and validated interactive installation where embodied agents




Improvisation with human collaborators is an essential skill for intelligent agents to de-
velop in order to act in realistically large-scale problem domains where cognitive, as well
as physical resource limitations, severe time constraints, open-ended action spaces, and
ill-defined goal spaces, are characteristic. For convenience, I have coined the term em-
bodied narrative improvisation [1] to refer to an important set of creative domains within
the space of improvisational domains that is at the intersection of embodied collabora-
tive creativity (co-creativity) and narrative improvisation (in a broadly applicable sense).
Successful human-computer embodied narrative improvisation would have valuable appli-
cations within diverse fields such as human-robot (or human-agent) interaction, immersive
scenario-based training, expressive arts or play therapies, virtual reality (VR) games or
entertainment, and using performing arts to encourage broader participation in STEM (sci-
ence, technology, engineering, and mathematics). Embodied narrative improvisation, as I
defined it in [1], involves an agent co-constructing and enacting narratives with other agents
using the various interaction modalities, constraints, and affordances of its body situated
within a virtual or physical environment. For example, within a VR game that enables play-
ers to interact with the virtual world and each other through naturalistic embodied interac-
tion, non-player characters (NPCs) could co-construct the game’s narrative with players
through their embodied actions instead of being restricted to following scripted sequences
of canned animations and pre-recorded behaviors.
The problem of human-computer embodied narrative improvisation is too complex and
challenging to address in its unconstrained form because it requires agents to possess many
complex reasoning capabilities such as narrative intelligence (the ability to tell and under-
stand narratives, see section 1.2), social cognition (the ability to reason about other agents’
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mental states and how that interacts with one’s mental state), performance of linguistic and
non-linguistic action, as well as many other reasoning faculties, interaction capabilities,
knowledge, and experience. Therefore, this dissertation aims to form the first exploratory
steps towards someday creating improvisational agents that can perform unconstrained em-
bodied narrative improvisation with people. In order to achieve this, I have simplified the
scope of my research in several ways. Firstly, due to the relative abundance of research
in speech-based and textual narrative domains, I focus on studying improvisation within
a problem domain where the primary interaction modalities are object-based and gestural
interaction. I refer to this set of simplified problem domains as movement improv domains
(see section 1.2) throughout this dissertation in order to emphasize that they primarily in-
volve full-body gesture and object-based interactions. Secondly, I restrict the scope of the
research in this dissertation to addressing the improvisational action selection problem (see
section 1.2.1), which is a key challenge for creating improvisational agents for movement
improv that prior research in improvised dance [2] and pretend play [3] had highlighted.
Finally, as a tangible step closer to unconstrained embodied narrative compared to my prior
work in human-computer improvised dance [2], in this dissertation I choose to study the
improvisational action selection problem within a problem domain that represents an in-
crease both in the complexity of the improvised embodied interactions and in the degree of
semantic structure required for successful improvisation.
The remainder of this chapter starts by introducing the terms and concepts used in
this research before describing the improvisational action selection problem. The chapter
then discusses the domain chosen to study the improvisational action selection problem
as well as the techniques used to create improvisational agents within that domain. The
chapter then presents my thesis statement and the research questions guiding the formal
evaluation of the claims in my thesis statement. This chapter finally concludes by detailing
the contributions of this research.
2
1.1 Creativity and Improvisation
This section formally introduces the concepts of creativity, co-creativity, and improvisa-
tion as they are used in this dissertation. The definitions for these terms are required to
contextualize the main problem addressed through this research (see section 1.2.1) and
the computational techniques used to address it (see section 1.4). More detail about these
concepts and relevant related research can also be seen in sections 2.1 and 2.4.
Formal research into the phenomenon of creativity from both humanistic and computa-
tional perspectives have has led to a scientific understanding of human creativity including
recommendations for improving creativity [4], better supporting creative practice [5], and
scaling up creative impact [6]. Creativity research has also resulted in several definitions
of creativity as a phenomenon. Newell, Shaw, and Simon’s creative problem solving [7]
referred to elements of creativity as novelty, value, rejection of previous assumptions, per-
sistence towards a goal, and the development of a problem specification itself. Boden’s
influential model [8] of creativity defined creativity as “the ability to come up with ideas
or artifacts that are new, surprising and valuable” (under various senses of the terms ‘nov-
elty’, ‘surprise’, and ‘value’). Colton’s creativity tripod [9] argued for creativity involving
skill, imagination, and an appreciation of a chosen creative medium. Colton, Charnley, and
Pease’s later FACE model [10], on the other hand, defined conceptual creativity in terms
of creative concept invention, expression of the concept as an artifact, aesthetic evaluation
of the artifact, and the framing of the artifact to an audience. Finally, Jordanous’ Stan-
dardized Procedure for Evaluating Creative Systems (SPECS) methodology [11] described
a three-part methodology for evaluating creativity that provided fourteen common criteria
that were commonly associated with defining creativity ranging from originality to domain
competence and value. More detail about how these definitions contribute to computational
models for evaluating creativity can be found in section 2.4. For this dissertation, Boden’s
[8] product-based definition of creativity (mentioned above) is adapted and operationalized
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for the current context in the following definitions along with component terms such as
novelty, surprise, unexpectedness, value, and quality.
Definition 1.1.1 (Novelty) The aggregated difference between a percept or artifact and
other comparable experiences or artifacts that an agent has already experienced.
Definition 1.1.2 (Unexpectedness) The degree that an experience or artifact deviates from
the agent’s expectation for that experience or artifact.
Definition 1.1.3 (Surprise) An affective reaction to an experience or artifact caused by
the violation of confidently held expectations about that experience or artifact proportional
to the degree of experienced unexpectedness.
Definition 1.1.4 (Quality) The standard of an experience or artifact in comparison to
other comparable experiences according to specific, predetermined criteria used for as-
sessment.
Definition 1.1.5 (Value) The usefulness and quality of an experience (or artifact) to the
creator(s), consumer(s), embedding society or culture, and the contexts for the creation,
consumption, and gatekeeping of that experience (or artifact).
Definition 1.1.6 (Creativity) The creativity of an artifact is the weighted aggregation of its
novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as a measure of value) as
experienced by an evaluating agent in relation to its past experiences, current expectations,
and quality criteria.
The computational creativity research community has traditionally focused on the au-
tonomous generation of creative artifacts [12], in addition to their contributions towards
modeling creativity. Recently, there has been a rising interest in collaborative creativity or
co-creativity between human and machine [13]. Co-creativity is defined in this work with
a process-based perspective as follows (see more about different kinds of perspectives in
section 2.4).
4
Definition 1.1.7 (Co-creativity) The process by which two or more agents (human or com-
puter) collaborate within a creative domain in a variety of possible configurations and
collaborative roles to generate a creative artifact together.
Co-creative agents can assist, augment, direct, or otherwise relate to human creativity
by taking on a variety of roles in the creative collaboration. These roles can include creativ-
ity support tool [13], creative task worker [13], creative assistant [13], inspirational source
[13], nanny [14], coach [14], pen-pal [14], colleague [14], critic [15], task provider [16],
or instructor [16], task leader [16], task follower [16]. Newer co-creative agents can also
transition between different co-creative roles in the co-creative process depending on the
context over time (e.g. transitions between leader-follower roles in [17]).
Improvisation is a term that is used to refer to a broad spectrum of creative domains that
involve the production of creative outputs ‘in the moment’ to varying degrees. Berliner [18]
describes improvisation (in jazz) as “reworking pre-composed material and design in rela-
tion to unanticipated ideas conceived, shaped, and transformed under the special conditions
of performance, thereby adding unique features to every creation.” Pressing [19] describes
how the improvisational process proceeds with respect to a “formal schema or guiding im-
age” called the referent that serves as inspiration or constraining criteria throughout the
improvisational performance. According to Sawyer [20] the degree of guiding structure in
an improvised performance can vary drastically based on the performance domain, ranging
in complexity from improvisation that is “as basic as a performer’s elaboration or variation
of an existing framework a song, ritual prayer, or traditional story,” to those improvisational
performances where “the performers start without any advance framework and create the
entire work on stage.” However, across these two extremes of improvisational complexity,
the improvisational process highlights the impressive ability of a creative agent (human or
computer) to fluidly generate creative responses in near real-time within open-ended and
ill-defined problem domains.
Improvisational creativity necessarily operates using constrained cognitive and physical
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resources, under severe time constraints, over a potentially unbounded action space (i.e.,
an open-ended action space), and without a single (or small set of) well-defined goal(s)
to pursue at any given time (i.e., it has an ill-defined goal space). The improvisational
domains referred to or addressed in this dissertation are characteristically collaborative
(i.e. involving more than one improvising agent), open-ended (i.e. having a potentially
unbounded action space from which to select creative responses in near real-time), ill-
defined (i.e. lacking a clear set of well-specified goals to follow or objective functions to
optimize in order to select responses in near real-time), and performative (i.e. restricted to
creative domains where some set of agents is performing for an audience in near real-time).
Therefore, improvisation is defined within this work as follows.
Definition 1.1.8 (Improvisation) Improvisation is the process of collaboratively produc-
ing creative outputs in near real-time within open-ended, ill-defined creative performance
domains.
Improvisation has long been studied in human creative practice and creative process
[19, 21, 22, 23]. This has most often taken the form of observational studies of human
improvisers. Computational models of improvisational creativity have also been explored
for a small number of domains, including music [24], visual art [25], pretend play [3],
theater [26], and emergency response management [21].
Research in computational creativity, co-creativity, and improvisation have largely ig-
nored domains of embodied creativity such as dance, theater, mime, and pretend play [27]
(though notable exceptions exist). In addition to being artistically and creatively impor-
tant fields, it is a particularly opportune time to study embodied co-creativity with the easy
availability of cheap, high quality body sensing technology enabling reliable embodied in-
teraction and the mass-market adoption of VR technology highlighting the transformative
potential for embodied co-creativity in a wide range of extended reality (XR) applications.
This dissertation thus focuses on research into human-computer improvisation within do-
mains highlighting embodied co-creativity.
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1.2 Embodied Narrative Improvisation and Movement Improv
The human affinity for understanding the world and communicating ideas through narra-
tive is referred to as narrative intelligence (see [28, 29, 30]). As a central human faculty,
narrative has been defined in many ways according to various schools of thought over time.
Abbott [31] presents a minimal definition of narrative as, “the representation of an event or
a series of events.” Graesser, Hauft-Smith, Cohen, and Pyles [32] defines narrative as prose
that “delineates actions and events which causally unfold in time, e.g., stories and tales.”
Graesser, Singer, and Trabasso [33] add that narratives “involve people performing actions
in pursuit of goals, the occurrence of obstacles to goals, and emotional reactions to events.”
Lakoff and Johnson [34] detail the features that narratives commonly possess in their ‘Life
Is A Story’ metaphor, including participants (characters), parts (settings, episodes, states
etc.), stages (temporal sections of the story), linear sequences (temporal and/or causal rela-
tions between successive episodes and states), causation (causal relations between episodes
and states), and purpose (goals and plans). Following from these perspectives, narrative is
defined in this research using Prince’s [35] definition as follows.
Definition 1.2.1 (Narrative) The representation of at least two real or fictive events in a
time sequence, neither of which presupposes or entails the other.
Embodied narrative refers to the physical (or virtual) enactment of narrative grounded in
an agent’s embodied experience, constructed using its body within the physical (or virtual)
environment in which it is situated [36]. Some examples of embodied narrative include
reenacting a favorite movie, acting in the theater, playing certain virtual reality games, and
performing a dance interpreting a classic story. Disembodied narrative, on the other hand,
includes a text translation of the Epic of Gilgamesh in English or an autobiographical blog
post on the world wide web. Embodied narrative is defined in this work as follows.
Definition 1.2.2 (Embodied Narrative) A narrative that a physically (or virtually) em-
bodied agent constructs using the interaction modalities, constraints, and affordances of
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its physical (or virtual) body as well as interactions with its physical (or virtual) environ-
ment.
Embodied narrative improvisation encompasses a challenging class of improvisational
domains, such as long-form improvisational theater, live-action role-playing (LARP) games,
collaborative pretend play, and certain forms of improvisational dance. These activities in-
volve embodied narrative co-construction predominantly in real-time based on the current
improvisational context and the creative offers (opportunities for progressing the narrative)
being passed back and forth between improvisers. The complexity of the improvisational
task in a particular domain may be constrained by differing levels of structure arising from
the ‘rules’ or conventions of the domain. Embodied narrative improvisation is defined in
this work as follows.
Definition 1.2.3 (Embodied Narrative Improvisation) Embodied narrative co-construction
among multiple participants in near real-time by performing actions to advance the narra-
tive from an open-ended narrative action space and an ill-defined goal space.
The opportunity for embodied narrative improvisation to make a lasting impact has been
highlighted in recent years by the explosion of immersive VR for entertainment and indus-
trial applications. VR-focused applications, including VR games, productivity tools, and
training experiences, are a fast-growing segment of the digital entertainment [37], artistic
practice [38], as well as training and simulation industries [39, 40]. The embodied inter-
action in VR, such as walking and manipulating the virtual world using the body, strongly
supports a user’s ability to perform embodied narrative improvisation and adds to a user’s
immersion [41]. Users can physically mime flipping burgers [42] or scaling Mt. Everest
[43] to do so in-game. Naturalistic embodied interaction in VR, thus enforces the direct
correspondence between the movements performed by their body and the character’s ac-
tions in the virtual world increasing user presence [41].
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There is currently a jarring imbalance in the agency available to (and responsibility
placed on) the human collaborator in VR games and experiences at present. For example,
in the game Job Simulator [42], the user has extraordinary physical control of the world
using their body to flip burgers, stamp sales reports, and even play Minesweeper on a
computer. However, the other NPCs in the game are all floating computer heads with
disembodied hands that can float in predefined points and do the same actions the same
way each time. This is because a non-player character (NPC) in VR experiences is still
limited to using sets of pre-recorded animations (albeit cleverly blended in predetermined
ways) to move or act. In Job Simulator, the distinct lack of variation can be excused since
the other NPCs are presented as floating CRT monitors with disembodied hands, and their
robotic behavior is aesthetically appropriate. However, any VR game or experience that
aims to portray a behaviorally realistic (or behaviorally believable) human (or humanoid)
NPC needs to overcome this lack of character expressiveness and fully support open-ended
embodied interaction [44].
Open-world sandbox games in VR like [45, 46] or expressive interactive experiences
in embodied environments like [47, 48, 49] are usually solitary explorations of human cre-
ativity and expression or rely on human players to provide a sense of social gameplay. This
is because developing NPC AI for co-creativity and expression is vastly more complex than
doing so for task-oriented games with a fixed set of rules and clear rewards for following
them. The lack of clearly defined goals to perform at each point in these open-ended games
makes the experience of playing them more akin to an improvisational narrative than tra-
ditional narratives evolving from a fixed set of possible actions and ways that they can be
performed. Therefore, NPCs that could improvise in embodied environments could form
collaborative companions to players in open-world sandbox games and expressive interac-
tive experiences in embodied environments.
The grand challenge of creating a computational agent that can perform unconstrained
embodied narrative improvisation with people in a real-world creative domain would re-
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quire the agent to possess models of narrative intelligence, social cognition, common
sense reasoning, meta-communication, and many other cognitive faculties in addition to
vast amounts of knowledge about the creative domain and experience within it. Moving
along the path towards unconstrained human-agent embodied narrative improvisation, the
research in this dissertation continues from prior work on gestural proto-narrative (a se-
quence of temporally and aesthetically related actions executed by a set of actors [50])
and dance improvisation in the LuminAI installation [50, 2, 16] to investigate object-based
proto-narrative improvisational theater. Object-based proto-narrative improvisational the-
ater was chosen because of its emphasis on embodiment and environmental interaction.
Improvisation within this domain would also demonstrate success despite an increase both
in the complexity of the interaction modalities used for improvisation and in the degree
of narrative (as well as semantic) structure required for the domain, compared to prior
work in the LuminAI installation. Additionally, while unconstrained embodied narrative
improvisation could be performed through any of the body’s interaction modalities includ-
ing speech, gesture, non-verbal communication, environmental interactions, this research
is restricted to embodied improvisation using gesture and object-based interactions within
virtual environments in order to make the problem tractable (as in my prior work). These
restricted domains of embodied improvisation that are closely related to embodied narrative
improvisation and include domains from prior work as well as the main problem domain
for research in this dissertation are collectively referred to as movement improv.
Definition 1.2.4 (Movement Improv) The set of embodied improvisational domains that
are closely related to embodied narrative improvisation but are restricted to focus on full-
body gestural interaction between fellow improvisers as well as object-based interactions
within the environment they are situated in while requiring varying levels of improvisational
complexity in terms of narrative and semantic structure.
Movement improv forms a simplified set of embodied improvisational domains com-
pared to unconstrained embodied narrative improvisation. However, it encompasses a large
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number of creative domains and practices from the real-world such as improvisational
dance, prop-based improv theatre games, collaborative VR sandbox games, or pretend
play with toys. Human-agent movement improv is difficult for improvisational agents to
perform due to several inherent challenges. Prior work in human-agent movement improv
within the domains of pretend play [51] studied the problem of narrative improvisation with
non-experts. More recent work in gestural proto-narrative and improvisational dance within
the LuminAI installation [50, 2, 16] explored how to address the knowledge-authoring
bottleneck (the difficulty of acquiring expert knowledge followed by its subsequent repre-
sentation and storage to enable efficient future utilization) that restricted the pretend play
research to severely limited problem domains for improvisation. My prior research within
the LuminAI installation highlighted that a critical challenge for embodied improvisational
agents to perform human-agent movement improv is the improvisational action selection
problem.
1.2.1 The Improvisational Action Selection Problem
Embodied agents that are performing movement improv with people are required to pro-
duce a response in near real-time based on the current context of the unfolding improvised
performance. They face the challenge of selecting their response from an open-ended ac-
tion space in the presence of an ill-defined goal space to guide their action selection. In
order to work within the severe temporal constraints for action selection within improvisa-
tional domains, the agent could attempt to use stochastic or shallow reasoning. However,
this can easily result in generated agent behavior that is perceived as incoherent in the
long term [2, 16]. On the other hand, attempting to perform deep and complex reason-
ing in order to select an action can easily result in violating the temporal constraints of
the domain, leading to perceived decision paralysis from the agent. In both cases, the ab-
sence of well-defined goals to follow or objective functions to optimize for action selection
also adds to the risk of the selected actions not being meaningfully different or expressive
11
enough at different points in the improvised performance or across different performances.
Thus the agent is required to perform improvisational reasoning in order to select actions
while avoiding incoherent behavior, decision paralysis, and unexpressive responses. The
improvisational action selection problem is then defined as follows in this research.
Definition 1.2.5 (The Improvisational Action Selection Problem) The challenge of per-
forming action selection as an improvisational agent in near real-time from an open-ended
action space with an ill-defined goal space based on previous experience and the current
improvisational context in order to avoid incoherent behavior, decision paralysis, and un-
expressive responses.
The severity of the improvisational action selection problem is directly dependent on
the complexity of the improvisational task. Pressing [19] refers to this in musical impro-
visation as “a continuum of possibilities between the extreme hypothetical limits of ‘pure’
improvisation and ‘pure’ composition.” He also states that for human improvisers the two
theoretical extremes are “never obtained in live performance because no improviser (even
in ‘free’ improvisation) can avoid the use of previously learned material, and no re-creative
performer can avoid small variations specific to each occasion.” The complexity of im-
provisation directly affects the severity of the improvisational action selection problem
with ‘pure’ improvisation being the most challenging to address. For a severely reductive
example, the use of jazz standards reduces the improvisational complexity to the task of
improvising melodic variations based on these widely-known songs. On the other hand,
the task of improvising a long-form improvisational theater narrative consists of a much
more fundamental negotiation of the conventions for a performance in parallel with the im-
provisation of content within those negotiated conventions. The latter is, therefore, a more
complex improvisational task and faces a more severe form of the improvisational action
selection problem.
The complexity of the improvisational task and the severity of the improvisational ac-
tion selection problem vary inversely with the degree of formal structure or improvisational
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constraints present on that task. While not a perfect mapping, the degree of structure in
Pressing’s [19] concept of referent (an “underlying formal scheme or guiding image spe-
cific to a given piece” that is “used by the improviser to facilitate the generation and editing
of improvised behaviour”) is useful as a proxy to understand the degree of structure present
in a given improvisational task. The more rigid the productive mapping between referent
and generated or integrated content, the more tightly constrained and more structured the
improvisation. Pressing [19] also states conversely, that “if no referent is present, or if it
is devised in real-time,” the result is “/,‘free’ or ‘absolute’ improvisation.” This is a much
rarer improvisational form than the previous “referent-guided, or ‘relative’ improvisation”
and faces a much more severe improvisational action selection problem. For example,
comparing modern improv theater with the Commedia Dell’arte [52], there are clearer
constraints imposed on improvisation within Commedia Dell’arte due to the stereotypical
characters and high-level plot outlines than on modern improvisational actors, leading to a
greater severity of the improvisational action selection problem in modern improv theater
as a domain than the Commedia Dell’arte.
Various computational techniques have been used in the past for problem spaces where
it is not desirable (or even possible necessarily) to define/enumerate a set of goals for an
agent to follow. Some of these techniques include evolutionary algorithms and reinforce-
ment learning (along with its variations). For movement improv, however, by definition,
it is not possible to formalize the entire problem into a set of objective function(s) for
evolutionary approaches to optimize. Similarly, reinforcement learning (RL) [53] is not a
feasible solution either due to the lack of a well-specified reward function for movement
improv. A number of inverse RL [54] or imitation learning [55] variants from the RL re-
search space could potentially be used in this situation since they either learn a reward
function to optimize or directly learn a policy imitatively respectively from observing hu-
mans complete a task. However, due to the vast size of the action space for performing
movement improv and the sample inefficiency of these approaches, they cannot practically
13
be used at the moment.
1.3 Problem Domain
The research in this dissertation continues my investigation of improvisational agents for
embodied co-creativity in movement improv from prior work that focused on how agents
can improvise gestural proto-narrative or dance while attempting to address the knowledge-
authoring bottleneck involved [50, 2, 16]. The problem domain described in this disserta-
tion for studying the improvisational action selection problem shows an increase in im-
provisational complexity from my prior work in order to form a clear progression towards
unconstrained embodied narrative improvisation in the future.
1.3.1 Object-based Gestural Proto-narrative and The Props Game
Object-based gestural proto-narrative (a sequence of temporally and aesthetically related
actions executed by a set of actors [50] using the interaction modalities of gestural and
object-based interaction) within a virtual environment was explored as the movement im-
prov domain for this dissertation continuing from prior work in gestural proto-narrative
and improvisational dance [50, 2, 16]. This particular problem domain was chosen as an
advancement over that prior work in terms of both the degree of narrative (or action se-
mantics) involved and the interaction modalities for the agent to improvise with people.
The ‘rules’ of the domain were also structured enough to allow for the exploration of the
improvisational action selection problem.
The specific form of object interaction-based proto-narrative that was chosen for this
research was the Props Game from short-form improv theatre. The Props Game involves
improvised interactions between two or more participants using unfamiliar, ambiguous
props to perform recognizable comedic actions pretending the prop to be a familiar real-
world or fictional object. Therefore, in this research, the performance was taking place
between an embodied virtual agent and a human improviser using ambiguous props that
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were potentially unfamiliar to the agent. Beyond improv theater, this problem is useful
for embodied agents in general since it is the first step towards allowing them to gain new
knowledge about unfamiliar objects through interaction. For example, this could include
an agent learning to use unfamiliar objects in unfamiliar scenarios according to familiar
human norms/customs or using unfamiliar objects for a specific task, such as improvising
a digging tool for disaster recovery.
1.3.2 Movement Improv With Non-experts
Improvisation with non-experts was explicitly a design consideration in this research for
multiple reasons. Firstly, previous research [56] had indicated the reduced dissemination
impact of the improvisational experiences when restricting the experiences and activities
that were involved to a target population of experts in a niche domain. Secondly, expert
users tended to want to exert more control over the improvisational performance and in
co-creative interactions than non-experts did [13]. Thirdly, it was intended that designing
installations in public spaces for non-experts would democratize access to the installation
and encourage more diversity in the knowledge that was learned and eventually entered
the installation. Finally, it was also decided that non-expert data would be used to train
the agents in the installation in order to reduce participants’ social embarrassment about
improvising in public next to an intimidatingly expert improviser and lower the barrier for
entry to participate in the installation.
1.4 Improvisational Agents For Performing Movement Improv
Improvisational agents that are required to perform movement improv with non-experts
need to address the improvisational action selection problem (see section 1.2.1). Perhaps
improvisational agents can take inspiration (and generalize) from the different aesthetic
trajectories that are found to give guiding structure to various artistic and creative domains
such as dramatic arcs in narrative, arcs of rising or falling tension in music, and visual lines
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or movement in visual art in order to address the improvisational action selection prob-
lem and perform movement improv with non-experts. I hypothesize that improvisational
agents performing movement improv with non-experts using a form of intrinsically
motivated action selection called creative arc negotiation successfully address the im-
provisational action selection problem. Creative arc negotiation and related terms are
defined in this dissertation as follows.
Definition 1.4.1 (Creative Space) The multi-dimensional space of novelty, unexpected-
ness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as a measure of value) within which perceived
or generated action variants can be localized.
Definition 1.4.2 (Creative Arc) The desired temporal progression or target trajectory for
an agent’s selected actions within a creative space over the course of an improvised per-
formance.
Definition 1.4.3 (Creative Arc Negotiation) Interruptible, temporally constrained, search-
based action selection to best follow a given creative arc through the agent’s creative space
considering the current improvisational context and the agent’s previous experience.
Addressing the improvisational action selection problem entails by definition that the
agent can select actions in near real-time from an open-ended action space and an impro-
visational domain with an ill-defined goal space. This also implies that the improvisational
agent can successfully avoid decision paralysis, incoherent behavior, and unexpressive re-
sponses if it is able to follow the guiding structure of the given creative arc over the course
of the improvised performance. Therefore, I hypothesize that successfully addressing the
improvisational action selection problem using creative arc negotiation will increase
both participant and audience perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coher-
ence over the course of the improvised performance.
An improvisational agent performs creative arc negotiation by strategically searching
an action space during its turn and evaluating candidate action variants that are generated
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during the search to find the closest match to the next target point on the given creative
arc within the temporal constraints of its turn. Through the research in this dissertation, I
explore how improvisational agents can operationalize the creative arc negotiation process
using the following components.
• A parameterizable action variant generator from the agent’s action space.
• A set of improvisational reasoning strategies for guiding the agent’s action space
search based on previous experience as well as the current improvisational context.
• A set of computational models for evaluating the creativity of perceived or generated
action variants in terms of their novelty, unexpectedness, and quality.
An improvisational agent that aims to perform movement improv with non-experts us-
ing creative arc negotiation needs to be able to generate action variants from the agent’s ac-
tion space based on a given set of parameters. In the object-based gestural proto-narrative
domain described in this dissertation, the physical attributes of objects that are provided to
the agent to use for improvising actions form a useful set of parameters to conditionally
constrain the action variant generation in addition to other search parameters. A compu-
tational model that learns a mapping between the physical attributes of objects and the set
of possible actions with those objects enables the agent to generate action variants that can
serve as candidate actions for the agent to use as its responses. Such a model implements
an acquired relation between the agent’s learned action space, the physical object attributes
that the agent has experienced, and the embodied capabilities of the agent. Therefore, it
forms a model of affordance-based action variant generation according to Şahin, Çakmak,
Doğar, Uğur, and Üçoluk [57]’s definition of affordance (see sections 2.3.1 and 3.3.4 for
more detail). This work explores how affordance-based action variant generation en-
ables the agent to perform parameterized action variant generation from a learned
action space as a part of creative arc negotiation.
17
Creative arc negotiation requires the agent to search its creative space to find the clos-
est candidate response to the next target point on the given creative arc in near real-time.
Human improvisers have been known to use various reasoning strategies for generating
responses in near real-time based on their previous experience and the current improvisa-
tional context across various forms of improvisation [19, 58]. Computational formaliza-
tions of these improvisational reasoning strategies have been used in prior work to enable
the agent to respond to humans with potentially valid actions even when it has not learned
the constraints or ‘rules’ of the domain [50]. This research examines how improvisational
reasoning strategies formalized from human improvisers and extended from prior
work enable the agent to search its action space based on its previous experience and
the current improvisational context while performing creative arc negotiation.
Creative arc negotiation requires the improvisational agent to computationally evaluate
the creativity of action variants that it generates as possible responses to its partner as well
as the human improviser’s actions that it perceives. The agent evaluates these actions in
terms of their novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as a measure
of value). This dissertation studies how computational models of novelty, unexpected-
ness, and quality enable the agent to evaluate the creativity of perceived and generated
actions in near real-time for performing creative arc negotiation.
1.5 Thesis Statement
This dissertation synthesizes the hypotheses described above and presents an investigation
of the following thesis statement.
Embodied agents that address the improvisational action selection problem us-
ing ‘creative arc negotiation’ increase perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativ-
ity, and coherence in both observers and participants while performing move-
ment improv with non-experts.
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1.6 Research Questions
The avenues of inquiry presented by the thesis statement above were pursued through the
following research questions (RQ).
RQ1 How can an agent perform parameterized action variant generation from a
learned action space based on the physical attributes of a given object?
RQ2 How can an agent improvisationally search its action space based on previous
experience and the current improvisational context?
RQ3 How can an improvisational agent computationally evaluate the creativity of
perceived or generated actions in near real-time in terms of their novelty, unex-
pectedness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as a measure of value)?
RQ4 How can an embodied agent select actions to negotiate a given creative arc in
order to address the improvisational action selection problem while performing
movement improv with non-experts?
RQ5 How does addressing the improvisational action selection problem while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts affect both observer and partici-
pant perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence?
The research in this dissertation investigating the guiding research questions (RQ) is
outlined below as a set of objectives (O) for exploring each research question, methods
(M) used to achieve the objectives and measurable outcomes (MO) from the research in the
following list.
RQ1 How can an agent perform parameterized action variant generation from a
learned action space based on the physical attributes of a given object?
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O1.1 To create a computational model of parameterized action variant generation
from a learned action space, conditioned on the physical attributes of objects
(affordance-based action variant generation).
∗ Methods
M1.1.1 Explore the use of conditional variational autoencoders and latent space
sampling for affordance-based action variant generation.
M1.1.2 Validate the model of affordance-based action variant generation.
∗ Measurable Outcomes
MO1.1.1 A validated model of affordance-based action variant generation from
a learned action space.
RQ2 How can an agent improvisationally search its action space based on previous
experience and the current improvisational context?
O2.1 To formalize procedural reasoning strategies adapted from human improvisa-
tion practices across domains in order to guide the agents action selection in
open-ended action spaces with ill-defined goals using previous experience and
the current improvisational context.
∗ Methods
M2.1.1 Explore the use of procedural strategies for latent space search within
a conditional variational autoencoder model to formalize improvisa-
tional response strategies from human improvisers and search the agent’s
learned action space using previous experience and the current impro-
visational context.
M2.1.2 Evaluate the agent can perform improvisational action selection in open-




MO2.1.1 Validated formalization of improvisational response strategies that heuris-
tically guide the agents action selection in open-ended action spaces
with ill-defined goals using previous experience and the current im-
provisational context.
RQ3 How can an improvisational agent computationally evaluate the creativity of
perceived or generated actions in near real-time in terms of their novelty, unex-
pectedness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as a measure of value)?
O3.1 To create a computational model for evaluating the novelty, unexpectedness,
and quality of perceived human actions and generated agent actions.
∗ Methods
M3.1.1 Explore the use of content-based mean distance to evaluate the gestural
and semantic novelty of perceived or generated actions.
M3.1.2 Explore the use of Bayesian Surprise [59] and distance from expected
outcome [60] to evaluate the gestural and semantic unexpectedness of
perceived or generated actions given the physical attributes of the ob-
ject being used to enact them.
M3.1.3 Explore the use of heuristic functions to evaluate the quality of per-
ceived or generated actions in terms of their smoothness and recogniz-
ability.
M3.1.4 Evaluate whether the models for evaluating the novelty, unexpected-
ness, and quality of perceived and generated actions match human per-
ceptions of these qualities.
∗ Measurable Outcomes
MO3.1.1 Validated computational model for evaluation of novelty for human
and agent actions.
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MO3.1.2 Validated computational model for evaluation of unexpectedness for
human and agent actions.
MO3.1.3 A validated computational model for evaluation of quality in terms of
the smoothness and recognizability of the gesture
RQ4 How can an embodied agent select actions to negotiate a given creative arc in
order to address the improvisational action selection problem while performing
movement improv with non-experts?
O4.1 To create an embodied agent architecture that enables an agent to negotiate a
given creative arc while performing movement improv with non-experts.
∗ Methods
M4.1.1 Explore the use of parameterized action variant generation, formaliza-
tion of improvisational response strategies, and creativity evaluation
models to enable an agent to negotiate a given creative arc while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts.
M4.1.2 Evaluate whether the embodied agent architecture enables an agent to
negotiate a given creative arc while performing movement improv.
∗ Measurable Outcomes
MO4.1.1 A validated embodied agent architecture that enables an agent to ne-
gotiate a given creative arc while performing movement improv with
non-experts.
RQ5 How does addressing the improvisational action selection problem while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts affect both observer and partici-
pant perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence?
O5.1 To evaluate how an embodied agent that can negotiate a creative arc while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts affects user and observer percep-
22
tions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence.
∗ Methods
M5.1.1 Evaluate how participant and observer perceptions of enjoyment, agent
creativity, and coherence are affected when improvising with a creative
arc negotiating embodied agent within an interactive installation for
performing movement improv with non-experts.
∗ Measurable Outcomes
MO5.1.1 Validated results on how an embodied agent that can negotiate a cre-
ative arc while performing movement improv with non-experts affects
participant and observer perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity,
and coherence.
1.7 Contributions
The contributions of the research in this dissertation are as follows.
• A model of affordance-based action variant generation for conditionally searching
the agents learned action space based on a given objects physical attributes.
• A formalized set of improvisational reasoning strategies for guiding an agents action
space search based on previous experience and the current improvisational context.
• Computational models for evaluating the creativity of perceived and generated action
variants in terms of their novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and
quality (as a measure of value).
• A model of creative arc negotiation for improvisational action selection while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts that increases participant and observer
perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence.
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• A publicly disseminated and validated interactive installation where embodied agents
can perform movement improv with non-experts.
The remainder of this dissertation continues by detailing related work that contextual-
izes the research conducted and the claims made in this dissertation. The dissertation then
describes the improvisational action selection problem and how it is studied within the
Props game domain through the Robot Improv Circus VR installation and the CARNIVAL
agent architecture. The chapter continues to discuss the problem studied, the framework
for addressing it in relation to my thesis statement, the technical approach taken to address
the problem, various evaluation experiments for understanding the degree to which the so-
lution addressed the claims in my thesis statement, and a further discussion to highlight ad-
ditional insights from the system building and evaluation process. Finally, the dissertation
concludes with a chapter that reiterates the contributions of the research in this dissertation
and provides a quick sketch of future directions for this work as it relates to the problem of




2.1 Creativity Research and Computational Creativity
Formal studies of creativity have focused on different aspects of the phenomenon. Some
researchers have studied creativity from a domain-independent perspective considering the
psychometrics of creativity [61], characterizations of creative personalities [62], analyses
of creative environments [63], case studies of creative process [64], and experimental enu-
meration of the cognitive processes involved in creative cognition [65]. Others have studied
creativity observing the processes that practitioners in specific creative domains actually
follow to produce creative artifacts. These include studies of artistic or expressive domains
like music [66], visual art [67], and storytelling [68] as well as other creative domains such
as design [69], insight problem solving [70], and scientific invention [71].
The fields of artificial intelligence and machine learning have, more recently, given
creativity researchers the tools and techniques to computationally model creativity. These
have included computational systems that either attempted to emulate human creative cog-
nition or to use uniquely computational processes for performing creative tasks. Some ex-
amples include MEXICA [72] system that used a cognitive model of human composition
(originally from creative writing) called engagement-reflection (ER) to generate stories, the
COLIBRI [73] system that used a case-based reasoning (CBR) [74] approach to generate
poetry, and the Painting Fool [75] artificial visual artist system that used several models of
visual art and visual creativity to generate paintings.
My research into improvisational agents for embodied co-creativity is situated within
this field of computational creativity. Computational creativity research involves the “phi-
losophy, science and engineering of computational systems which, by taking on particular
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responsibilities, exhibit behaviors that unbiased observers would deem to be creative” [76].
Computationally creative systems include the Angelina system for automatically generat-
ing video games [77], The Painting Fool system for generating visual art [75], IDyOM
for music generation [78], and COLIBRI for poetry generation [73]. This traditional def-
inition has been expanded over the years, bringing related areas of research into the fold.
A relatively recent area of interest within the computational creativity community is in
computational systems that perform co-creation and co-creativity alongside human collab-
orators.
2.1.1 Computationally Co-creative Systems
Co-creativity (or collaborative creativity) refers to creative processes where there is active
participation from two or more collaborators at a high-level [79]. Additional criteria can be
applied to this definition such as the need for synchronous participation and collaborative
emergence [80], the relative balance of creative agency and responsibility [2], or various
creative roles for the collaborators in the co-creative process [14, 16, 17]. Some authors
have also identified co-creation as a more general process that reduces the creative respon-
sibility of the computational agent involved in the collaboration [13]. Some examples of
co-creative or co-creational agents in the literature include collaborative sketching agents
[25, 81], collaborative game design agents [82, 83, 84, 85], creative writing or storytelling
[86, 87, 88, 89, 90], and dance or choreography [91, 92, 93, 94, 95]. The vast majority of
existing co-creative agents in the literature are disembodied agents that users interact with
through software user interfaces. In contrast, this dissertation focuses on understanding
how to build co-creative agents specifically for embodied improvisational domains such
as gestural proto-narrative, dance, and object-based gestural proto-narrative improvisation.
Additionally, the research presented in this dissertation contributes to co-creative agents
that possess equal creative agency and responsibility during the co-creative process.
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2.1.2 Improvisational Systems
Improvisational agents demonstrate near real-time co-creativity or co-creation in open-
ended, ill-defined domains. A limit set of previous improvisational systems can be found
in the domains of musical improvisation [96, 97, 98, 99], emergency response management
[100], improvisational theater [101, 56, 26, 102, 103], collaborative visual art [104], dance
[105], and improvisational storytelling [106]. In contrast to the relatively simplistic for-
mulaic improvisation strategies used in the majority of music improvisation systems, the
systems presented in this work can learn domain-specific improvisational patterns directly
from the users actions as well as use formalizations of general-purpose improvisational re-
sponse strategies to act within regions of decision space where it has no prior experience.
The emergency response decision support [100], Three Line Scene [26], and Party Quirks
systems [56] were designed as cognitive models of the improvisational process. However,
they maintain a static repository of encoded expert knowledge to use, and thus can only
be used in significantly limited versions of the open-ended domains in which they were
designed to improvise. They would also suffer from the improvisational action selection
problem if their domains were expanded to be realistically open-ended. The proposed re-
search aims to overcome this shortcoming in current approaches by having the system use
creative arc negotiation to mitigate the improvisational action selection problem. Newer
improvisational systems such as [104, 103, 106] offer exciting directions for addressing
the improvisational action selection problem. However, all three systems fail to evaluate
the creativity of their responses/offers before producing them, leading to reduced creative
agency and more creative responsibility placed on their human collaborators for incorpo-
rating the system’s outputs into the improvised performance.
27
2.2 Learning and Generating Actions For Movement Improv
The improvisational agents presented in this dissertation perform generative exploration of
actions learned from demonstration in order for the agent to perform action space search
while selecting actions improvisationally. The embodied knowledge that agents must learn
in order to be able to respond successfully and expressively to human improvisational part-
ners within movement improv varies based on the particular performance domain but could
include 1) the set of gestures that can possibly be performed in the domain; 2) seman-
tic knowledge about what the gestures ‘mean’, portray, or cause within the domain that is
grounded in the agent’s experience; 3) the set of causal, temporal, and aesthetic constraints,
policies, patterns, or rules that in the agent’s experience, allow it to sequence together the
actions it knows about; and 4) other conceptual or procedural knowledge about its envi-
ronment, performance, or other agents within the domain that it learns over time. The
embodied agents presented (or referred to in prior work) in this research learn a subset of
this knowledge to different degrees from their human collaborators with the iterative ap-
plication of action learning from demonstration after every performance is completed (see
section 3.3.4).
2.2.1 Learning from Demonstration (LfD) and Imitation Learning
Imitation learning and learning from demonstration (LfD) are both forms of observational
learning. There are sometimes used interchangeably in the robotics and human-robot in-
teraction (HRI) literature [107, 108]. The two terms can refer to different techniques for
observational learning in the reinforcement learning (RL) community [53] however. In the
latter context, LfD includes techniques like inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) where the
reward function is learned from demonstration, and regular RL is used to learn a policy
for optimizing that learned reward function [54], while imitation is restricted to techniques
like behavioral cloning that learn both actions and policies from demonstration [55]. LfD
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research in HRI includes learning compound action models from demonstration by learn-
ing the sequencing and structure of primitive actions that make up a compound action
commonly using Gaussian mixture models, support vector machines, or hidden Markov
models [107, 108]. Other research in this area focuses on the learning of task networks that
encode a graph-based representation of the sequence of primitive actions and higher-level
combinations of these primitive actions [109]. A recent approach also presents case-based
imitation learning for transferring learned skills to new contexts [110]. LfD and imita-
tion learning in both HRI and RL contexts are usually applied to heavily constrained and
well-specified tasks due to their sample inefficiency and the necessity for providing enough
demonstrations to cover the decision space. In contrast, the improvisational agents pre-
sented in this dissertation operate within open-ended, ill-defined problem domains where
the lack of a well-specified reward function and the size of the action space make the pre-
ceding techniques difficult to apply.
2.2.2 Generation of Action Variants
The improvisational agents presented in this dissertation directly learn an explorable latent
action space from a set of demonstrations. Research in gesture generation has explored
related questions to this approach, where gestures are synthesized using different tech-
niques. Older systems explored this problem used statistical sequencing of primitive gestu-
ral components, while more recent research has used direct synthesis using neural network
approaches.
Gesture synthesis systems in disciplines such as choreography synthesis, robotics, and
embodied conversational agents, try to create parameterized, natural, and expressive ges-
tures by following a similar pipeline: input to gesture planner, selection by a statistical
model, and modification by final component [111]. Generative choreography systems such
as Ikeuchi [112] and Ofli, Erzin, Yemez, and Tekalp [113] used segmented music measures
as a conditioning input to their generative choreography systems. The most statistically
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likely candidate dance segments from a pre-authored database were then chosen based on
the music inputs and combined to create smooth transitions. Embodied conversational
agents create gestures from speech, text, or video clips. Mancini and Castellano [114] used
video tracking and analysis to create an agent capable of mimicking detected expressivity.
Kipp, Neff, Kipp, and Albrecht [115] focused on creating natural gestures in virtual agents
by using g-units to create continuous flowing movements from gesture segments. Previous
models of gestural creativity have been successful in mimicking tasks, but a deep genera-
tive model was chosen for action variant generation in the latter part of this work instead of
a traditional statistical model because of the open-ended action space in the domain.
Gesture synthesis has made significant advances through deep generative models such
as Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) and Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). They
have proven to be particularly useful for generating novel gestures and choreography with
minimal feature engineering by hand. Augello, Cipolla, Infantino, Manfré, Pilato, and Vella
[116] employed a vanilla VAE trained on a data set of human dance movements to generate
robot dance movements. Similar work by Kiasari, Moirangthem, and Lee [117] focused on
combining VAEs and GANs to produce sequences of stylized actions. Their model utilized
latent variables from the autoencoder as input to the GAN’s discriminator network, while
the input to the GAN’s generator network was conditioned using action labels and initial
poses of the generated action sequences. The architecture presented in this work also seeks
to control the mode of the generated data through conditioning but adds conditioning both
at input and latent space sampling stages since we draw inference directly from the latent
space (see section 3.4.3).
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), notably Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) net-
works, have also commonly been used for sequential motion generation. Researchers have
exploited the hidden Markov model process underlying motion and choreography by using
RNN models that combine distributed hidden states and non-linear dynamics. The results
are evident in choreographic support [118, 119] and motion synthesis [120, 121]. The
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approach presented in this work extends previous work by conditioning RNN-based gen-
erative models for gesture synthesis and preserving local/regional coherence by grouping
multiple poses within temporal proximity.
2.3 Computational Formalizations of Tacit Knowledge
Improvisational practitioners rely on tacit knowledge of many kinds in order to successfully
improvise performances in near real-time. These can include tacit knowledge in the forms
of learned conceptual systems, frameworks, and vocabularies from within the domain for
conceptualizing or reasoning about different aspects of the performance during the improvi-
sation; learned constraints and rules specific to the performance company/troupe or within
the improv theater game/activity being played/performed; and learned procedural knowl-
edge about how to act in various situations, including procedural strategies for improvising
in uncharted performance territory. This section describes formalizations of tacit knowl-
edge that are implemented as procedurally encoded mappings and procedural strategies
so that they can be applied across many different contexts rather than just being additional
expert knowledge that needs to be repeatedly authored for every new improvisational agent.
2.3.1 Affordance Domain Knowledge
The research presented in this dissertation on improvisational agents for object-based ges-
tural proto-narrative improvisation relies on the formalization of a learned procedurally en-
coded mapping between physical object attributes and the action variants within an agent’s
learned action space. This enables the agent’s local action space exploration to be con-
strained to regions of the global action space that are ‘afforded’ by the physical attributes
of that object. This section examines definitions of affordance and how they might apply
to the current context.
The concept of affordances was first introduced by Gibson in his seminal work on eco-
logical psychology [122, 123]. Over time, the term was adopted and adapted by designers
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[124] and roboticists [125], among others (for a survey of perspectives on affordances, see
[126]). The resulting blurring and adaptation of the meaning of the term ‘affordance’ have
tailored the definition of the term to the needs of the individual field within which it is used.
The term was originally defined by Gibson in [122] as follows. “When the constant
properties of constant object are perceived (the shape, size, color, texture, composition,
motion, animation, and position relative to other objects), the observer can go on to detect
their affordances.” He elaborated on the meaning of the term in later writing [123] by stat-
ing that the “affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides
or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the
noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the
environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complemen-
tarity of the animal and the environment.” In this most commonly referenced description of
Gibson concept of affordances, the relationship between animal and object/environment is
clearer than his initial definition. Additionally, Gibson also specified the process by which
affordances are perceived and utilized. An agent perceives an object’s affordances by di-
rectly perceiving and recognizing its perceptual invariants to mean the presence or absence
in that object of a particular affordance that enables it to perform the specific action corre-
sponding to that affordance with that object, i.e., it enables the agent to use that object in
that particular way. This means that the set of affordances are fixed for every object and
are represented as binary presence-absence values for any particular action (of which there
may be many thousands of actions).
Perspectives from other fields have also been useful for comparison with (and usage
within) this work. Norman [124] provided a modified description of affordances as the
relationship between the agent interacting with an object in its environment and the per-
ceived actions that could be done with that object. In Norman [124]’s own words, “affor-
dance refers to the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily those fundamental
properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used.” This focuses on the
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perception of the afforded actions in addition to the absolute affordances that are function-
ally available to the interacting agent regardless of the plausibility of discovery or usage.
He later termed this ‘perceived affordance’ to distinguish it from Gibson’s [123] usage of
the term. Norman did eventually come to regret the casual eliding of both terms in field
of design community and stated that, “[w]hen I get around to revising POET [[124]], I
will make a global change, replacing all instances of the word ‘affordance’ with the phrase
‘perceived affordance’.”
Adapting later perspectives from ecological psychology from both Stoffregen [127],
who stated that affordances are “properties of the animal-environment system” and that
“they are emergent properties that do not inhere in either the environment or the animal”,
and Chemero [128], who stated that affordances are “relations between the abilities of
organisms and features of the environment”, Şahin, Çakmak, Doğar, Uğur, and Üçoluk [57]
defined affordances as follows. “An affordance is an acquired relation between a certain
effect and a (entity, behavior) tuple, such that when the agent applies the behavior on the
entity, the effect is generated.” Comparing this definition to previous definitions, the entity
refers to the object and its properties, the behavior refers to the embodied capabilities of the
agent that interacts with the entity, and the effect describes the outcome of some kind from
performing an action on/with that entity. It is important to note that the relation between
the effect and the entity-behavior tuple is not intrinsic, but acquired somehow, whether
through previous interaction, explicit design, or some other process. This differentiates it
significantly from Gibson’s [123] original notion of affordances being part of the intrinsic
nature of an object within the agent’s environment. This definition, in combination with
Norman’s [124] earlier definition form the basis for the usage of the term ‘affordance’ in
this work.
The concept of affordance in my work (defined in my research as “a learned tacit proce-
dural mapping between the physical attributes of an object in the agent’s environment and
that agent’s learned action space that partitions and controls access to that agent’s action
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space.”) applies to an embodied agent situated within its environment alongside objects
with which it has the embodied ability to interact. Affordance, in this context, is defined as
a tacit learned mapping that is procedurally encoded between the physical attributes of an
object in the agent’s environment and that agent’s learned action space that partitions and
controls access to that agent’s action space. This represents a relational mapping between
the entity (i.e., the physical attributes of the object), its embodied capabilities, and the set
of actions possible, similar to Şahin, Çakmak, Doğar, Uğur, and Üçoluk’s [57] definition
of affordances. However, since the agent’s improvised actions are pantomimed, an action’s
effects are not physical but represented in terms of the agent’s interpretation of what is
being portrayed (or signified). The mapping, in turn, makes certain regions of the agent’s
action space (i.e., certain actions) more or less difficult to generate from (or even consider).
In this way, it forms a hybrid interpolation between the absolute affordances (possible or
impossible actions) that Gibson [123] describes and the perceived affordances (more or less
easily perceived actions) that Norman [124] describes.
2.3.2 Procedural Improvisation Knowledge
Many tacit or learned genre conventions, structural rules, and procedural strategies exist
in improv theater to facilitate successfully coherent and entertaining improvised perfor-
mances from the performers despite the severity of the improvisational action selection
problem for the ground-up embodied narrative improvisation seen in improvisational the-
ater. For example, in long-form improv theater where improvised performances can rival
the duration of a rehearsed play, there might be structural rules that improvisers have de-
cided on beforehand such as fixed sequences for starting and ending scenes from multiple
subplots as well as how to move between the parallel scenes from multiple subplots. This
preserves the vastly open-ended and massively ill-defined nature of the long-form improv
theater problem domain but provides some degree of constructive constraints for the impro-
visational process. Similarly, other improvisational art forms have their own conventions
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and structures that facilitate coherent improvisation. The degree of structure can vary sig-
nificantly, however, from trading solos for a fixed number of measures over a jazz standard
to free jazz improvisation with far fewer constraints or the diversity in the degree of con-
straints between short-form and long-form improv theater. The following section presents
examples of practice-based and computational formalizations of tacit procedural strategies
from improv theater for constructing improvised narratives that are complementary to the
improvisational response strategies and creative arc negotiation process presented in this
dissertation.
Improvisational Conventions In Improv Theater
Conventions for improv theater include fundamental rules like, ‘Yes, and...’ which ensures
that performers constructively build on top of creative offers from other players without
stalling or halting the momentum of a scene, not being too clever when adding offers to
the scene in order to support other performers’ ability to react realistically to your offers,
or respecting the bounds, physical reality, and constraints of an imaginary setting that has
already been established by another performer [129]. Other conventions for certain kinds
of narrative-driven improv theater act as high-level procedural strategies for prescriptively
guiding action selection during the improvised performance (at least) at the high-level de-
scription of a practice-based framework. For example, Johnstone [130] describes the con-
vention of establishing a platform (i.e. what is the setting for a scene, who are the characters
in it, and what activity are they engaged in) as early as possible, then focusing on adding
conflict to give the scene purpose, and then repeatedly acting together to create and resolve
lesser conflicts or tilting the platform that has been established by adding new elements that
reinterpret the scene and create a new narrative direction to explore for the group.
An alternative to Johnstone’s high-level framework is the widely used practice-based
framework from the Upright Citizen’s Brigade (UCB) [131] involves finding the game of
the scene after establishing the platform and then navigating the remainder of the scene
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using three kinds of ‘improvisational moves’ — raising the stakes, exploration, and top of
intelligence responses [132]. In this framework, raising the stakes involves performing ac-
tions that add conflict, drama, or some form of narrative incoherence that has to be resolved
imminently. Exploration actions are those that justify some incoherence in the scene that
arose from a previously performed raising the stakes action. Finally, top of intelligence
actions are those that would form an established character’s natural reactions to unusual or
incoherent situations. According to this prescriptive framework, once the game of the scene
has started, actions have to repeatedly raise the stakes, cause top of intelligence responses
from other characters present, and then cause the unusual situation to be resolved or jus-
tified to some degree using exploration responses by one or more of the other characters
until the scene ends with enough of a resolution of the raised stakes.
Improvisers also have to collaboratively construct a shared fictional reality in real-time,
fluidly navigating ambiguity. Therefore, there are also tacit improvisational conventions
around resolving ambiguity without halting the performance and the construction process.
These conventions can be seen in various knowledge disparity games from short-form im-
prov theater such as Party Quirks, where improvisers arrive as guests, one by one, at a
host’s improvised party with a quirk that is only known to themselves and the audience.
The host is required to subtly investigate each guest’s quirk and equally subtly guess what
their quirk is without halting the improvised party or breaking character. The improvisers
who act as guests gradually reveal increasingly obvious clues about their quirks until the
host guesses correctly, but timed to provide the audience with a satisfyingly long time be-
ing the only ones (aside from the guest with the quirk) who know what the quirk is and
understand the references or inside jokes pointing to that fact.
Improvisers use tacit procedural strategies and conventions even in straightforward sit-
uations like platform establishment, where ambiguity needs to be resolved as quickly as
possible for the scene to proceed where an improviser A who is miming actions to con-
vey that they are raking leaves outside their house might be understood by improviser B
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to be sweeping the floor inside a cafe, there are clear conventions for navigating around
each performer’s beliefs about the ongoing improvisation. These strategies involve com-
municating what one improviser believes to be happening through actions related to the
content of the scene, monitoring the other improviser’s reactions to see if they are correct
in their original beliefs, correcting misunderstandings using a set of repair strategies, and
then covertly communicating that they (or the other improviser) have changed their beliefs
to best support the scene moving forward. This tacit shared mental model negotiation pro-
cess [133] is performed by experienced improvisers using procedural strategies so as to
fluidly navigate the ambiguity of a shared fiction that is being simultaneously explored and
constructed collaboratively while hiding the nature of the resulting cognitive divergences
from the audience observing this negotiation process.
Computer Models of Improvisational Conventions In Improv Theater
Several procedural strategies and improvisational conventions have been modeled com-
putationally in the literature by taking inspiration from the various practice-based frame-
works as well as by studying how improvisers actually perform improv in laboratory ex-
periments. O’Neill, Piplica, Fuller, and Magerko [26] describe a computational model for
establishing the platform in a short form improv theater game called Three Line Scene.
Brisson, Magerko, Brian, and Paiva, Ana [134] describe a computational model for finding
the tilt and exploiting it for adding progression to a scene being improvised. Though not
strictly from the domain of improv theater, Davis, Comerford, Hsiao, Jacob, and Magerko
[3] present the (partly computationally-implemented, partly conceptual) enactive model of
playing pretend (which can perhaps be understood as a less structured or stylized form of
everyday non-expert improvised narrative in comparison to improv theater). Davis, Com-
erford, Hsiao, Jacob, and Magerko’s particular model presents a marked similarity to the
UCB framework for finding the game of the scene. Magerko, Dohogne, and DeLeon [101]
described the improvisational strategies for navigating knowledge disparity games in the
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Party Quirks short form improv theater game and Hodhod, Piplica, and Magerko [135]
described an architecture for formally modelling the shared mental model negotiation pro-
cess in improv theater games. Additionally, Martin, Harrison, and Riedl [106] proposed
a system for open-world improvisation using plot graphs that included a set of strategies
for handling user actions as they were classified under constituent, consistent, and excep-
tional branches as a way to perform disembodied improv theater in the context of text-based
narrative improvisation.
The preceding computational models of procedural strategies for navigating various
components of the narrative improvisation task in improv theater heavily rely on rich, pre-
authored domain knowledge in order to function effectively. They are severely impacted
by the limitations of content authoring and need to address that problem before they can be
used to address the improvisational action selection problem. Martin, Harrison, and Riedl
[106] use plot graph learning from crowdsourced knowledge to avoid this problem in their
text-based improv domain. However, the problem remains challenging to address when
working with embodied content knowledge to enact the crowdsourced natural language
knowledge. As the semantic complexity and formal structure of the knowledge learned by
improvisational agents such as the ones presented in this dissertation increase to the point
where they can be used by these models, the approaches presented above would greatly
help to add structure and constraints to the ill-defined nature of the improv theater do-
main. Therefore, they remain complementary to the domain-independent improvisational
response strategies and the creative arc negotiation process presented in this dissertation.
2.4 Computational Models for Evaluating Creativity
There have historically been a large number of theories, models, and definitions for under-
standing (and subsequently evaluating) creativity from diverse research fields ranging from
media and cultural studies to psychology and cognitive science to artificial intelligence and
computational creativity. One way to organize this set of parallel ideas usefully is to use the
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4P taxonomy from Rhodes [136] that was later introduced to the field of computational cre-
ativity by Jordanous [137]. The 4P taxonomy organizes theories, models, and definitions
of creativity into the four categories of person or producer, product, process, and press.
Models of creativity that deal with person or producer focus on intrinsic characteristics that
make that person or producer creative (e.g., psychometrics for creativity [61, 138] or case
studies of creative people [139]). Product models focus on the creative artifact produced as
a part or result of creativity, while process models focus on modeling the creative process
itself. Press models focus on how the creative person/producer, process, or product affects
the culture, environment, or society within which it exists.
Several perspectives on creativity evaluation also deal with multiple aspects of the 4P
taxonomy simultaneously (e.g. Colton, Jordanous, Colton, Charnley, and Pease). Colton’s
creativity tripod [9] argues for evaluating a computationally creative system on the basis of
its skill, imagination, and appreciation of the creative medium seems on the surface to be a
producer/person model of creativity evaluation by the traits or characteristics of the system.
However, this work is intended in a way that addresses both person/producer and press
models of creativity evaluation.Jordanous’ Standardized Procedure for Evaluating Creative
Systems (SPECS) methodology [11] describes 14 criteria obtained through the analysis of
creativity research corpora that are suggested for use by researchers in creating their own
working definitions of creativity in order to rigorously evaluate the creativity of their system
according to that specific working definition. Colton, Charnley, and Pease’s FACE model
[10] evaluates computational creativity systems for creative concept invention, expression
of the concept as an artifact, aesthetic evaluation of the artifact, and the framing of the
artifact to the public.
The research presented in this dissertation uses a product definition of creativity (see
section 1.1), especially as part of the agent’s creativity evaluation models that are opera-
tionalized in this work (see section 3.3.6). However, the discussions of improvisation as a
process (see section 2.3.2), as well as the process of creative arc negotiation described in
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this work (see section 3.3.3), focus on process-based aspects of creativity. Therefore, this
section focuses on the process and product perspectives on creativity and will ignore the
person/producer and press perspectives. A part of the evaluation sections for the interactive
installation (see section 3.5) presented in the dissertation references press-based measures
of creativity, so the press perspective will be referenced as needed in context. For more
detail on all four categories, a detailed survey of models for evaluating creativity and how
they impact the methodology of computational creativity research can be seen in Lamb,
Brown, and Clarke [140].
2.4.1 Product Models of Creativity
Product models of creativity focus on the different potential qualities of an artifact that
enable it to be called creative to some degree. The most famous of these models is Bo-
den’s [8] model of creativity for artifacts that considers an artifact creative if it possesses
various kinds of novelty and value while evoking surprise in an experiencing entity. This
conceptual model was operationalized by Maher [141] to measure the novelty, surprise,
and value for artifacts resulting from design creativity. Ritchie [142] provide a parallel
evaluation framework for creative artifacts that features the additional criteria of typicality
(or conformity) to the expectations for artifacts in a domain. This added criterion empha-
sizes the desirability of both novelty as well as typicality depending on the context. Since
it provides mathematical models and computational functions for evaluating creativity, the
work presented in this dissertation extends Maher [141] to provide computational mod-
els for evaluating the novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as
a measure of value) of perceived and generated actions within improvisational domains.
Additionally, the systems presented in this dissertation incorporate a central idea that aim-
ing to maximize novelty and unexpectedness are not always the most important aspects of
a temporally-extended session of improvisational creativity. This is in keeping with both
Ritchie’s typicality and Perišić, Štorga, and Gero’s situated novelty.
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Pease, Winterstein, and Colton discuss how modified Turing Test evaluation methodol-
ogy emphasis computational pastiche and ‘window dressing’ rather than actual creativity
in generated creative artifacts. They recommend framing information as additional artifacts
that are needed for a computationally creative system as such. Lamb, Brown, and Clarke
[140] also agree and recommend it as methodology only if verisimilitude to human artifacts
is a true requirement for creativity in a system’s generated artifacts. Taking this advice to
heart, the modified Turing Test is only used to assess the properties of outputs from the
improvisational agents when verisimilitude is the point of the evaluation.
2.4.2 Process Models of Creativity
Process models of creativity describe different aspects of the creative process itself, rather
than focusing on the outputs of that process necessarily. Newell, Shaw, and Simon [7]
present a search-based process for creative problem solving that involves searching for
solutions to a creative problem that are novel and have value (similar to product theo-
ries), but also focus on the rejection of previous assumptions, demonstrating persistence
towards a goal, and the development of the problem specification itself over the course of
the search process. Boden [8] categorizes the different processes of generating creative ar-
tifacts (process in relationship to product creativity) into three categories — combinatorial,
exploratory, and transformational creativity. All three forms of creativity are described in
relation to the conceptual space of the creative domain. Combinatorial creativity involves
combining elements of a single (or multiple) conceptual space(s) together in order to gen-
erate creative artifacts. Exploratory creativity is a search through a conceptual space to dis-
cover different creative artifacts within the bounds of that space. Transformational creativ-
ity is the transformation of the ‘rules’ or bounds of a conceptual space to be able to generate
creative artifacts that couldn’t be generated within the bounds of that space previously, even
with the most exhaustive exploration. Combinatorial creativity includes processes such as
conceptual blending [145] (where elements of two input concept spaces are selectively
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mapped together and combined into an output conceptual blend space), analogy [146] and
metaphor [147] (different processes for selectively mapping and transferring elements from
a source space into a target space to create new conceptual outputs), conceptual expansion
[148] (combining concepts from different spaces using mathematical filters to select and
modify how their elements are transferred into the expanded space), and other forms of
conceptual combination in the literature. Exploratory and transformational creativity were
further operationalized beyond Boden’s original abstracted description by Wiggins [149]
to be defined as formal search within a conceptual space (exploratory creativity) as well
as meta-search of conceptual spaces themselves (transformational creativity). The research
presented in this dissertation intentionally includes techniques for computational creativ-
ity that covers combinatorial and exploratory creativity. However, any transformational
creativity exhibited by the system is not intentional.
Process theories of creativity have also included prescriptive or descriptive models
of different stages that are involved in the creative process. Wallas’ idealized four-stage
model of creativity includes preparation (information gathering), incubation (considering
the problem and perhaps abandoning a conscious search for a solution), insight (sponta-
neous awareness of a solution to the problem that was potentially abandoned), and veri-
fication (evaluation to see whether the idea works and then modification or development
as needed). Others have included additional stages such as intimation [151], evaluation
[152], and interactions between explicit and implicit reasoning/knowledge during these
stages [153]. Other stage models include Finke, Ward, and Smith’s Geneplore model
[154], Johnson-Laird’s NONCE model of improvisational creativity [155], and Perez and
Sharples’ exploration-reflection (ER) model (originally applied to creative writing). The
Geneplore model consists of the exploration and evaluation of pre-inventive structures gen-
erated through synthesis, transformation, and exemplar retrieval as a description of the cre-
ative process. The NONCE model for jazz improvisation involves performing both knowl-
edge or constraint-guided generation (neo-Lamarckian approach) and explicit constraint-
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based evaluation after generation (neo-Darwinian approach). The ER model involves alter-
nating sequences of exploration (or generation) of content fragments, followed by a reflec-
tive evaluation of the generated fragments until a satisfactory creative solution is created.
The process models described in this section all commonly perform some repeated or
cyclical stages of generation, followed by evaluation. The research presented in this work
presents creative decision making on the part of an improvisational agent architecture that
can be described as a process model for improvisational creativity. The creative arc nego-
tiation performed in this research follows a cyclical generate and evaluate process, where
the agent’s generation process is constrained by the temporal bounds of the performance,
the agent’s given creative arc, and its set of improvisational response strategies. The agent
directly evaluates each of the candidate responses it generates for novelty, unexpectedness,
and quality fit to a given creative arc target point. In this way, it is close to the hybrid
between neo-Lamarckian and neo-Darwinian approaches that is advocated for and theoret-
ically described in [155].
2.5 Creativity and Intrinsically Motivated Agents
Models of creativity can also serve as motivational drives for agents. For example, curios-
ity, defined here as an intrinsic motivation to discover novel percepts, experiences, expla-
nations, or knowledge [156, 157], is one of the intrinsic motivational drives that can be
used to control learning algorithms. This is exemplified by curiosity-driven reinforcement
learning (RL) (e.g., [158]), where curiosity is used to modulate an agent’s learning pro-
cess. Schmidhuber also describes curiosity as the intrinsic reward mechanism that enables
their agent to learn in the absence of external reward functions in domains such as art and
music. Other intrinsic motivation functions can also be used to modulate agent behavior.
For example, Guckelsberger, Salge, and Colton presents intrinsically motivated agents for
co-creative contexts based on coupled empowerment maximization. This drive is a multi-
agent generalization of empowerment maximization [161], which is the potential for an
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agent to influence or control the outcome in the future given the current situation. Creative
arc selection and negotiation are presented in the latter part of this dissertation and can be
conceptualized as intrinsically-motivated search-based solution generation. In this case,
the target trajectory is the specified creative arc, and the intrinsic motivation is the drive to
follow that arc as best as possible within agent turn time limits. There is a far greater chal-
lenge in the current context compared to the previous approaches due to the near real-time
nature of the improvisational domain.
Evolutionary computing is another area where product-based aspects of creativity serve
as intrinsic and unique motivation for solution search. Objective search [162] is the default
configuration for evolutionary computing for ordinary or search-based creativity applica-
tions and corresponds to a search for high-quality solutions. Objective search involves
performing exploration of the solution space using a population of evolving candidates.
However, in the recent past, novelty search [163] and surprise search [164] have seen much
success in finding solutions more rapidly or robustly than objective search. This is partic-
ularly the case where finding globally optimal solutions requires the algorithm to traverse
deceptive paths through the search space [164]. Most of these systems have yet to inves-
tigate strategies for choosing between novelty and surprise or combining them as the need
may be. It is also technically possible to simulate a similar novelty seeking (curious) agent
in the proposed decision-making model by providing it with a creative arc that has a max-
imal novelty dimension throughout its trajectory, along with setting the agent to ignore (or
alternatively, to accept any value in) the surprise and value dimensions of the creative space.
This also enables the agent to perform surprise search [164] by providing the system with
a creative arc that maximizes the surprise dimension while setting the agent to ignore (or
alternatively, to accept any value in) the other two dimensions. The creative arc negotiation
system can also simulate other hybrid search agents [165].
The creative arc following agent presented in the latter part of this work differs from the
various intrinsically motivated agents mentioned above in the following two ways. Firstly,
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the former directly optimize novelty, surprise, and value dimensions (among others) while
the latter tries to optimize a given meta-level function composed of those same dimensions
in order to follow a creative arc. This is in contrast to the other techniques which encourage
always generating the most creative response. For example, a creative arc that starts with
low novelty and progresses to some peak novelty value before descending again might be
more valuable to an improvisational partner than an agent that tries to do the most novel
action it possibly can every single turn. Secondly, in the former cases there is often a
final output to the search process (when search is stopped eventually) that is evaluated to
assess the effectiveness and quality of the optimization technique, while in the latter case,
the agent’s creative artifacts are experienced by the agent’s improvisational partner (and a
potential audience) all throughout the creative arc making the improvised journey itself the
main creative artifact that is output for and assessed by the audience, not necessarily any
individual action generated by the agent along the way. The agent evaluates the creativity
of perceived and generated each action over the entire course of the performance, though.
2.6 Interactive Narrative and Drama/Experience Management
There is a natural fit between the eventual goal for this research as a path towards em-
bodied narrative improvisation and work in drama or experience management [166, 167]
within interactive narrative [168] research. Both seek to enable co-creation of entertaining
(or desirable) user experiences for participants (and potentially for an audience as well).
The research presented in the latter half of this dissertation on creative arc negotiation
was at least partly inspired by interactive narrative systems such as Mateas and Stern’s
Façade [169], Porteous, Teutenberg, Pizzi, and Cavazza’s Merchant of Venice [170], and
Magerko’s Haunt II [171] as well as Riedl, Stern, Dini, and Alderman’s Automated Story
Director (ASD) [172]. Façade [169] uses annotated story fragments called beats that are
sequenced in response to natural language user inputs with a reactive planner to gener-
ate interactive narrative experiences for the player that possess a clear dramatic arc [173].
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Similarly to Façade, the creative arc negotiation process presented in this work attempts
to structure the improvised performance according to its creative arc. A creative arc can
emulate arcs over a dramatic tension space by adding that as a component to the agent’s
quality heuristics and setting the agent to ignore novelty and unexpectedness in candi-
date actions. However, the creative arc negotiation can also use additional criteria such
as novelty and unexpectedness, to create player experiences that may only be accidentally
possible for an interactive narrative system such as Façade. Porteous, Teutenberg, Pizzi,
and Cavazza’s work describes a visual programming method for drawing dramatic arcs in
order to guide a planning-based interactive narrative experience of the Merchant of Venice.
This is a potentially useful idea that my research could incorporate in the future to enable
the personalization of creative arcs to players or ease the authoring process for non-expert
experience designers. Experience or drama management systems in interactive narrative
like Haunt II [171] and ASD [172] predominantly manage the tension between authorial
intent and player agency in the interactive to preserve the coherence of player or user ex-
periences (see [174] for a survey of the interactive narrative space and [167] for a survey
of drama management techniques). The techniques presented for managing the coherence
of the user’s experience in [167] could be incorporated in the future, once the improvised
performances are closer to narrative than proto-narrative. However, the most significant
problem with using these techniques at the moment is the extreme level of content pre-
authoring required to create structured knowledge for use in these experience management




THE ROBOT IMPROV CIRCUS
My thesis statement for this dissertation states that “embodied agents that address the im-
provisational action selection problem using ‘creative arc negotiation’ increase perceptions
of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence in both observers and participants while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts.” In order to investigate the specific claims
within that thesis statement, this chapter uses the following outline. I first introduce the
Props game problem domain and the Robot Improv Circus installation within which this
problem was studied. I then describe the general solution approach for addressing the
improvisational action selection problem using creative arc negotiation and how that is
implemented within an embodied improvisational agent architecture called CARNIVAL
for enabling embodied agents to perform movement improv with non-experts in the Props
game domain. I then discuss several experiments that aim to validate architectural com-
ponents and systematically evaluate the extent to which creative arc negotiation addresses
the improvisational action selection problem and improves participant and audience per-
ceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence as stated in my thesis statement.
3.1 The Props Game Domain
My research investigating the claims in my thesis statement and understanding how to build
embodied improvisational agents to perform movement improv with non-experts and ad-
dress the improvisational action selection problem was situated within object-based gestu-
ral proto-narrative improvisation. This domain is defined as proto-narrative improvisation
performed using gestural interaction with objects in the agent’s environment (see section
1.3). This form of improvisation is exemplified by the popular short-form improv theater
game — the ’Props’ game. The Props game involves improvised movement-based interac-
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Figure 3.1: Two actors playing the Props game from the popular TV show, “Whose Line Is
It Anyway?” [175]
tions between two or more participants using ambiguous props given to them at the start of
a game round to perform recognizable comedic vignettes or singular actions pantomiming
the use of the abstract prop as a real-world or fictional object. For example, when presented
with a prop shaped like a long, thin pole with a small sphere on one end, the first performer
pretending to use it like a baton and twirling it about like a bandleader for a marching
band, then the other performer pretending to play a drum solo using it as a long drumstick,
and continuing on with different props over different rounds of the game. Many different
variants of this game exist in the improvisational theater community with different degrees
(and kinds) of connectedness between performer turns, but the previous definition is the
version used in this research.
The Props game domain was chosen because the challenging nature of the improvi-
sational action selection problem (described in section 3.3) had been highlighted in prior
work [2] and the Props game domain allowed me to focus on that specific problem. Addi-
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tionally, in comparison to domains closer to unconstrained embodied narrative improvisa-
tion, the focus on one-shot actions or short vignettes through prop-based improvisational
interactions represented a simplification of higher-level semantic reasoning and longer-time
scale temporal reasoning for creating a virtual improviser in the domain. Beyond improv
theater, solutions to the Props game problem could potentially be adapted to allow em-
bodied agents to gain new knowledge about unfamiliar objects through interaction. For
example, with the addition of additional evaluation heuristics and goal-oriented reasoning,
the technical approach used in this work could enable agents to learn to use unfamiliar ob-
jects in unfamiliar scenarios according to familiar human norms/customs or use unfamiliar
objects for a specific task (such as improvising a digging tool for disaster recovery). In
summary, the motivation for selecting the Props game was that it allowed me to focus on
the improvisational action selection problem while simplifying the complexity of the prob-
lem to be more feasibly addressable (in comparison to unconstrained embodied narrative
improvisation) and enabling the future extension of this work to other important applica-
tions.
The agent’s actions within the Props game domain consist of gestural content and se-
mantic content. The gestural content represents the positions and orientations of key skele-
tal points of a body over time. The semantic content consists of the semantic interpretation
of the gestural content of an action in terms of the English verb describing the pretend
action being pantomimed as well as the English noun describing the pretend object being
signified with that pretend action. Since the semantic content represents an interpretation
of the gestural content, it constrains the space of valid gestural content to those that can
be mapped to interpretable semantic concepts of pretend objects and pretend actions. Thus
the Props game represents a tangible increase in the complexity of the improvisational do-
main over prior work in purely gestural proto-narrative improvisation [50, 2, 16] due to
the increased semantic constraints imposed over the agent’s generated gestures in order
for them to be interpreted successfully. However, it also does make it easier for the agent
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to communicate with the human user about how to interpret improvisationally generated
actions.
The added semantic constraints in the domain prevent certain computational techniques
(e.g., many forms of data augmentation) from being applied since naive modifications to
the gestural content of an action might not align with the interpretive semantics of the
augmented gestural content, and it is not possible to know about such a change in advance.
Additionally, the semantics necessitate reasoning over additional modalities and content for
communication with the human collaborator. This requires an expansion in the scope of
the improvisation being performed. In contrast to the challenges previously described, the
agent also obtains the opportunity for added clarity through communicating the semantics
of the action. For example, the agent can indicate what both the intended pretend action
and pretend object of a generated action were.
The current domain was studied within an interactive virtual reality (VR) installation
where the Props game could be played between an embodied virtual agent and a human
scene partner. This VR installation is called The Robot Improv Circus [176] and is be-
ing developed using an iterative design process. The installation has human users play
the Props game as a humanoid robot with their humanoid robot stage partner on the main
stage of an all robot circus. The experience was designed to leverage existing user expec-
tations about setting and experience for circuses in contrast to improv theater performance
venues. For instance, common expectations in the USA for circuses that can be lever-
aged to quickly situate a circus experience for many people include that they are held in
colorful big top circus tents with specific circus music and other thematic elements. In con-
trast, improv theater possesses less specific and less commonly held cultural expectations
that can be leveraged by the installation directly. Additionally, the denizens of the virtual
world (human user included) were designed to look like humanoid robots rather than hu-
man characters in order to manage expectations about the realism and verisimilitude of the
computational improviser’s actions and behavior.
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Figure 3.2: The user miming an action with a prop
3.2 The Robot Improv Circus Installation
The Robot Improv Circus [176] is a primarily single participant VR installation for people
to play the Props game with a virtual agent. While the participant is performing in VR,
the audience views the improvised performance from outside the installation through large
screens that form portals into the virtual world. The experience takes place on the virtual
stage of a robot circus, where improv is the main event. Participants take turns with the
virtual agent to mime pretend actions using abstract props as a real-world or fictional object
in imaginative ways in order to create an object-based gestural proto-narrative with the
agent. For example, when presented with a prop that looks like a long, thin cylinder with
a flat disk on one end, one player might pretend to use it like a katana and pantomime
slashing at the air repeatedly. The other agent might then use that prop as a ‘bo’ (long staff)
to pantomime blocking sword slashes or other actions.
The VR experience consists of a trial round followed by a small number of game rounds.
Each performer is given a new prop every round, and each round consists of five to seven
turns. The goal of each round is to create a proto-narrative by taking turns miming actions
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Figure 3.3: A view of the virtual agent miming an action using a prop in the Robot Improv
Circus VR installation
with the prop. Performers hit a virtual buzzer after enacting their actions to signal the end
of their turn.
As an example, after receiving a prop shaped like a flattened cuboid, the VR user might
pretend that the prop is a stovepipe hat and mime putting it on. She then hits the buzzer
to end her turn. The same prop then appears in front of the agent who pretends to comb
its hair using it as a comb. The agent speaks and displays a speech bubble that reads, “I
am combing with a comb” (like in fig. 3.3). The speech and speech bubbles were added
to encourage dialogue and increase the recognizability of the generated mimed actions
after initial validation experiments showed a clear need for improving that aspect of the
generated actions.
The Robot Improv Circus is exhibited in a circus tent (see fig. 3.4). The form and
decor of the installation were designed to evoke a familiar circus aesthetic with circus flags,
themed posters promoting the robot improv circus, and the VR experience itself housed
within the circus tent. The large, colorfully decorated circus tent also seeks to create a
commanding visual presence for the installation [177] to draw people to the installation.
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Figure 3.4: A VR user experiences the Robot Improv Circus in the installation tent
Figure 3.5: A screen displays a view from the virtual audience to human audience members
watching from outside the installation.
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The installation has two large displays outside the circus tent that act as portals for a
real-world human audience to glimpse the virtual circus stage and the performance being
improvised inside VR. They can watch, applaud, and provide positive feedback to partici-
pants in VR through their physical activity. The activity of the human audience is captured
using a video camera and pose extraction from the video feed [178], which then triggers
different kinds of supportive visual feedback in the virtual world according to the amount
of movement in the video frame over time. Their feedback appears in the virtual world
above the virtual audience’s heads as floating emoji (thumbs-up symbols, smiley faces,
clown faces, and hearts) rising up from the robot audience.
3.3 The Improvisational Action Selection Problem
The primary focus of my research in this dissertation is to investigate how addressing the
improvisational action selection problem for embodied improvisational agents that perform
movement improv with non-experts in the Robot Improv Circus affects both participant as
well as audience perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence. In order to do
so, the embodied improvisational agents instantiated in this research must be successfully
able to address the improvisational action selection problem. The improvisational action
selection problem (see Section 1.2.1) refers to the challenging nature of near real-time ac-
tion selection within improvisational domains that have open-ended action spaces as well as
ill-defined goal spaces. Addressing the improvisational action selection problem requires
a balance in the reasoning process that avoids decision paralysis, incoherent behavior, re-
sponses that are less diverse (or too similar), and a lack of qualitative impact on the user’s
experience.
3.3.1 Technical Need
Previous approaches to addressing the improvisational action selection problem have fo-
cused on various techniques to one or a few aspects of the problem. These include con-
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straining the temporal responsiveness of the system [179], constraining the action space
[26], simplifying or enumerating a constrained formalization of the goal space of the do-
main [100], or using simplified stochastic action selection [97]. My research attempts to
address the different components of the improvisational action selection problem together
and thus does not use any of the former simplifications.
The improvisational action selection problem has multiple interacting factors that make
it particularly challenging to address. Firstly, the open-endedness of the action space makes
near real-time performance difficult. Secondly, constraining the action space to make per-
formance more responsive decreases the expressivity, flexibility, and diversity of possible
agent responses [26]. Thirdly, if a simpler or more stochastic action selection mechanism
is used to improve responsiveness, the agent’s behavior seems incoherent over time [2].
Finally, the lack of a well-defined set of goals for the domain prevents the agent from con-
fidently preferring one action over the other, leading to less diverse user experiences across
the different versions of the system [180].
The ill-defined goal space for the improvisational problem domain makes it especially
difficult for commonly used techniques like reinforcement learning (RL) [53], inverse RL
(IRL) [54], or behavioral cloning (BC) [55] to be used easily. RL involves learning a policy
for selecting actions to maximize reward over time and would be difficult to apply due to the
lack of a well-defined reward function. IRL involves the learning of a reward function from
observation and then using RL to solve the learned reward function. BC is the process of
learning and generalizing action sequences used by experts in demonstrations to a new task.
IRL and BC are difficult to apply due to the open-endedness of the action space alongside
the ill-defined goal space. More specifically, this is due to the sample inefficiency of IRL
and the relatively poor performance of BC in unobserved regions of the problem space.
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3.3.2 Solution Approach
The approach used in my research attempts to address as many of the interacting com-
ponents of the improvisational action selection problem simultaneously as possible. It is
desirable for the agent to be able to improvise in near real-time within the open-ended ac-
tion space to produce expressive responses that form coherent behavior over time while
showing perceivably diverse behavior with changes to its action selection within the ill-
defined domain. The following is the technical approach used to achieve these results in
the improvisational agent presented in this research.
The computational approach to embodied improvisation used in this work aims to pro-
duce responsive improvisational behavior that is coherent over time with a demonstrably
perceivable (or identifiable) impact on user experience (in terms of perceptions of enjoy-
ment, agent creativity, and coherence) across different versions of the system. In order
to generate improvisational behavior that satisfies these properties, this research presents
a process called creative arc negotiation, where the agent performs stochastic, inter-
ruptible, strategy-guided action space search to follow a given creative arc through its
creative space of novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as
a measure of value) (see section 1.4). The agent implements creative arc negotiation us-
ing the following components. Affordance-based action variant generation enables the
agent to perform conditional parameterized generation of action variants based on the
physical attributes of objects that are given to it during improvisation as a way to search
its learned action space. Adapted from prior work [50] and formalized from human impro-
visational practice, the agent uses improvisational reasoning strategies to guide action
space search while negotiating a creative arc. The agent also computationally evaluates
the novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as a measure of
value) of perceived actions and generated candidate responses to localize them within
the agent’s creative space. The following subsections describe the creative arc negotia-
tion process and the conceptual details of the three components in more detail, however,
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the exact implementation details for each component are described in the corresponding
subsections of the CARNIVAL architecture (see section 3.4).
3.3.3 Creative Arc Negotiation (RQ4)
The agent presented in this research performs creative arc negotiation. Creative arc negoti-
ation is the process of selecting actions over time to best follow a given target trajectory or
’creative arc’ through an agent’s ’creative space.’ The agent aggregates both the human’s
last action and the agent’s candidate actions before comparing it to the target creative arc
in order to select the agent’s next action. Creative arc negotiation aims to provide the user
with a temporally evolving experience that appears coherent over time and qualitatively
different across different creative arcs (or without a creative arc guiding action selection).
The working definition of creativity used in this system is an extension of Boden’s def-
inition of creativity focusing on the novelty, surprise, and value of perceived or generated
artifacts (see section 1.1). A multidimensional model of creativity is used here with the
artifact localized to a point in the space of novelty, surprise, and value. In order to avoid
some of the deeply overloaded semantics of the terms ‘surprise’ and ‘value,’ in practice,
the agent computationally evaluates candidate responses using heuristics of novelty, unex-
pectedness (as a measure of surprise) and quality (as a measure of value) instead. Creative
arcs are, therefore, continuous trajectories through this three-dimensional creative space
that an agent follows over the course of a temporally-extended improvised performance.
An example of a creative arc is illustrated in Figure 3.6
Creative arc negotiation selects actions using a given trajectory over time (the creative
arc) within the creative space rather than always attempting to choose a maximally creative
action. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the process was inspired by (and general-
ized from) practice-based conventions across several different creative domains about the
use of arcs and trajectories to structure experiences. For example, tension in musical com-
position [181] and improvisation [182] (even pitch for simple cantus firmi [183]) follows
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Figure 3.6: An example creative arc.
well-defined arcs. Similarly, dramatic arcs in several forms of narrative at a high-level rely
on variations of a familiar trajectory involving rising to a climactic point and then falling to
a resolution to deliver their affective payload. In visual art, as well, artists are often taught
to compose their subjects so as to encourage a viewer’s eye to move across the entire com-
position in smooth arcs and trajectories drawn by the visual forms and expectations of the
composition. Secondly, the novelty and surprise components of creative space demonstrate
‘inverted U’ characteristics against perceptual arousal (or preference) [184]. Thus having a
constant value at a maximum could be negative overall.
The improvisational agent is required to perform action selection in an open-ended ac-
tion space in near real-time. Therefore, creative arc negotiation is strategy-guided as an
optimization using strategies formalized from human improvisers that anchor the search in
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the current improvisational context while searching desirable regions of the search space.
Creative arc negotiation is implemented as an interruptible stochastic search where the
agent returns the ’best’ solution until a) the point of interruption in its search or b) it suc-
cessfully finds an action within ε of the target creative space point as a further optimization.
3.3.4 Affordance-based Action Variant Generation (RQ1)
The improvisational agent learns the action space it can use for improvisation within the
Props game from training data representing non-expert demonstrations of pantomimed ac-
tions using props as real-world or fictional objects. A conditional variational autoencoder
[185] architecture was used to learn the distribution of the data set in its latent space in
order for the agent to be able to search or explore that action space (including unseen ac-
tion variants interpolated between the demonstrated examples). Autoencoders [186], in
general, learn a non-linear dimensionality-reduced representation of a given training data
set in their latent space. However, variational autoencoders [187] warp the latent space to
allow smooth interpolations between trained data in the model’s latent space. Conditional
variational autoencoders (CVAE) are variational autoencoders that are conditioned on ad-
ditional features that can be used to partition the latent space and condition generation from
the model’s latent space. The CVAE used in this research was conditioned on the physical
attributes of props (see Section 3.4.3) used to enact the pantomimed actions from the data
set. This allowed the agent to both restrict action variant generation to appropriate props
but also to generalize learned actions to props with similar physical attributes (see section
3.4.3 for more detail).
I refer to the process of generating action variants from the agent’s learned action space
as affordance-based action generation. I define affordance in this work as “a learned tacit
procedural mapping between the physical attributes of an object in the agent’s environment
and that agent’s learned action space that partitions and controls access to that agent’s ac-
tion space.” As described in section 2.3.1, this definition represents a relational mapping
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between the entity (i.e., the physical attributes of the object), its embodied capabilities, and
the set of actions possible with that entity, similar to Şahin, Çakmak, Doğar, Uğur, and
Üçoluk’s [57] definition of affordances. This learned mapping is encoded in the CVAE
model as embodied tacit knowledge; therefore, the action generation proceeds using the
learned model of affordance as defined above. The learned structure of (and relative distri-
bution of action classes in) the model’s latent space make(s) certain regions of the agent’s
action space (i.e., certain action classes) more or less difficult to generate from. It forms
a hybrid interpolation between the absolute affordances (possible vs. impossible actions)
that Gibson [123] describes and the perceived affordances (more vs. less easily perceived
actions) that Norman [124] describes.
The agent learns how to generate action variants for generating candidate actions and
searching its action space by training on a data set of human actions pantomiming the use
of props as real-world or fictional objects. The data, once collected and annotated (see
section 3.3.4), contains the physical attributes of the actual prop, the mimed pretend action,
and the intended pretend object. The gestural content of the percept along with this inter-
preted information jointly form a perceived action in the context of the improvised Props
game performance. The representation of the physical attributes of the prop is discussed
in section 3.3.4. The combination of the pretend action and pretend object represents the
semantics of this action (to a degree) based on the distributional hypothesis [188] that “a
word is characterized by the company it keeps” (especially with their vector representation
presented in 3.4.1).
Object Physical Attribute Representation
A key requirement for playing the Props game is that the given abstract (or unfamiliar)
object/prop has to be interpreted into a real-world or fictional object and then used in such
a way that signifies what object it is being pretended (or imagined) to be through pan-
tomimed pretend actions (e.g., pretending a big sphere is a beach ball and pantomiming the
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act of playing volleyball with it). In order to do this pretense computationally, the agent
needs to be able to map the abstract or unfamiliar props to real-world or fictional pretend
objects and vice versa. Annotated data from human demonstrations provide the agent with
knowledge about what pretend objects and pretend actions are possible in the world and
what embodied knowledge in the form of gestures actually corresponds to using a prop
as a specific pretend object through a specific pantomimed pretend action. In order to ex-
tend and augment the agent’s ability to perform affordance-based action variant generation
an abstracted representation of object physical attributes was formalized. The process for
developing this representation and the actual representation itself are presented below.
The agent’s representation of objects in terms of their physical attributes was arrived
at by reviewing affordance representation schema from robotics research [189, 190, 191,
192]. Varadarajan and Vincze [189] was chosen due to the two-stage process it intro-
duced for mapping object features to primitive actions for agents to use [193]. Since only
a severely limited version of their AffNet 2.0 database was available, the limited set of
feature descriptors used in their work were filtered for feasibility, extended for coverage,
and adapted for suitability with the Props game domain. Their process, however, was not
feasible to use in this system due to its dependence on a fixed set of action primitives for
learning a mapping.
The representation that was developed is as follows. A given prop is represented as
a fixed-length feature vector. The feature values are obtained by decomposing the prop
into a set of parts or components. This is done by comparing them to a fixed set of shape
primitives and a fixed set of operations or deformations that could be applied to it. Since
the focus of this research is not on the automatic segmentation of the prop into parts, this
admittedly subjective decision was considered sufficient for hand annotation. The cho-
sen individual parts of the object are then coded/parsed to obtain a set of binary physical
attributes features representing whether or not that feature is present/applicable to that part.
The set of physical attributes features developed in this project includes a part’s shape
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primitive, size, thickness, flatness, concavity, taper, rigidity, curvature, hole size, and whether
a digit/symbol is signified. As mentioned earlier, the feature set was chosen by extending
the geometric mapping features from affordance representation ontologies such as [189].
After annotating the physical attributes feature values for each part, the features for each
part are then aggregated by summing them together and normalizing them using the max-
imum count for any feature in the data set. This encoded value represents the normalized
counts of each physical attribute feature for the prop across all parts and is a fixed-length
vector representation of the object. For example, a barbell-shaped prop might be two flat-
tened spheres connected by a long, thin cylinder. The process for encoding the physical
attributes of objects could be automated in future extensions of this work using computer
vision tools.
The extended set of features developed in this work for object representation was used
to annotate a set of objects used by performers while playing the Props game on the Whose
Line Is It Anyway? [175] TV show. A subset of eighty props was then hand-annotated using
the developed feature schema out of the total number of props used on the show. Out of
the eighty props that were annotated, twenty props were then selected for use in the Robot
Improv Circus according to the following process. Fifteen props were chosen that had
the highest aggregated individual feature counts as a rough measure of the total number
of actions that could be performed with them. The remaining five props were chosen to
accommodate props that had features which were absent in from the already chosen fifteen
in order to boost the diversity of actions and actions possible with the set of props. The
decision to choose props with high feature counts was made to potentially enable users
to perform a larger and more diverse set of actions with these props. This decision itself
was not specifically evaluated, but each prop (as well as the total set of chosen props) has
empirically and qualitatively been shown to generate many different pretend objects and
pretend actions (see section 3.5).
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Learning Actions From Non-expert Demonstrations
The agent’s model of affordance-based action variant generation was learned from repeated
iterations of batch learning from non-expert demonstrations as a data set collected from five
non-expert improvisers pantomiming pretend actions using the provided props as pretend
objects. Non-expert improvisers were used as a data source to better reflect the target
population for the improvisational experience created using this improvisational agent (for
more, see section 1.3.2). After the demonstration sessions were completed, the data were
processed by research staff using a separate annotation tool (see image 3.7) along with the
help of recorded videos of the improvisational data collection session. After annotating the
pretend action and pretend object as well as segmenting the start and end of the actions
in the data collection session using between five and seven annotators, 893 mimed actions
of length from 3.3 seconds (minimum length chosen) to 10 seconds (maximum length
chosen) were curated as the initial data set. Each training data point (each action) was
represented using the gesture vector and semantic vector presented in section 3.3.4. This
data set has increased over time, but for a better comparison of results, later experiments
were conducted using the same initial data set.
3.3.5 Improvisational Response Strategies (RQ2)
Improvisational response strategies extend prior work in LuminAI [50] and represent domain-
independent procedural knowledge about the different reasoning strategies that human im-
provisers use during improvisation. While performing creative arc negotiation, these strate-
gies enable human improvisers or improvisational agents to anchor their search for a suit-
able response to the current (or recent) improvisational context and reduce the size of their
response search space and facilitate response generation in near real-time. The strategies
themselves were compiled using literature search from jazz improvisation [58] and were
adapted for use with dance [194] and improv theater [176].
The set of improvisational response strategies developed in LuminAI is extended in
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Figure 3.7: The annotation tool used to segment and annotate collected data.
this work. The strategies explored in this work include Mimicry, Transformation, Combi-
nation, Similarity-based Retrieval, and Pattern Projection. Other strategies for modulating
the novelty, surprise, and value directly have also been proposed in initial ideation but re-
main future work. All of the strategies detailed in this research operate within the latent
space of the CVAE generative model utilizing vector relationships that exist between points
in that latent space. This provides a consistent mechanism for generating different action
variants from a uniform representation and model. Some added detail for each strategy
is given in the following paragraph, but specific implementation details in the CARNI-
VAL architecture are provided in the corresponding section of the architecture (see section
3.4.5).
Mimicry is the process of copying an observed action for interpretation and replay to for
connecting to another improviser. Transformation consists of interpreting observed actions
and then changing them according to relationships between previous actions. Combination
involves interpolation of multiple recent actions as a way to generate variation while retain-
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ing connections to prior context. Similarity-based recall can generate a space of gestures
from most similar to least similar from the latent space. Finally, pattern projection is the
process of using relationships between recent actions from the human and agent to project
a source action to a target action so that it adheres to the given relationships.
3.3.6 Computational Models for Evaluating Creativity (RQ3)
The process of creative arc negotiation relies on the agent’s ability to evaluate the creativity
of perceived actions (and generated action candidates) computationally so that the agent
can select responses that follow a target creative arc over the course of the improvised
performance. Therefore this research contributes a set of computational models for eval-
uating creativity. The specific working definition of creativity used in this work follows
Boden’s definition of artifact creativity stating that creative actions perceived or generated
by the agent are characterized by their degree of novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of
surprise), and quality (as a measure of value). See section 3.4.4 for more information.
Framework For Creativity Evaluation Models
The models used in this research can be analyzed and potentially separated from other
related computational models of creativity evaluation from the literature using a general
framework. The framework specifies several dimensions along which the agent’s approach
to creativity evaluation are specialized due to the specific constraints of movement im-
prov between a human and virtual character (as well as a potential audience). The general
framework developed in this work is listed below.
1. The perspective being evaluated: There are three separate perspectives for judging
the creativity of improvised interactions for an improvised performance/interaction
between a virtual character, human collaborator, and an audience. The choice would
depend on the main goal of the interaction, whether to optimize the quality of agent’s
learning and data acquisition, the user experience of the human collaborator, au-
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dience enjoyment, or some combination of these (ideal for an improvised human-
computer performance).
2. The degree of dynamism: This is the amount that the evaluation changes over time
due to the experiences of the agent. A static/unchanging model would be fixed (with-
out accounting for habituation or other changes over time), while a more dynamic
model might adapt offline in between every improvisational session. The most desir-
able model adapts online over the course of the ongoing improvisational session.
3. The role of feedback: The model may not use feedback at all to improve its scoring
over time. Alternatively, the model might utilize explicit feedback from the audience
(e.g., applause) or collaborator (e.g., post-interaction surveys). The feedback could
also be implicit through metrics like interaction duration or facial expression counts
if explicit feedback can’t easily be collected. Feedback is usually desirable unless
the expertise of the system is far greater than the user.
4. The relative expertise of the system: A fledgling system that has little data or expe-
rience cannot expect to match human ratings of novelty and expectation and should
treat the user’s experiences as a superset of its own (e.g., an open-ended narrative
improv system). A system that has collected data over its lifetime or through mas-
sive datasets can potentially surpass the human in terms of experience (e.g., a recipe
generation system mining from large online recipe databases). It might then need
to localize novelty and surprise estimation to the neighborhood of the user’s experi-
ences.
5. The relative domain-dependence of the model: Individual components of models
for evaluating creativity can be considered on a spectrum from domain-independent
to domain-dependent. For example, a theoretical model for evaluating novelty that
uses aggregated distance measures between percepts in a given perceptual space can
be considered largely domain-independent since the model could be applied to any
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domain where percepts can be compared in perceptual space. On the other hand,
a model for evaluating the quality (as a measure of value) would need to be more
domain-dependent due to the high specificity of quality heuristics to a domain. In
practice, all models lie on a spectrum somewhere between the two extremes, since
some domain-specific knowledge is needed to operationalize the former and some
domain-general processes can be used to apply the latter across domains.
Evaluating Novelty
Novelty of a perceived or generated action is evaluated in the agent using a distance-based
comparison to other comparable actions that the agent has encountered before or is aware of
(adapted from [141]). The distance-based comparisons are performed on both the gestural
and semantic components of actions (see Section 3.4.4 for more detail about novelty cal-
culation). Since the selection of all comparable actions to a specified action in the general
case is a difficult problem, a naive solution is to compare against all actions perceived or
generated by the agent. However, due to the growth of the agent’s experience over its life-
time, this problem is approximated by comparing the specified action against its K nearest
neighbors with K set empirically. The use of K nearest neighbors approximates the prob-
lem since, for truly novel actions, even the K nearest neighbors would be distant, while
for commonly experienced actions, the K nearest neighbors would be at a short aggregate
distance.
Evaluating Surprise
The agent computes the unexpectedness of a certain action as a measure of the surprise
experienced by the agent. There are two general classes of methods that are used for com-
puting unexpectedness in the related literature (see section 2.4). Impact-based surprise
computes the impact of an observation on the agent’s beliefs or expectations. Deviation
from expectation is another class of models for computing surprise where distance-based
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methods are used to compare the observed action and the most expected action(s) for a
given situation. Both types of surprise are calculated in this agent to provide a balance be-
tween the two approaches. As discussed above in the framework for comparing creativity
evaluation models (see section 3.3.6), this particular evaluation model for unexpectedness
retains an exclusively agent-centric perspective. Future work could add additional perspec-
tives or use personalization to tailor the perspective of the model over time to the participant
or audience.
The distributions of expectation used in the unexpectedness evaluation models are con-
ditioned on the physical attributes of the object (or prop) given to the agent (or human) due
to the lack of data about the probabilities of pairs of actions over time in this particular
domain as well as the feasibility of collecting this data. Future work could use interactive
learning to approximate this distribution over time as the agent explored sequences with
more of the actions in its action space. This would be an important step for adding narra-
tive or causal coherence to the improvisation in order to apply this to future domains with
added causal structure like full-scale embodied narrative improvisation.
Evaluating Value
Value is strongly dependent on the context, culture, and domain of the evaluation being
performed and is a concept that is complex and overloaded in its use (see section 1.1 for
definitions). Therefore, the agent evaluates the quality of perceived or generated actions as
a measure of value using a set of heuristics specified for the Props game domain (it ignores
all explicit reasoning about the societal or cultural value in its judgments of quality). Qual-
ity is more domain-dependent than novelty or unexpectedness (see discussion in section
3.3.6) and requires domain-dependent heuristics for its calculation.
A characteristic problem with improvisational domains like movement improv, in gen-
eral, or the Props game, in particular, is the lack of a well-defined goal space or easily-
specified objective function(s). Therefore, the heuristics defined for the agent in the Props
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game domain are considered weak heuristics that are necessary but not sufficient and can
thus only evaluate an incomplete region of the goal-space for the domain. Currently, in
the agent, the two heuristics used to measure the quality of perceived or generated actions
are the smoothness of a performed action, and the recognizability of a performed action
in terms of the pretend object and pretend action that is signified by it (see section 3.4.4
for more detail). These heuristics compute the quality of an action both in terms of its
gestural quality (though recognizability evaluates the gestural component in relation to the
semantic component of an action). The different components are equally weighted in the
current iteration of the model but can have their relative weighting modulated according to
empirical results or even personalized to user preference in the future.
3.4 CARNIVAL: Creative ARc Negotiating Improvisational Virtual Agent pLat-
form
The robot improviser character that plays the Props game with VR users in the Robot
Improv Circus installation is controlled by the CARNIVAL (Creative ARc Negotiating
Improvisational Virtual Agent pLatform) agent architecture. CARNIVAL uses creative arc
negotiation to address the improvisational action selection problem for embodied agents
that perform movement improv. The architecture consists of three high-level components
— perception, reasoning, and action — that work together to enable the agent to improvise.
CARNIVAL’s perception module receives VR tracking data of the human’s gestures in
the virtual environment in the form of user-segmented gestures and interprets it in terms
of the real/fictional pretend object being portrayed, the pretend action being pantomimed
with that pretend object, and its location in various dimensionality-reduced spaces. The
reasoning module reasons in real-time about what action from its open-ended action space
best fits the target location on the agent’s creative arc, given the previous improvisational
context up till that point and how much of the performance remains. The action module
receives the generated action from the reasoning module and plays it back in the virtual
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Figure 3.8: The CARNIVAL agent architecture that implements creative arc negotiation
(see section 3.4.2 for process details). Lighter regions refer to future work.
world in a realistic manner by walking to the prop, picking up the prop, playing the gen-
erated action with that prop, dropping the prop when finished, walking to the buzzer, and
hitting the buzzer to end its turn.
3.4.1 Perception: Interpreting Human Gestures
The perception module receives a gesture consisting of a temporal sequence of human pose
data constituting a user-segmented gesture. Each frame of pose data is extrapolated from
the instantaneous values of the three hardware-tracked points of a standard VR system
(head, left hand, and right hand). The extrapolation is performed using inverse kinematics
over the user’s VR player avatar (the character used to represent the user in the virtual
world). The end result of this process is world-space positions and rotations of the user’s
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Figure 3.9: The CARNIVAL agent architecture with the perception module highlighted.
22 skeletal joints (head, neck, pelvis, left shoulder, right shoulder, etc.). In addition, the
states of the VR controller buttons, as well as the position and rotation of the virtual prop
on stage, are recorded in the perceived gesture.
Perceived gestures are vectorized into a 27000-dimensional or a 16000-dimensional
vector representation. Both vector representations consist of concatenated frames of fea-
tures extracted from the pose data. The 27000-dimensional vector uses 30 features per
frame, extracted from the perceived gesture at 90 frames per second (FPS) for 10 seconds.
The 30 features per frame consist of the normalized position (3D Cartesian coordinate rep-
resentation) and normalized orientation (4D quaternion representation) of the user’s head,
left hand, right hand, and pelvis as well as the Boolean states of two VR controller but-
tons representing whether the user was trying to grab an object at that point. The 16000-
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dimensional vector uses 35 features per frame, extracted from the perceived gesture at 45
FPS for 10 seconds. The 35 features per frame consist of the normalized position (3D
Cartesian coordinate representation) and normalized orientation (4D quaternion represen-
tation) of the user’s head, left hand, right hand, and pelvis, as well as the normalized po-
sition (3D Cartesian coordinate representation) and normalized orientation (4D quaternion
representation) of the given prop. Zero padding values are added at the end for 250 places
to round the total vector length to 16000. Additionally, if gestures are shorter or longer
than 10 seconds, they are zero-padded at the end of the resulting vector or trimmed to the
maximum duration, respectively.
Inferring Pretend Object and Pretend Action
Perceived gestures are interpreted by classifying them into pretend actions and pretend
objects. The classification is done, at the moment, using a relatively simple K Nearest
Neighbors classification approach. First, the dimensionality of the gesture vector is re-
duced to a two-dimensional point in the latent space of the generative model used to per-
form affordance-based action generation (see Section 3.4.3). The projected point is then
used to query an RTree data structure [195] (a space partitioning tree with efficient dy-
namic loading that is widely used in spatial querying) for its nearest K neighbors (with
K set empirically), consisting of previously seen and generated gestures. The RTree data
structure is used as an optimization to perform K nearest neighbors search in logarithmic
time complexity. The interpretation of a gesture in terms of an inferred pretend object and
pretend action can be done using either a simple majority of its neighbors’ object and ac-
tion labels or by weighting the majority using their relative distances to the projected query
point. The pretend action and pretend object are an English verb and an English noun
(usually with high concreteness [196] respectively. The pretend action and pretend object
are represented as 300-dimensional vectors from a pre-computed word embedding [197].
The respective vector interpretations of the gestural and semantic content of the action can
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be dimensionally reduced using parametric T-SNE models [198] and are used later in the
creativity evaluation process (see Section 3.4.4).
The RTree [195] that is used for nearest neighbor queries is initially pre-loaded with
a data set of human-annotated actions [see Section 3.3.4] in order to avoid a cold start
problem with the pretend action and object inference. These actions were annotated by
members of the research team using a special annotation tool [See picture 3.7] while listen-
ing to participants talking through their improvisational performances with the given props.
Since the RTree grows over the course of the installation as the agent’s experience grows, it
can be saved to a database for the agent’s next run. The increase in elements also increases
the size of K needed for the labeling process with the increase in RTree elements.
3.4.2 Reasoning: Creative Arc Negotiation
Interpreted human actions from the Perception module are received by the Reasoning mod-
ule in order to generate the agent’s response. The reasoning module uses creative arc nego-
tiation to generate an appropriate response, addressing the improvisational action selection
problem. This process is represented as an interruptible stochastic search through the cre-
ative space for a generated action that is nearest to the target point from the agent’s creative
arc for that turn or the agent’s time remaining for the turn runs low.
Creative arc negotiation requires the following components to work together to enable
the negotiation process.
1. The interruptible search process described above.
2. A parameterizable action variant generator that is able to search the agent’s action
space for candidate action variants.
3. A set of improvisational response strategies that can heuristically guide the agent’s
search to potentially important regions of the action space depending on the impro-
visational context till that point in the performance.
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4. A set of computational models for localizing a generated action variant in the agent’s
creative space.
5. An optional process for selecting improvisational strategies according to the gradient
between the agent’s previous and current target points on the creative arc.
Creative Space and Creative Arc Representation
As described earlier (see Section 3.3.3), the agent’s creative space is reductively adapted
from Boden’s definition of creativity as the novelty, surprise, and value experienced while
evaluating a creative artifact. The agent’s three-dimensional creative space consists of nov-
elty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as a measure of value), with
each dimension having values measured in the closed interval [0.0, 1.0]. The creative arc
is represented in CARNIVAL as a temporal sequence of creative space target points for
the agent to use when selecting generated responses. The initial interpretation of a given
creative arc is to treat it as a set of evenly spaced key points whose values can be linearly
interpolated between based on the total number of turns for a given performance of the
Props game.
Creative Arc Negotiation As Search
Creative arc negotiation is implemented as search through the agent’s learned action space
to find a generated action variant whose location in the agent’s creative space is within an
empirically set distance threshold ε of the current interpolated target point from the creative
arc for the agent’s turn. The search is interruptible so that if the agent’s remaining time
for the turn is equal to the maximum possible generated action variant length (currently
10 seconds), the nearest action till that point is returned as the agent’s chosen response.
The agent can perform creative arc negotiation either by considering the creative space
locations of only its own actions or that of the human participant as well. In the latter case,
the target point from the creative arc is compared with the halfway interpolated creative
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Figure 3.10: The actual negotiated creative arc in CARNIVAL.
space locations of the human participant’s action and the agent’s current generated action
variant being considered.
3.4.3 Reasoning: Action Variant Generation
The process of searching through the agent’s learned action space is operationalized us-
ing a parameterizable action variant generator. The action variant generator is trained on
a data set of mimed human actions using props as real-world or fictional objects. A deep
generative model is used to perform affordance-based action variant generation (see Sec-
tion 3.4.3) by learning a parameterized mapping between the formalized physical attributes
of the props used to mime the actions in the data set and the action space represented by
the data set. The generative model’s latent space is conditioned on the given prop’s phys-
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Figure 3.11: Improvisational response strategies used for guiding search through the
agent’s action space.
ical attributes and parameterized by a search control vector that can be varied to generate
different actions mapped to the given prop’s physical attributes. The iterative process of
affordance-based action variant generation and evaluation by variation of the generative
model’s control vector is thus how the agent’s action space can be searched in order to
select responses to negotiate a creative arc.
DeepIMAGINATION
A deep generative model was used in CARNIVAL to perform affordance-based action vari-
ant generation, i.e., to learn the mapping between a prop’s physical attributes and the set of
actions that were shown to be possible to perform given props with those physical attributes.
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Figure 3.12: Optional strategy selection.
The conceptual model design was named DeepIMAGINATION for Deep IMprovised Ac-
tion Generation through INteractive Affordance-based exploraTION [199] and was based
around a general conditional variational autoencoder (CVAE) [185] architecture. Several
variants of the actual model architecture were implemented using several convolutional and
recurrent alternatives.
CVAEs consist of an encoder and decoder with conditioning happening on both the
inputs to the encoder and decoder. In this case, the encoder and decoder were both con-
ditioned on the physical attribute vectors of the props used to perform the actions us-
ing input concatenation. The encoder reduces the high-dimensional input into a low-
dimensional latent space, and the decoder reconstructs a sampled latent vector back into
a high-dimensional output from the same space as the input. Both convolutional neural
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Figure 3.13: Local exploration of the agent’s action space using DeepIMAGINATION.
networks (CNN) and recurrent neural networks (RNN) were used to implement variants
of the DeepIMAGINATION module. One of the convolutional architecture variants is de-
picted in Figure 3.17. This particular variant uses 1-dimensional convolutional layers and
1-dimensional transposed convolutional layers in the encoder and decoder, respectively.
Dropout layers were also used for regularization. A recurrent CVAE variant is described
later.
Each CVAE variant was implemented in TensorFlow [200] and trained with the ADAM
optimizer [201]. Each CVAE variant was trained on 900+ mimed pretend actions of length
ranging from 3.3 to 10 seconds collected from five novice improvisers playing the Props
game within a VR data collection environment (see previous Section 3.3.4 for details of
the data collection). Therefore given an input distribution X , a latent distribution z and a
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Figure 3.14: Action selection from the explored set.
conditioning distribution c, each CVAE variant was trained using the CVAE loss function
defined as:
L(X, z, c) = E[log P (X|z, c)] + DKL[Q(z|X, c) || P (z|c)] (3.1)
In other words, the loss function is the sum of the decoder’s reconstruction loss and the en-
coder’s Kullback-Leibler divergence [202] loss, both conditioned on the physical attributes
distribution. Training the network is made possible by using the re-parameterization trick
(with mean µ(X, c) and diagonal covariance matrix Σ(X, c)) [187]:
z = µ(X, c) + Σ
1
2 (X, c) ε, where ε ∼ N (0, 1) (3.2)
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Figure 3.15: The negotiated creative arc in the agent is updated.
During the generation of action variants, the model’s latent space is repeatedly sampled
at specific locations provided by CARNIVAL’s improvisational response strategies (see
Section 3.4.5), based on the current improvisational context occurring. The DeepIMAG-
INATION module generates action variants conditioned on the physical attributes of the
given prop. Generated action variants are evaluated by CARNIVAL’s creativity evaluation
models (see Section 3.4.4).
A total of eight architecture variants were designed and trained, including four convolu-
tional models and four recurrent models. The variants were implemented for performance
evaluation and selection (see evaluation experiments in Section 3.5). The convolutional ar-
chitectures only differed in their input vector representations and resultant layer dimension-
ality. The four recurrent models used either a vanilla RNN architecture or an architecture
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Figure 3.16: The CARNIVAL agent architecture with the DeepIMAGINATION module
highlighted.
based on the MusicVAE network [203]. The two groups of RNN variants were also trained
on different input vector representations.
Convolutional Variants
It is helpful to think of the different input vector representations ((27000, 1), (16000, 1),
(900, 30), and (450, 35)) for convolutional models in terms of the number of channels in
the input data. The data was first represented with one channel, that is, 27000 and 16000
dimensional vectors were reshaped to (27000, 1) and (16000, 1) dimensional tensors, re-
spectively. In another representation, the number of channels corresponded to the number
of features per body pose frame - i.e., 27000 dimensional vectors were reshaped to (900, 30)
tensors while the 16000 dimensional vectors were reshaped to (450, 35) tensors (discard-
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Figure 3.17: A convolutional variant of the DeepIMAGINATION architecture with
(27000, 1) shaped input gesture and 2D latent space. General CVAE architecture shown
in upper right quadrant. Zoomed-in views of encoder and decoder in upper left and bottom
respectively. Dropout layers not shown but applied between each convolution layer and
between each transposed convolution layer.
ing the zero-padding). The outputs from the decoder were 27000 and 16000 dimensional
vectors depending on the input vector representation.
Recurrent Variants
The RNN versions of CVAE were implemented using Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
layers. Both the encoders and decoders of the Vanilla RNN implementation include sin-
gle layers of bidirectional LSTMs that represented information for each frame concate-
nated with the physical attributes vector. Based on results from Roberts, Engel, Raffel,
Hawthorne, and Eck, where vanilla RNN-based decoders sometimes had poor sampling
and reconstruction performance, a hierarchical RNN architecture for the decoder was de-
signed based on their MusicVAE architecture Roberts, Engel, Raffel, Hawthorne, and Eck.
In this variant, the latent vector z is first passed through a fully connected layer to initialize
the state of the Conductor layer, which is composed of a unidirectional LSTM layer. The
output of the conductor layer is then passed as initialization for the bottom LSTM layers,
82
where each frame vector from Conductor layer, concatenated with the output of previous
bottom layer LSTM, is used as initialization for the bottom layer LSTM of next time inter-
val. The outputs of each bottom layer LSTM are then concatenated and flattened to match
the input tensor shape.
3.4.4 Reasoning: Computationally Evaluating Creativity
Figure 3.18: The CARNIVAL agent architecture with the computational models for evalu-
ating creativity highlighted.
Perceived human actions and generated action variants from DeepIMAGINATION are
localized to the agent’s creative space and compared to find the response that is the lo-
cal best fit with the current target point on the agent’s creative arc. This process involves
computationally evaluating the creativity of the perceived or generated actions. As de-
scribed previously, the working definition of creativity in this work is the degree to which
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a perceived or generated action is novel, surprising, and of high value from the evaluating
agent’s perspective. Therefore, the task of computationally evaluating creativity is divided
into the subtasks of evaluating the novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and
quality (as a measure of value) of a perceived or generated action variant from the agent’s
perspective.
The operationalized definition of creativity in this work uses unexpectedness and qual-
ity as (imperfect) measures or proxies for surprise and value. Unexpectedness is used in
the definition of creativity instead of surprise because the requirements for surprise as it is
defined in this work specify it to 1) be an affective reaction and 2) cause a reaction pro-
portional to the confidence with which a violated expectation is held [204]. As a result,
the function over unexpectedness that is evaluated in the improvisational agent (see sec-
tion 3.4.4) cannot technically be called surprise because it is not generated through any
validated computational model of affect yet (such as one based in appraisal theory [205]
or the somatic marker hypothesis [206]) and because the evaluation does not yet formally
threshold the evaluated unexpectedness according to the measured confidence of the expec-
tation. Both these shortcomings of the unexpectedness evaluation model will be addressed
in future work.
The agent measures the quality of perceived and generated actions. However, the mea-
sured quality cannot necessarily be considered equivalent to value due to 1) the complex
nature of defining quality metrics for the open-ended, ill-defined domains studied in this
work, 2) the complex nature of ‘usefulness’ when dealing with the societal context of in-
teractive installations or performative improvisation, and 3) the often complex functional
relationships between the quality and value [207, 140]. These shortcomings of the work are
planned to be addressed in future iterations of this work by studying 1) how people relate
to this work as participants and observers, 2) practice-based and observational measures of
quality within this creative domain, and 3) how it fits within the societal context of improv
theater at multiple levels of analysis in the wild.
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Evaluating Novelty
Novelty has been used to describe how new, unique, or original a sensation, percept, or
experience is to an agent [208, 163, 209]. Through this definition, sensory percepts that an
agent experiences can be evaluated for their novelty. However, generated items that arise
from an agent’s cognition can also be evaluated similarly as though perceptually experi-
enced by the agent.
Novelty is measured in this research as the aggregated difference between a percept
and other comparable experiences that an agent has already experienced (see 1). Using
the framework discussed in section 3.3.6 about desirable properties of creativity evaluation
models, this definition has the following properties. It is dynamic, since the experienced
novelty changes over time, depending on the agent’s experiences. It is evaluated from the
perspective of the agent since the comparisons are made based on the agent’s experiences.
It does not incorporate external feedback to the agent to tune the model with human interac-
tion. It is also designed to work most efficiently when the agent is relatively inexperienced
compared to its human collaborators. Finally, the model is largely domain-independent
though it does need domain-specific knowledge for both converting percepts into a spatial
representation for applying distance-based comparisons and aggregating component nov-
elty scores together to give a total novelty score. Future work would be needed to incorpo-
rate human feedback about the novelty evaluations of the model to improve its believability
and to change the model to function more efficiently as it gains expertise from interacting
with many human collaborators over time.
Novelty evaluation in CARNIVAL is modeled using the following algorithm.
It should be noted that finding the K nearest neighbors is used in algorithm 1 as an
initial solution to the problem of selecting the set of comparable elements against which
to compare the percept. The value of K was set empirically by using the elbow method
[210]. This method was used on a graph of the absolute acceleration of the mean of mean
distances between every K nearest neighbors in a collected data set of size N for values of
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Input: Percept X, Integer K, and RTree<PerceptVector> R
Result: The general novelty score for an observed percept X
PerceptVector XVector := DimensionalityReduce(X);
PerceptVector[] NearestKNeighbors := FindKNearestNeighbors(XVector, K, R);
Distance[] NearestKDistances := GetDistances(XVector, NearestKNeighbors);
Double Novelty := Mean(NearestKDistances);
R := UpdateRTree(XVector);
Return Novelty;
Algorithm 1: ComputeNovelty(. . . )
K ranging from 2 to N
2
.
CARNIVAL’s novelty model evaluates perceived and generated action variants. Since
an action is composed of gestural content and semantic content (in the form of the pretend
action and pretend object), novelty values are calculated for each of the three components,
aggregated together, and scaled to the closed interval [0.0, 1.0]. The exact process for each
type of novelty proceeds as follows (see 1).
Gestural content in an action is represented as either a 27000-dimensional or 16000-
dimensional vector. Since nearest neighbor searches are conducted over the gesture vectors
to find its K nearest neighbors, the high-dimensional vectors representing gestural con-
tent are dimensionality-reduced using parametric T-SNE [198]. Parametric T-SNE is a
manifold-learning approach to non-linear dimensionality reduction implemented using a
neural network encoder trained on a parametric T-SNE loss function. The parametric T-
SNE model is advantageous over newer T-SNE dimensionality-reduction implementations
that are faster such as Barnes-Hut T-SNE [211] since the model [198] does not have to
be repeatedly retrained to work on new data, though the learned transformations would be
increasingly distorted over time without retraining.
The K nearest neighbors of the dimensionality-reduced gesture vector are found using
an RTree data structure [195] that performs the query in logarithmic time complexity. The
mean distance between the evaluated percept and its K nearest neighbors is used as the
gestural novelty component score. This score component is aggregated with the semantic
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novelty component score and scaled to get the final novelty score.
Semantic content in an action consists of two English words representing the action’s
pretend action and pretend object, for example, ‘looking through’ and ‘kaleidoscope’).
These are represented as two 300-dimensional word vectors from a pre-computed word
embedding [197]. The dimensionality of each word vector is reduced using a similar PT-
SNE model as the gestural content but trained on an English word data set. The dimen-
sionality reduced output vectors are used to query two separate RTree data structures [195]
that are populated with previously experienced pretend actions and pretend objects for the
respective sets of K nearest neighbors. The respective mean distances are calculated from
these sets of neighbors. These pretend action and pretend object novelty score components
are averaged to get the semantic novelty score components.
The total novelty score is calculated by computing the mean of gestural and semantic
novelty component scores. The resulting total score is adaptively scaled to get a final
score in the closed interval [0.0, 1.0]. Adaptive scaling is performed so that the expected
minimum and maximum values of the source domain can be adjusted according to the
observed minimum and maximum values generated by the creativity evaluation models.
Evaluating Unexpectedness
The creativity evaluation models in CARNIVAL measure the unexpectedness of a per-
ceived or generated action variant as a proxy for the surprise that an agent might encounter
in these situations. Unexpectedness is defined in this research in terms of the degree that an
experience deviates from the agent’s expectation for that experience. The degree of surprise
is also proportional to the confidence of the agent’s belief or expectation, i.e., the higher the
agent’s confidence in a belief or expectation, the higher the agent’s surprise if it is violated
[212].
Surprise differs from novelty in subtle but significant ways. Novelty is a global measure
of the difference between an experience being evaluated and other comparable experiences,
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regardless of what an agent might expect that experience to be like. In contrast, surprise is
the difference between an experience being evaluated and what it expects that experience
to be, regardless of how different that experience is to other comparable experiences. For
example, let us imagine a hypothetical situation where an agent is shown different images
of animals from the African savanna and is asked to identify the animal. In that context, if
the agent is shown an animal that it has seen examples of many times, say a giraffe, it can
correctly identify the animal as a giraffe. The animal is not novel to the agent. Additionally,
given that the agent is expecting to see images of animals from the African savanna, the
image of the giraffe is not surprising to it. The agent is then shown an image of a newly
discovered animal called an ‘eleppo’ which looks like a combination of an elephant and
a hippopotamus. The eleppo is different from all the other animals that are potentially
comparable to the eleppo and is thus novel to the agent. The eleppo is also quite different
from all the animals the agent was expecting to see in an African savanna context, therefore,
the eleppo is surprising to the agent.
The pattern of showing the hypothetical agent a familiar animal and then an unfamiliar
animal created from combining other animals is repeated several times, continuing the
example. The agent has built up expectations about many aspects of the game by this time,
including the categories of animals it is shown each turn, the shifting context of each round
of the game, and specifically that the second round of each pair will see an animal combined
from two other animals in the African savanna. At this point in the game, the combination
animals the agent is shown in every even-numbered turn is still different from every other
comparable animal it has seen before and is thus novel to the agent. However, the agent
has correctly learned to expect that it will see an animal that is made up of a combination
of other animals found in the African savanna and is thus not surprised by the novel animal
when it sees an image of that animal.
Continuing the example further, in the next even-numbered turn, however, the agent
sees a familiar giraffe again. The image of the giraffe violates the agent’s expectation of
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seeing an unfamiliar combination animal like the eleppo. Therefore, the agent is surprised
at seeing the familiar image of the giraffe. The image of the giraffe is not novel to the agent
though since it has seen many images of giraffes like that one in the past.
The preceding example clearly demonstrates two scenarios where novelty and surprise
can differ significantly. However, differences between surprise and novelty are often not as
clear cut. Additionally, it is not always the case that all expectations that are violated are
based on temporal patterns. In the Props game that is played within the Robot Improv Cir-
cus installation, unexpectedness can be generated from atemporal sources of expectation
violation. In that case, props that are given to the player or agent can convey expectations
for their usage as certain pretend objects over others. For example, a large prop that consists
of two spherical parts joined together by a long thin cylindrical part, would be more com-
monly expected to be used as a cartoon barbell rather than a comically large swizzle stick.
These expectations are atemporal in nature depending on the implementation of the agent’s
models, i.e., not necessarily dependent on the temporal ordering of actions observed by the
agent. However, since the degree of unexpectedness is proportional to the confidence with
which a belief is held or expectation is generated, beliefs that are reinforced or weakened
over time may give rise to more or less unexpectedness if violated, as in the case of an
agent that has a dynamic model of unexpectedness implemented. For a detailed taxonomy
of dimensions along which to inspect the various kinds of expectation used for evaluating
surprise, see [213].
In the literature, approaches to measuring surprise or unexpectedness have been divided
into those that measure the impact of an experience on an agent’s prior beliefs and those
that directly measure the deviation of an observed experience from the expected outcome
or experience [213]. This research uses both methods to compute an aggregated score for
the unexpectedness of a perceived or generated action variant.
The agent’s model for evaluating unexpectedness can be analyzed using the framework
introduced in section 3.3.6. The agent’s model of unexpectedness is dynamic since it is
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updated according to the agent’s changing beliefs. Therefore, the agent would be less
surprised over time if it repeatedly observed the initially unexpected percept in a given
context. The model measures unexpectedness from its own perspective rather than that of
the human collaborator or a potential audience. While the model does update over time
through belief updation, it does not yet tune its outputs according to external feedback in
order to potentially make its evaluations more realistic. Additionally, the model is currently
designed to be more efficient for situations where the agent has less expertise than a human
collaborator or audience, such as an interactive learning context where the agent improves
over time. The agent’s model of unexpectedness is also largely domain-independent and
could be applied to other domains in a straightforward manner with appropriate knowledge
about what distributions of beliefs would be relevant for the model in the new domain.
The agent’s general model for evaluating unexpectedness uses a combination of Bayesian
Surprise [59] and direct computation of ‘deviation from expectation’ [141] (DFE). This
model can be seen in algorithm 2. The model computes unexpectedness over the gestural
and semantic content of a perceived or generated action variant. The two scores are then
adaptively scaled to the closed interval [0.0, 1.0], as with the novelty score components,
and the mean is returned as the total unexpectedness score for the agent.
Input: Percept X, Integer KBS , Integer KDFE , and RTree<PerceptVector> R
Data: ProbabilityDistribution PerceptDistribution
Result: The unexpectedness score for a given percept X computed from Bayesian
Surprise and deviation from expectation methods
PerceptVector XVector := DimensionallyReduce(X);
Double BSScore := ComputeBSScore(XVector, KBS , R, PerceptDistribution);
Double ScaledBSScore := Scale(BSScore, 0.0, 1.0);
Double DFEScore := ComputeDFEScore(XVector, KDFE , PerceptDistribution);
Double ScaledDFEScore := Scale(DFEScore, 0.0, 1.0);




Algorithm 2: ComputeUnexpectedness(. . . )
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The component of the agent’s unexpectedness that is computed based on the impact
that an experience has on the agent’s prior beliefs is based on Bayesian Surprise [59] and
can be seen in algorithm 3. Bayesian Surprise is the aggregated difference between a
probability distribution of the agent’s beliefs before (prior distribution) and after (posterior
distribution) observing some percept, and the difference between the prior and posterior
distributions is calculated using KL Divergence [202]. According to this measure of sur-
prise, the higher the change on a prior belief due to observing some evidence, the higher
the surprise. Bayesian Surprise is computed across the gestural and semantic content of an
action variant separately and summed together.
Input: PerceptVector XVector, Integer KBS , RTree<PerceptVector> R, and
ProbabilityDistribution PerceptDistribution
Result: The unexpectedness score for a given percept X computed using the
Bayesian Surprise method
ProbabilityDistribution Prior := GetPriorDistribution(PerceptDistribution);
ProbabilityDistribution Temp := Clone(PerceptDistribution);
Temp := UpdateDistribution(XVector);
PerceptVector[] NearestKNeighbors := FindKNearestNeighbors(XVector, KBS , R);
Temp := UpdateDistibution(NearestKNeighbors);
ProbabilityDistribution Posterior := GetPriorDistribution(Temp);
Double BSScore := ComputeKLDivergence(Prior, Posterior);
Return BSScore;
Algorithm 3: ComputeBSScore(. . . )
The other component of unexpectedness computed in the agent’s model is a direct mea-
sure of the degree to which the gestural and semantic content of a perceived or generated
action variant differs from the most expected set of action variants. The algorithm for calcu-
lating this, in general, is shown in algorithm 4. The process is repeated for the gestural and
semantic components of the action variant, and the resulting scores are summed together.
Many different probability distributions could have been used to compute the Bayesian
Surprise and DFE components of unexpectedness. However, at least initially, the agent’s
expectations are conditioned on the given prop rather than on other temporal distribu-
tions (like the temporal expectation of which pretend action could follow the last one in
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Input: PerceptVector XVector, Integer KDFE , and ProbabilityDistribution
PerceptDistribution
Result: The unexpectedness score for a given percept X computed using the
deviation from expectation method
PerceptVector[] MostExpectedKPerceptVectors :=
FindKMostExpectedPercepts(PerceptDistribution, KDFE);
Double DFEScore := GetMeanDistance(XVector, MostExpectedKPerceptVectors);
Return DFEScore;
Algorithm 4: ComputeDFEScore(. . . )
a narrative). Specifically, the generated expectations are based on the conditional prob-
ability distributions — P(dimensionality-reduced pretend action vector|prop physical at-
tributes), P(dimensionality-reduced pretend object vector|prop physical attributes), and
P(dimensionality-reduced gesture vector|prop physical attributes). In the future, other con-
ditional probability distributions could also be useful for calculating the unexpectedness
component scores. These could include probability distributions such as P(dimensionality-
reduced pretend action at time=tn|dimensionality-reduced pretend action at time=tn−1)
leading to more temporally or causally coherent action variants. However, these distri-
butions are not currently used, due to a lack of data at present.
Evaluating Quality
The agent evaluates the quality of a perceived or generated action variant using a set of
domain-dependent heuristic functions as a simplistic measure of its value. At present, this
set of heuristics consists of the smoothness of the gestural content of an action variant and
the recognizability of the gestural content of an action variant (recognizability from the
agent’s perspective). The current two heuristics were chosen by considering the aesthetics
of a performed gesture and by consulting domain experts in improv theatre for their sug-
gestions as well. They could be expanded in the future to include measures of coherence
or even humor (given a computational model of humor). The general algorithm combining
the smoothness and recognizability components can be seen in algorithm 5.
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Input: Action A, Integer K, and RTree<GestureVector> R
Result: The quality score for a given action A computed from smoothness and
recognizability heuristic functions
GestureVector GVector := DimensionallyReduceGesture(A);
SemanticVector[] SVectors := DimensionallyReduceSemantic(A);
Double SScore := ComputeSmoothnessScore(GVector);
Double ScaledSScore := Scale(SScore, 0.0, 1.0);
Double RScore := ComputeRecognizabilityScore(GVector, SVectors, K, R);
Double ScaledRScore := Scale(RScore, 0.0, 1.0);
Double Quality := Mean(ScaledBSScore, ScaledDFEScore);
R := UpdateRTree(GVector);
Return Quality;
Algorithm 5: ComputeQuality(. . . )
The agent’s model of quality evaluation can be analyzed using the framework stated
in section 3.3.6. The quality evaluation model is less dynamic than the novelty and unex-
pectedness evaluation models since the smoothness component measures the same intrinsic
property of all gestures that it evaluates. However, the smoothness component can’t be used
to filter out gestures that score low in that heuristic since the agent might require a lower
smoothness gesture during improvisation or the recognizability might boost quality to a re-
quired level according to the current creative arc. In contrast, the recognizability heuristic
is dynamic because its estimation of recognizability would change over time based on the
relative frequencies of observed gestures for each semantic class (classes of pretend actions
and pretend objects) that a gesture could be labeled with as well as their relative distances
to each other. The agent evaluates quality purely from its own perspective rather than from
that of a human collaborator or audience. The quality evaluation model does not incorpo-
rate external feedback at the moment, though future versions could feasibly use a trained
classifier to recognize aesthetic quality based on feedback from collaborators or audience
members. Like the previous models described in this work, the agent’s models of quality
evaluation are also based on an agent with less experience than its human collaborators or
audience members. Unlike the previous two models, the agent’s quality evaluation model
is heavily domain-dependent. This is because quality itself, unlike novelty and unexpect-
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edness, is heavily tied to the conventions, rules, and boundaries of the specific domain in
which it is evaluated.
The smoothness of an action variant is shown in algorithm 6. The smoothness heuristic
function measures the average jerk [214] in the motion of each joint in a gesture across
three different windows sizes for aggregating the motion. This results in three vectors of
movement at different scales of resolution per joint of the agent’s pose frame. In physics,
jerk is computed as the third derivative of a positional vector (first two being velocity and
acceleration). Therefore smoothness is computed as the inverse of the mean jerk across all
joints for an agent across three resolutions of movement. An inverse scaling is used in the
heuristic since high jerk equates to low smoothness.
Input: GestureVector GVector
Data: Integer LocalWindowSize, Integer RegionalWindowSize, Integer
GlobalWindowSize
Result: The quality score for a given gesture vector GVector computed from the
smoothness of GVector
DoubleVector[] JointVectors := GetJointVectors(XVector);
Integer[] WindowSizes := [LocalWindowSize, RegionalWindowSize,
GlobalWindowSize];
DoubleVector MeanJointJerkValues;
for Integer WindowSize in WindowSizes do
DoubleVector[] AvgPoolJointVectors := AvgPoolVectors(JointVectors,
WindowSize);
DoubleVector JointJerkValues := ComputePerJointJerk(AvgPoolJointVectors);
MeanJointJerkValues := IncrementalMean(JointJerkValues, 1);
end
Double SScore := Mean(MeanJointJerkValues);
Double ScaledSScore := InverseScaling(SScore);
Return ScaledSScore;
Algorithm 6: ComputeSmoothnessScore(. . . )
The recognizability of an action variant is shown in algorithm 7. Recognizability is
intended to calculate the degree to which a gesture can be recognized as a specific pre-
tend action or pretend object. This is calculated by finding the K nearest neighbors to the
observed gesture. From this set, the mean distance between the observed gesture and all
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gestures with pretend action and pretend object interpretations matching the observed ges-
ture (intra-class mean distance) are found. The mean distance between the observed gesture
and neighbors with pretend action and pretend object interpretations that don’t match the
observed gesture (inter-class mean distance) are found next. The ratio between the intra-
class and inter-class mean distances is inverse scaled and returned as the recognizability
score.
It may not immediately be obvious how the scaled inverse of the intra-class to inter-
class mean distance ratio predicts recognizability. Examining the heuristic, this function
scores low when the inter-class mean distance is low, and intra-class mean distance is high.
This implies that the nearest gestures that do not match the observed gestures’ semantic
interpretation are nearer to the observed gesture than the nearest gestures that do match
the observed gesture’s semantic interpretation. The opposite holds for a high score of this
heuristic, i.e., previously observed gestures that match the observed gesture’s semantic in-
terpretation are nearer to it than previously observed gestures that do not. This implies that
in the former case, the gesture does not ‘look like’ other gestures that have been interpreted
the same way, and in the latter case, it does.
The models for evaluating novelty, unexpectedness, and quality return scores in the
closed interval [0.0, 1.0]. The scores form a three-dimensional point in the agent’s evalua-
tive creative space. The scores are used by the creative arc negotiation process to find the
closest generated action variant to the next target point on the creative arc.
3.4.5 Reasoning: Improvisational Response Strategies
Creative arc negotiation could be performed with an exhaustive search of generated action
variants in the creative space. However, given that a primary characteristic of improvisa-
tion is the necessity to return satisfactory responses in near real-time with a potential loss
of optimality (if optimality were even possible in movement improv), the creative arc ne-
gotiation is necessarily guided by heuristics to seek out potentially lucrative regions of the
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Input: GestureVector GVector, SemanticVector[] SVectors, Integer K, and
RTree<GestureVector> R
Result: The quality score for a given gesture vector GVector computed from a
recognizability heuristic
GestureVector[] NearestKNeighbors := FindKNearestNeighbors(GVector, K, R);
SemanticVector[] NearestKLabels := LabelGestures(NearestKNeighbors);




Distance[] MatchDistances := GetDistances(GVector, LabelMatchGestures);
Double MeanMatchDistance := Mean(MatchDistances);
Distance[] MismatchDistances := GetDistances(GVector, LabelMismatchGestures);
Double MeanMismatchDistance := Mean(MismatchDistances);
Double RScore := MeanMatchDistance ÷MeanMismatchDistance;
Double ScaledRScore := InverseScaling(RScore);
Return ScaledRScore;
Algorithm 7: ComputeRecognizabilityScore(. . . )
search space as quickly as possible. These heuristics are encoded in CARNIVAL through
improvisational response strategies.
Improvisational response strategies were introduced earlier in this chapter as formally
encoded strategies used by improvisers to generate near real-time responses during impro-
visation by bounding their search to the current improvisational context. Searching the
agent’s action space in CARNIVAL is performed by varying the parameters to the Deep-
IMAGINATION module. Therefore, improvisational response strategies are encoded as
strategies for generating parameters for DeepIMAGINATION based on the current impro-
visational context. The generated action variants are then evaluated using the creative space
localization models.
Mimicry
Mimicry is a response strategy where the agent observes the human’s action, interprets it
in terms of its learned action space, and attempts to generate the action it just saw the
human perform. In contrast to prior work in the LuminAI agent [50], where the agent
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Figure 3.19: The CARNIVAL agent architecture with the improvisational response strate-
gies highlighted.
could playback the human’s gesture exactly, CARNIVAL agents map the observed action
to a point in its learned action space (i.e., as a point in DeepIMAGINATION’s latent space),
and then try to recreate or regenerate it using DeepIMAGINATION. Therefore, the agent
will be able to mimic the user’s action to a high degree of accuracy only if it has been trained
on actions similar to what the human just performed. The converse of that statement is also
true, and the action variant CARNIVAL generates through mimicry may not look exactly
like the human action depending on its novelty to the agent. This is more realistic in terms
of what a human might expect from another human improviser in terms of both process and
result since it is unlikely that a human would be able to perfectly recreate an action that is
largely novel to them on their first try as well. The lack of exact replay is further justifiable,
given that CARNIVAL is designed to be retrained regularly on obtaining more data from
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human participants over time.
Combination
Combination is a response strategy where the agent can interpolate between N actions
that are similar (but not the same) to the current action from the agent’s past experience
and combine them together to create a new action variant. When N = 1, this is a purely
episodic recall response strategy, i.e., being reminded of a similar action from the agent’s
recent experience and no combination is actually done since there is only 1 action. How-
ever, when N > 1, this is a unique strategy where the agent is reminded of N actions, and
they are combined together into a novel action variant. When N = 2, the strategy performs
an interpolation in latent space similar to other generative models [203, 215]. Combination
for N > 2 is achieved by finding the centroid of the coordinates of the N similar (but not
the same) actions in DeepIMAGINATION’s latent space and then generating the resulting
combined action variant.
Transformation and Pattern Projection
Transformation as a response strategy was previously used in prior work as changes that
could be made to a gesture according to the specific aspects of the gesture and other func-
tional changes in the gesture’s form itself. In CARNIVAL, transformations are performed
by doing vector operations between coordinates in the latent space being used to generate
actions from DeepIMAGINATION.
The use of the DeepIMAGINATION latent space as a representation of the agent’s
learned action space is convenient for implementing action space search as well as for the
application of response strategies as search control. However, the latent space in Deep-
IMAGINATION is not directly interpretable, i.e., each dimension does not correspond to
meaningfully higher-level or usefully abstracted dimensions. Therefore, it is currently dif-
ficult to map interpretable semantics onto the latent space dimensions in order to directly
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generate transformations based on them like in prior work [50]. Transformations are thus
based on patterns that are calculated between previous human-agent turns.
Pattern projection can directly be applied by finding a vector between the actions in the
previous human and agent turns in DeepIMAGINATION’s latent space and then translating
that vector to the coordinate of the human’s current action in the latent space. This applies
the properties of the spatial relationship between the two actions in the previous turn to
the current human action. Baseline pattern application without any other transformations
added to that pattern is thus translation in the vector space. Patterns can also be found by
looking at the current action perceived by the agent, searching for the closest action from
the agent’s episodic memory (temporally backwards), and then looking at how that action
was responded to from the episodic memory, calculating the vector relationship between
those two actions and projecting that vector out from the current action in DeepIMAGINA-
TION’s latent space.
Additional affine transformations can be added to a translated vector in the latent space.
These can include rotation, reflection, and magnitude scaling of the pattern or spatial re-
lationship vector. Reflection is interpreted as applying a complementary (if not opposite)
pattern to the current action. Further research is required to better understand the inter-
pretations of spatial relationships or patterns in the latent space and to find interpretable
dimensions that can be mapped onto the latent space.
Similarity-based Recall
A simplified and constrained version of Similarity-based recall was previously presented in
prior work [50]. In prior work, this strategy was restricted to finding the most similar ges-
ture in an interpreted space. CARNIVAL’s version of the similarity-based recall response
strategy is a significant advancement over the previous version of this strategy due to the
parameterizable nature of similarity in this search. The agent can recreate the most similar
(but not same) recent action as its response, equivalent to how this was implemented in
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prior work. However, it can also recreate the least similar (or most dissimilar) recent ac-
tion. It can even generate an action variant that is arbitrarily in between the two extremes of
most similar and most dissimilar. Currently, the most similar and most dissimilar strategies
are used.
Generating Novelty, Unexpectedness, and Quality
Previous experience with the strategies in the LuminAI architecture [2] had qualitatively
indicated some trends in how people perceived the generated gestures from the different
response strategies. Mimicry seemed to be perceived as low novelty, but participants de-
scribed the experience of seeing the character repeat their actions very positively (high
value from the user’s perspective). Transformations tended to be perceived with varying
degrees of quality but had high estimations of novelty. The moment when characters did
not repeat a user’s actions but did something different was also rated as highly unexpected.
Similarity-based Recall and Pattern Application in LuminAI were perceived similarly to
Mimicry (lower novelty and higher quality), though they also created moments of unexpect-
edness in participants when they realized that the agent was not only performing mimicry.
These trends from prior work in LuminAI need to be examined in the future and deter-
mined whether they transfer to the CARNIVAL architecture and the Robot Improv Circus
installation as well. Strategies unique to or approached differently in CARNIVAL, such
as combination, pattern application, and similarity-based recall are currently not known in
terms of their predicted effects on participants for evoking novelty, unexpectedness, and
quality. Other strategies for CARNIVAL were also proposed in [176] for modulating the
perceived novelty, surprise, and value directly and could be added in the future.
Strategy Selection
Strategy selection was originally meant to be a part of CARNIVAL as a way to further
optimize the creative arc negotiation process. It was originally meant to be implemented
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Figure 3.20: The CARNIVAL agent architecture with its naive implementation of strategy
selection as parallel strategy execution highlighted.
using a learned policy mapping between the known set of strategies and the desired direc-
tion of movement in the agent’s creative space between the agent’s current location and the
next target point on the creative arc. However, for the initial iteration of the CARNIVAL
architecture, it was decided that all strategies would be executed in parallel and strategy
selection would be applied in the future.
3.4.6 Action: Performing Agent Responses
The action module in CARNIVAL receives a selected action variant once the creative arc
negotiation process is completed. The action module uses a finite state machine, inverse
kinematics (IK), and path planning over a navigation mesh (or navmesh) to perform the
action variant more realistically on stage. These features are implemented using off the
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Figure 3.21: The CARNIVAL agent architecture with the action module highlighted.
shelf tools or included features within the Unity3D game engine.
Realistic Action Playback
The action module is implemented as a finite state machine (FSM) that receives actions
and plays it back. When it is the agent’s turn in the round/game, and the reasoning module
outputs an action variant for performance, the action FSM first transitions from an idle state
to a walk-to-prop state. The agent uses path-planning over a navmesh to walk to the current
location of the agent’s prop for that turn. When at that location, the FSM then transitions
to a pick-up-prop state where it uses IK to move its hand down to the prop on the ground,
attach the prop to its hand, and stand back up using IK again. The FSM then transitions to a
walk-to-first-location state, and the agent navigates back to the location on stage where the
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first frame of the action variant will start. The agent then plays back the action variant using
IK, with the prop attached to the correct hand or controlled by the gesture representation
directly. After finishing playback of the selected action variant, the FSM transitions to a
walk-to-stage-center state and the agent walks back to the center of the stage. Then the
FSM transitions to a drop-prop state, and the agent drops the prop by detaching it from
its hand. The FSM then transitions to a walk-to-buzzer state, and the agent navigates to
its buzzer. The FSM then transitions to a hit-buzzer state, and the agent uses IK to hit the
buzzer. This ends the agent’s turn, and the FSM switches back to an idle state. For the
duration of the human’s turn, the agent turns to watch the human’s performance.
3.5 Evaluation
The research presented thus far in the chapter described the Robot Improv Circus installa-
tion and the CARNIVAL architecture as tangible boundary objects for studying the claims
made in my thesis statement. My thesis statement stated, “embodied agents that address
the improvisational action selection problem using ‘creative arc negotiation’ increase per-
ceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence in both observers and participants
while performing movement improv with non-experts.” My research questions served as
a guiding outline for evaluating the claims made in my thesis statement over the course of
this research and are repeated for convenience as follows.
RQ1 How can an agent perform parameterized action variant generation from a
learned action space based on the physical attributes of a given object?
RQ2 How can an agent improvisationally search its action space based on previous
experience and the current improvisational context?
RQ3 How can an improvisational agent computationally evaluate the creativity of
perceived or generated actions in near real-time in terms of their novelty, unex-
pectedness (as a measure of surprise), and quality (as a measure of value)?
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RQ4 How can an embodied agent select actions to negotiate a given creative arc in
order to address the improvisational action selection problem while performing
movement improv with non-experts?
RQ5 How does addressing the improvisational action selection problem while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts affect both observer and partici-
pant perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence?
The following list describes the formal evaluation plan for the research questions re-
peated above in order to evaluate the claims made in my thesis statement systematically. I
first describe two experiments to validate the implementations of affordance-based action
variant generation (RQ1) and the creativity evaluation models (RQ3) in CARNIVAL. I then
describe the next set of three experiments and aim to show that my thesis statement holds
with the following chain of evidence that they provide.
1. The improvisational action selection problem is successfully addressed by creative
arc negotiation as an approach.
2. Embodied agents addressing the improvisational action selection problem using cre-
ative arc negotiation can perform movement improv with non-experts.
3. Embodied agents addressing the improvisational action selection problem using cre-
ative arc negotiation and performing movement improv with non-experts can be in-
teracted with as a participant and experienced as an audience member.
4. Embodied agents addressing the improvisational action selection problem using cre-
ative arc negotiation can perform movement improv with non-experts so that percep-
tions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence increase for both participant and
audience member.
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3.5.1 Validating Affordance-based Action Variant Generation in CARNIVAL
DeepIMAGINATION is the parameterizable action generator for conditionally searching
the agent’s action space in the CARNIVAL architecture based on the physical attributes of
objects given to the agent (see Section 3.4.3). It was designed with the aim of enabling
an agent to search a learned action space in order to generate believable, recognizable,
and high-quality pretend action variants with similar abstract props. Therefore, validating
the component involved investigating whether the architecture allows an agent to generate
action variants that were believable, recognizable, and high-quality compared to human
actions? This was determined using a survey-driven study of non-experts evaluating human
and computer-generated actions from DeepIMAGINATION in the criteria of believability,
recognizability, and quality.
Methodology
Multiple surveys were created using Amazons Mechanical Turk platform that assessed the
believability, quality, and recognizability of four data sets related to actions from Deep-
IMAGINATION (human actions, agent mimicry of human actions, near variants of mim-
icked human actions, and far variants of mimicked human actions). The experiment was
conducted to address the evaluation question described above. Each of the four data sets
consisted of 40 gestures performed by a robot character in VR across 20 props from the
Robot Improv Circus. A GIF was recorded of the robot character performing two actions
with each prop for a total of 160 actions across all four datasets. These GIFs were then
evaluated by remote workers on the Mechanical Turk platform.
The human-generated data set comprised actions performed by a human in VR with a
robot avatar. This set of human gestures was then passed through DeepIMAGINATION
in various conditions to generate three additional data sets of actions with the same robot
avatar. The direct output of the autoencoding process made up the agent mimicry data set
as it represented the agent’s interpretation of human gestures. The third and fourth data
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sets were made up of near and far action variants (respectively) of the agent mimicry data
set. They were generated by sampling points at a radius of 0.1 and 2.0 away (respectively)
from the mimicry gestures in the CVAE model’s latent space with the exact values for radial
distance determined empirically. The same robot avatar performed these actions as well.
Each survey required the participant to watch either one or two recorded GIFs of actions
(depending on the task involved) from one of the four datasets and answer questions about
the GIF(s). In each survey, the human data set made up the human actions, and the other
three data sets made up the computer-generated actions. There were 80 participants for
tasks with single GIFs (absolute ratings) and 60 participants for tasks with two GIF com-
parisons (comparative rating in a forced-choice configuration). Each participant worked on
20 GIFs out of the entire data set of GIFs.
Believability: In order to assess the believability of the actions, two survey tasks were
given to Mechanical Turk workers. In the first survey, each participant watched a single GIF
(absolute rating configuration) at a time and answered whether they believed the action was
performed by a human in VR or generated by a computer program. The comparison was
made in order to evaluate whether participants could tell the difference between computer-
generated (CG) actions and human actions between each data set. The hypothesis was that
differences would be seen between the discrimination accuracy of the generated actions
according to which of the three CG data sets was being evaluated (indicating that at least
some groups of CG actions were as believable as human actions). Notably, if the partici-
pant’s accuracy at this task was low, it meant that the generated action was easily mistaken
for human action, and thus, the generated action variants were believable.
A second task was conducted that asked people to compare a human action from the
human actions data set with a CG action from one of the other three datasets and asked
the participant to identify which action they believed was generated by a computer. The
test helped to clarify whether participants thought that computer-generated actions were
human actions when directly comparing the two. The test also indicated how believable
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the CG GIFs were. If the participants had low accuracy in determining the identity of the
CG GIF, it would indicate that the CG GIFs were believable. The hypothesis was that there
would be significant differences in recognition accuracy across groups, indicating that the
CG actions were mistaken for human actions in some of the groups.
Recognizability: The recognizability of the actions in the four data sets was assessed
in terms of how accurately identifiable both the pretend object and pretend action were
that the character in the GIF was portraying (no written annotations were given to them in
the GIF, of course). The survey asked participants to select what they believed the robot
character was most likely enacting from a list of three options. The options were similar to
stabbing with a sword or eating with a spoon. High accuracy in identifying the actions and
objects shown in the GIF would indicate that the portrayal was recognizable overall. Our
hypothesis was that comparable recognition accuracy across groups would be seen showing
that the CG action sets were equally recognizable to human actions.
Quality: Participants were asked to determine the quality of the GIFs through two
tasks. In the first one, participants were asked to rate the smoothness and quality on a 5-
point Likert scale by looking at a GIF and evaluating it on its own. They were also asked
to state what their criteria were for quality in this domain before rating any GIFs and were
asked to use those criteria strictly during rating.
The second task was designed as a comparative rating, forced-choice configuration task.
Participants were asked which action of the two they thought was smoother and of higher
quality. Each participant was asked to define quality themselves at the beginning of the
survey and to strictly use those same criteria while rating the GIFs for quality later on.
The two measures (smoothness and user-defined quality) were used together to assess
the overall quality of each action in both tasks. If smoothness and user-defined quality were
high for each action, it would indicate that the overall quality was high. Our hypothesis was
that there would be comparable quality and smoothness ratings across groups.
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Results
Believability: The task of detecting whether a given GIF was human performed or CG was
treated as a binary classification task between the performance of the participants on the
human data set in comparison to their performance on each of the other three data sets. The
lower the participant accuracy, the stronger would be the evidence that the CG actions were
believable. In order to analyze the participant responses, a confusion matrix was created
for the four sets of comparisons: human vs. all CG, human vs. agent mimicry, human
vs. near variant, and human vs. far variant. The F1 scores for the four conditions were:
0.5251, 0.7154, 0.7163, and 0.671. Additionally, the Matthews Correlation Coefficients
for the four conditions were: 0.3308, 0.4237, 0.426, and 0.2912, respectively (all weak
positive correlations).
The results above showed that the believability of the CG actions was comparable to
that of the human actions in the absolute rating task when human vs. all CG or human
vs. far variant conditions were considered. The fact that far variants scored the highest in
comparison to agent mimicry and near variants was surprising since it was the least close
to the corresponding human point in the latent space. However, it possible that it was close
to some other human point and thus ended up generating believable actions.
Responses from the comparative rating, forced-choice configuration study of believ-
ability between two action GIFs were assessed by treating the task as a multi-class classifi-
cation problem. The options given to participants were – CG action on the left, CG action
on the right, both CG actions, and neither CG actions. As a reminder, poor participant
performance on this task would be indicative that the CG actions were highly believable.
A four-class confusion matrix was created for the four responses possible, once each
for human vs. agent mimicry, human vs. near variant, and human vs. far variant. In that
order, the F1 scores were 0.8157, 0.7925, and 0.7678, respectively. The Matthews Cor-
relation Coefficient was calculated, respectively, to be 0.5414, 0.5938, and 0.4931 (strong
positive correlations). Both results were calculated using micro-averaging due to the multi-
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class condition. The result indicated that when compared directly side-by-side to a human-
performed action, participants were able to identify the human-performed action with rel-
atively high accuracy, indicating that the actions were not as believable as desirable when
compared directly against a human-performed action.
Recognizability: Participants of the recognizability experiment were asked to identify
the actions performed by robot characters when assessing the recognizability of actions.
Their mean accuracy (standard deviation in parenthesis) was determined across the differ-
ent data sets ordered as human, agent mimicry, near variant, and far variant as 0.64 (0.26),
0.37 (0.24), 0.41 (0.23), and 0.33 (0.27). The median accuracy values for the same groups
were 0.66, 0.4, 0.4, and 0.30. This outcome is a negative result that shows that recog-
nizability for CG actions was comparable to random guessing, while human-performed
actions were twice as likely to be recognized correctly.
A Shapiro-Wilk [216] test found a non-normal distribution for the accuracy data. There-
fore, a Kruskal-Wallis omnibus rank-sum test [217] was computed on the data. The re-
sults were found to be significant, and the null hypothesis was rejected with a p-value
= 5.505771 · 10−17. A Dunns test adjusted with Benjamini-Hochberg FDR showed that all
the negative result relationships between the human data and the CG data were significant
(all p-values < 0.019641).
Quality: For the comparative rating, forced-choice configuration study of the smooth-
ness and quality of each action, the medians were calculated for the Likert scale responses
and chi-squared tests were calculated for the human data compared to each of the three data
types to see if there were significant associations between the types of data and the Likert
scale responses for smoothness (or high quality respectively). For absolute smoothness,
the median values for human, agent mimicry, near variants, and far variants were 4, 2, 2, 3
on a 1 - 5 scale from not at all smooth to very smooth. The chi-squared test reported sig-
nificance with χ̃2 = 304.9299 and a p-value < 0.00001. For absolute user-defined quality,
the median scores reported for the same data sets were 4, 3, 3, 3 on a similar scale from
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very poor quality to very high quality. The chi-squared test reported significance with χ̃2 =
265.4731 and a p-value < 0.00001.
When assessing the comparative rating, forced-choice configuration study of smooth-
ness and quality for each action, the percentage of results that were considered smoother (or
higher-quality respectively) was recorded along with chi-squared tests that were calculated
for human data compared to each of the three data types. The test was conducted to see if
there were significant associations between the types of data and the selection of the human
or computer action as more smooth (or high quality respectively). For smoothness, human
data was chosen as smoother 75.63% against agent mimicry, 77.54% against near variants,
75.30% against far variants, and 76.14% overall against all CG actions. There were no sig-
nificant differences found between the groups, with χ̃2 = 0.6701 at a p-value < 0.05. For
user-defined quality, the percentage of responses where human data was chosen as higher-
quality was 73.58%, 78.26%, 76.74%, and 76.14% for the same ordering as smoothness.
There was no significant association found either, with χ̃2 = 2.6957 at a p-value < 0.05.
Discussion
Survey-driven observer-ratings were used to validate the implementation of the affordance-
based action generation module, DeepIMAGINATION, within the CARNIVAL architec-
ture. The experiment was conducted by collecting observer-ratings of video clips of the
agent performing different types of action variants in order to evaluate the believability,
recognizability, and quality of the action variants with respect to each other. Ratings were
performed either on each variant by itself or by directly comparing human and computer-
generated variants together.
The survey-driven observer-rating study of believability, recognizability, and quality
produced mixed results. The action variants generated showed high believability in the ab-
solute rating configuration (single video clip rating) with users confused about whether it
was a human or computer-generated clip roughly half the time. The believability of gener-
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ated action variants in a comparative-rating configuration was less stellar with much higher
accuracy for humans correctly identifying the two categories. This is understandable be-
cause the absolute rating case is a more realistic condition for evaluation since there would
only be one action at a time in the actual Props game setting where this would be used. The
comparative-rating configuration could then be considered a ceiling on performance for the
agent’s generation.
The results for recognizability were clearly negative. In the task, users were match-
ing the pretend object and pretend action to three options each. The results for human
actions were more than double that of generated action variants. Additionally, the rater’s
recognition accuracy for generated action variants was as low as random guessing perfor-
mance. As a result of the low recognizability ratings from observers, the agent was given
a speech bubble and an audible robotic voice (using text-to-speech) that announced what it
was attempting to portray using template-based dialogue generation. An example can be
seen in figure 3.3. A casual pilot interaction and experience design study with three par-
ticipants was conducted with this feature both activated and deactivated, resulting in every
participant corroborating the high utility of the speech bubble and audio voice for added
participatory recognizability.
The quality of the generated action variants was evaluated in terms of smoothness and
user-defined quality. These values were comparatively high for all types of evaluated data in
the absolute rating configuration. However, there was a definite surprise in the comparative
rating version of this task. In the comparative rating configuration for comparing relative
quality between action GIFs (which was expected to be the performance ceiling condition),
25% of the time when comparing both smoothness and user-defined quality, raters preferred
the generated action variant over the human action. This was a surprising result since it was
expected that close to 0% of raters would choose the generated actions in this comparative
condition.
There were certain methodological limitations to this study, as well. Firstly, the task of
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evaluating generator outputs against each other (or by themselves), completely outside of
any context, would have been quite unusual for many human evaluators without possess-
ing a good reference point or comparison for what the expected bounds of performance
were in this task (though perhaps less so for those familiar with prop-based improv the-
atre). Therefore, the first set of results of the human evaluation task may not have truly
reflected the agent’s performance within the context of the entire CARNIVAL architecture.
Therefore, further studies have also been conducted to elaborate on the findings and lim-
itations of this first study, culminating in observer rating and in-person evaluation of the
entire CARNIVAL architecture as an improvisational partner.
3.5.2 Validating Creativity Evaluation Models in CARNIVAL
The agent’s computational models for evaluating the creativity of perceived as well as gen-
erated actions in terms of their novelty, unexpectedness, and quality were studied through a
set of validation experiments. The experiments were conducted using non-expert observer
ratings through a set of survey-driven tasks. The aim was to show that the implementa-
tion of the computational models in the CARNIVAL architecture rated the perceived and
generated actions similarly to non-expert human observers.
Methodology
An initial three-part study comparing the results of the agent’s creativity evaluation models
to the human perception of the novelty, unexpectedness, and quality of actions performed
by an agent was conducted on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. The study was con-
ducted with a sample of 50 online non-expert participants for each of the three properties
being compared. At a high level, participants were provided with video clips to compare
and asked to rate which video clip was more novel, more unexpected, or of higher quality.
Each participant was made to compare 20 pairs of video clips featuring the agent per-
forming actions from the training data set (see section 3.3.4) originally collected for the
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purposes of training DeepIMAGINATION (see section 3.4.3). Each pair was matched to
either compare two actions with a high and a low rating (experimental condition) or com-
pare two actions that both had medium ratings (control condition) for the property being
studied (say novelty). The primary study hypotheses were that there would be statistically
significant differences in the distributions of accuracy scores per participant for ratings that
matched the evaluation model’s choice for the higher-rated action between the experimen-
tal condition and the control condition in each of the three experiments involving novelty,
unexpectedness, and quality, respectively.
Each of the tasks for novelty, unexpectedness, and quality were conducted as a separate
task. Additionally, the novelty, unexpectedness, and quality ratings were calculated for
all actions in our data set, and then for each task, different actions were chosen. In other
words, the novelty evaluation task had different actions compared to the quality evaluation
task (which differed from the chosen actions for unexpectedness in turn), since the low,
medium, and high scoring actions would potentially be different for each axis of the creative
space.
For each of the studies, the properties of actions that the users were rating were defined
for the user before the task. However, there can be no guarantee that the definitions were
solely used by the user to make their choice. Additionally, each user was asked to define for
themselves criteria they would use to evaluate the creativity of an action performed with a
prop in a movie, theatrical play, or session of pretend play. They were also asked to choose
the video clip that featured the more creative action strictly using their previously-stated
criteria. They were asked at the end why they picked any notable actions over others in
terms of creativity as a way to get them to reflect on their decisions (even if it was a post
hoc rationalization).
The definitions given to participants included the following concepts and definitions
in language that tried to avoid being too technical. Novelty was defined as how different
or new or original the given action was to them in its performance as well as its intent
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compared to all the other comparable actions they might have been reminded of (even a
little bit) while watching it. Object surprise was defined as how unexpected the object was
that the current prop was imagined (or pretended) to be, given the look and feel of the
prop. For example, according to that metric, given a long cylindrical prop, it might have
been imagined to be a mop, which would be unsurprising; however, if it was imagined
to be a limp spaghetti noodle, that would be surprising. Action surprise was defined as
how unexpected a performed action was, given what object the prop was imagined (or
pretended) to be. For example, if the prop had been imagined to be a mop, it might have
been used to clean the floor, which would be unsurprising; however, if it was used to row
a boat, that would be surprising. Quality was defined as how smooth, and recognizable the
action was. As mentioned earlier, creativity was defined by the user, and they were asked
to strictly use that same definition when evaluating the actions for perceived creativity later
on. They were also asked about memorable reasons why the marked memorable actions
more or less creative than others.
Results
The results from the experimental and control conditions for novelty, unexpectedness, and
quality are displayed in table 3.1. The table shows the mean, median, and standard de-
viation for participant accuracy across each of the ten experimental and control pairings
in their task. The accuracy is calculated to mean whether the model accurately predicted
their response or not (or vice versa). The results for the user-defined creativity evaluations
across all three tasks are similarly displayed in table 3.2 and show a similar set of data.
Statistical hypothesis testing was done in order to measure the statistical significance of
our findings about the relative perceptual accuracy between the computational models of
novelty, unexpectedness, and quality. The null hypotheses (H0,1 to H0,7) stated that there
were no significant differences for results from a specific question. The alternate hypothe-
ses (H1 to H7) for each of the questions about novelty, unexpectedness (two hypotheses
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Table 3.1: Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation for participant accuracy.
High vs Low Med. vs Med.
µ M σ µ M σ
Novelty 0.4582 0.5 0.1595 0.5564 0.5 0.1619
Object Surprise 0.4818 0.5 0.1622 0.5364 0.5 0.1682
Action Surprise 0.4818 0.5 0.1645 0.54 0.5 0.1355
Quality 0.4473 0.5 0.1464 0.4 0.4 0.1427
Table 3.2: Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation for perceived creativity results from
novelty (N), surprise (S), and quality (Q) tasks respectively.
High vs Low Med. vs Med.
µ M σ µ M σ
Creativity (N) 0.4836 0.5 0.1719 0.4309 0.5 0.1538
Creativity (S) 0.48 0.5 0.1899 0.5327 0.5 0.1667
Creativity (Q) 0.4491 0.5 0.2045 0.4455 0.5 0.1942
each about the object surprise and action surprise respectively), quality, and user-defined
creativity (each task separately asked them about user-defined creativity leading to 3 alter-
nate hypotheses for each question about it). After finding non-normality in the distribu-
tions of responses using a Shapiro-Wilk [216] test, the non-parametric, repeated measures,
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test [218] was used to determine significance between the exper-
imental and control condition. The results from significance testing are in table 3.3 along
with the effect size to be interpreted as small effect > 0.1, medium effect > 0.3, and large
effect > 0.5.
Table 3.3: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for novelty, surprise, and quality task results. Bold
significant at p < 0.5. Shows P-values and effect size (φ).
Novelty Object Surprise Action Surprise Quality
p φ p φ p φ p φ
Total 0.0005 0.466 0.0731 0.242 0.0458 0.270 0.1203 0.210
Creativity 0.1123 0.214 0.0793 0.237 - - 0.9024 0.017
These results show that observers could not reliably recognize the predictions of the
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computational models for evaluating creativity in terms of novelty, unexpectedness, and
quality over actions that were performed by a robot character. The hypothesis for this
approach was that there would be significant differences in the recognition accuracy for
the different pairs (i.e., between the high-low pair and the medium-medium pair). It was
expected that if the predictions matched human perceptions for these properties of ac-
tions, then the high-low pairing would be more obviously and reliably comparable than
the medium-medium pair. However, from the results, this did not turn out to be the case.
It can be seen from table 3.3 that the only significant differences in the distributions of
responses were in the recognition accuracies between high-low and medium-medium for
Novelty and Action Surprise. However, these effects were both in the opposite direction of
significance than we had hoped for. The effect size φNovelty indicates medium effect size
while the φActionSurprise indicate a small effect. The reported accuracies for all pairs were
close to the 0.5 random selection baseline, though they were consistently slightly lower
accuracy than that baseline for most measures in the high-low pairing and consistently
slightly above that baseline for medium-medium measures.
This is a negative result from the context of validating the agent’s models for creativity
evaluation in terms of perceptual similarity with human observers. There could be many
reasons for this result, including the knowledge and expectation disparity, the difference
between the conceptual representation of the action and the actual performance of it, the
difference between experiencing the system as a participant and an observer, and even pos-
sible errors like incorrect parameter configurations in the system. Some of these potential
reasons will be discussed in the following section.
Discussion
This study aimed to validate that the ratings from the creativity evaluation models percep-
tually matched a human observer’s ratings. The study provided evidence that the creativity
evaluation models did not succeed at matching the human observers’ perceptions of con-
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cepts such as novelty, unexpectedness, quality, or creativity. It is possible that this is always
going to be the case until the system gets enough knowledge, experience, and builds ex-
pectations to match humans. Alternatively, it is possible that in order to improve the effec-
tiveness of these models, the participant’s experiences and expectations have to be teased
out through personalization and modeling. This is the approach taken by Grace, Maher,
Mohseni, and Pérez [219] and points to a potential future direction to take for this work.
Another perspective perhaps, as the saying goes, is to consider that, “all models are
wrong, but some models are useful.” Therefore, a more fundamental question might be
whether the models are evaluating some useful aspect of an improvisational collaborator’s
or audience member’s experience to make a meaningful difference in the agent while im-
provising, in terms of their perceptions of enjoyment, creativity, and coherence. If the
models are doing this already through guiding the agent’s action selection but can’t match
the quality of experience, they are evaluating to overloaded concepts like novelty, surprise,
value, or creativity that may be acceptable. Results from the next set of evaluation studies
would indicate that this is the case since the creativity evaluation models are being used to
deliver identifiable creative arc negotiation and study participants seem to prefer sessions
with creative arc negotiation across different criteria. It could also be that the task of com-
paring individual actions directly in this experiment was too challenging for raters, whereas
the longer, session-length task provided more context for them to evaluate similar parame-
ters. More study is required to disentangle what exactly the system’s creativity evaluation
models measure in this case.
3.5.3 Evaluating Creative Arc Identification with Observers
This experiment is the first of three studies that evaluate the claims made in the thesis
statement directly (RQ5). The aim of the experiment is to understand whether observers of
an improvised performance can correctly identify trends in various parameters according to
the creative arc used to drive action selection in each experimental condition. The results of
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this study, if successful, would serve to provide evidence (in concert with other results) that
a) CARNIVAL agents successfully perform creative arc negotiation and that people can
recognize that as well as that b) the improvised performances resulting from using creative
arc negotiation within CARNIVAL are meaningfully different enough to allow people to
recognize those differences in the performances (in terms of the different arcs they perceive)
and thus, at least partially address the improvisational action selection problem.
Methodology
A survey-driven, non-expert, observer-rating study was performed in an attempt to evaluate
whether we had successfully created an embodied agent architecture that enables an agent
to negotiate a given creative arc while performing movement improv with non-experts. This
was performed in combination with a pilot, in-person, non-expert, participant/interactor-
rating, laboratory study described later (see section 3.5.5). Since this was an observer-rating
study, it was designed to measure the degree to which observers could correctly identify the
nature of the creative arc in different improvised performance sessions, where the agent’s
action selection was performed by creative arc negotiation, through observation.
The three creative arcs used in the sessions for comparison were respectively rising,
falling, and level arcs. The values for each creative arc (with each creative space dimension
in the closed interval [0.0, 1.0]) were as follows. The rising arc had a linearly rising arc
over five turns of the props game, each ranging from < 0.0, 0.0, 0.5 > to < 1.0, 1.0, 1.0 >.
The falling arc had the opposite arc from < 1.0, 1.0, 1.0 > to < 0.0, 0.0, 0.5 >. Finally,
the level arc always had the scores < 0.5, 0.5, 0.5 >. Future work could also compare
level arcs with values at < 1.0, 1.0, 1.0 > or < 0.0, 0.0, 0.5 > to see how those constantly
maximum and minimum values in the creative space to the current set of arcs.
One hundred non-expert raters on Amazon Mechanical Turk were asked to watch videos
of three different sessions between a researcher and the agent (which was controlled by
creative arc negotiation). For each video, they were then asked to choose whether a given
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property of the performance was rising, falling, or level (i.e., with one-third or 33.33%
probability of selecting correctly at random). Each video was taken of the agent controlled
by one of the three creative arcs described above. The different qualities that were asked
of them were novelty, object surprise, action surprise, quality, and user-defined creativity.
All raters were given the definition of each property in the question (as defined in section
3.5.2 previously) except user-defined creativity, which they were made to define before the
rating task started. The study hypotheses were that there would be significant differences
between the different arcs in terms of relative recognition rates among all participants.
Results
The relative percentages of participants who correctly identified the option for each rated
property of the video session that observers were asked to identify as rising, falling, or level
are presented in table 3.4. It is important to note that in this task, a random baseline would
score 33.33% of its choices correctly since there are three choices from which to choose an
answer.
Table 3.4: Relative recognition percentages between arc types in creative arc identification
task. Bold is higher between pairs.
Rising Falling Level
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
Total 56.41% 43.59% 44.95% 55.05% 38.29% 61.71%
Novelty 57.14% 42.86% 37.14% 62.86% 20.95% 79.05%
Object Surprise 53.33% 46.67% 44.76% 55.24% 34.29% 65.71%
Action Surprise 47.12% 52.88% 37.14% 62.86% 42.86% 57.14%
Quality 73.08% 26.92% 61.90% 38.10% 60.00% 40.00%
Creativity 51.43% 48.57% 43.81% 56.19% 33.33% 66.67%
A Chi-Squared Test of Independence was used to calculate whether there were signif-
icant differences in relative recognition rates between the different arcs among all partic-
ipants. The null hypotheses (H0,1 to H0,5) for the five questions were that there was no
significant difference between the distributions of responses for each arc. The alternate
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hypotheses (H1 to H5) stated that significant differences did exist between the distributions
of responses for the three creative arc-driven performances. The results can be seen in table
3.5. A further Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test was performed to evaluate whether there
were significant results between correctly vs. incorrectly identifying the direction of the arc
for the given property. The null hypotheses (H0,6 to H0,10) for the five questions were that
there was no significant difference between the distributions of responses identifying the
arc for each property. The alternate hypotheses (H6 to H10) stated that significant differ-
ences did exist between the distributions of responses identifying the arc for each property.
The results for each rated property of the session from the Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test
are presented in table 3.6.
Table 3.5: Chi-Square test of independence for creative arc identification task. Bold signif-
icant at p < 0.5. φ is effect size.
X2 p φ
Total 35.3675 < 10−5 0.150
Novelty 29.1731 < 10−5 0.304
Object Surprise 7.7514 0.0207 0.157
Action Surprise 2.1444 0.3423 0.083
Quality 4.5762 0.1015 0.121
Creativity 7.0778 0.029 0.150
Table 3.6: Chi-Square goodness of fit for creative arc identification task arcs. Bold sig-
nificant at p < 0.5. φ is effect size. Object Surprise and Action Surprise contracted for
space.
Rising Falling Level
X2 p φ X2 p φ X2 p φ
Total 125.28 < 10−5 0.490 31.89 < 10−5 0.247 5.79 0.01608 0.106
Novelty 26.79 < 10−5 0.505 0.69 0.40763 0.081 7.24 0.0071 0.263
O Surprise 18.90 < 10−5 0.424 6.17 0.013 0.242 0.04 0.836 0.020
A Surprise 8.89 0.0029 0.292 0.69 0.4076 0.081 4.29 0.0384 0.202
Quality 73.92 < 10−5 0.843 38.57 < 10−5 0.606 33.60 < 10−5 0.566
Creativity 15.47 0.00008 0.384 5.19 0.0228 0.222 0 1 0
The differences in relative percentages of participants correctly identifying the rising,
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falling, and level creative arcs and the statistical hypothesis testing show that for the spe-
cific sets of significantly differing properties of the performances (i.e. for total response,
novelty, object surprise, and creativity), the videos of sessions with rising and falling arcs
could be identified reliably (note that 66% is twice the expectation for a random baseline
guess in this task due to the three options present for every question). It also shows the no-
table trend across all significantly different properties, that recognition accuracy for level
arcs is consistently and significantly as bad as random guessing. However, the effect sizes
to determine statistical differences across the different types of arcs are predominantly in
the small effect range. The Goodness of Fit results, however, show medium and large
effects consistently. They indicate that the properties of the video session that we were
interested in tracking over the course of the performance were reliably different from the
random guessing baseline recognition accuracies. This meant in general that these proper-
ties relating to the definition of creativity used in this system were reliably identifiable with
rising arcs, less so with falling arcs, and difficult to identify for level arcs. These results
are also discussed in more detail in section 3.6.1, especially their relationship to the claims
made in my thesis statement.
3.5.4 Evaluating Creative Arc Preferences with Observers
This observer evaluation study is the second of three that directly evaluates claims made
in my thesis statement (RQ5). This evaluation experiment aimed to understand the effect
of creative arc negotiation on the perceived enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence on
observers as compared to a random action selection alternative. The results of this study,
if successful at increasing these perceptions for observers, would serve as evidence (along
with other results) that a) using creative arc negotiation successfully addresses the impro-
visational action selection problem, b) at least for observers, using creative arc negotiation
increases perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence.
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Methodology
A survey-driven, non-expert, observer-rating study was performed in an attempt to evaluate
whether an embodied agent that could negotiate a creative arc while performing movement
improv with non-experts was successfully able to increase audience and user perceptions of
enjoyment and agent creativity. Since we were using an observer-rating study, we designed
it to measure the degree to which observers would prefer videos of improvised sessions
between a researcher and an agent that was controlled by either creative arc negotiation or
random sampling from the agent’s sample space (though still using affordance-based action
variant generation, just not the other two main components).
The two conditions compared in the study were a creative arc negotiating agent and
a random sampling agent. Additionally, the creative arc negotiating agent in the three
respective videos was controlled by three different creative arcs — rising, falling, and level
creative arcs. These followed the same values for the arcs in the creative space as in the
Creative Arc Identification study (see section 3.5.3).
One hundred non-expert raters on Amazon Mechanical Turk were asked to watch videos
of two different sessions between a researcher and the agent, who was either controlled by
creative arc negotiation or performing random sampling. For each video, they were then
asked to choose whether they preferred the one on the left or the one on the right in a
forced-choice configuration based on the given property of the performance. Each video
had a baseline random probability of being selected half the time (or 50%). The differ-
ent qualities that they were asked to compare were enjoyment, user-defined creativity, and
coherence. Before the study, participants were made to define creativity before the rating
task started and asked to restrict themselves to that definition of creativity during the task.
The study hypotheses were that there would be significant differences between the choice
of creative arc vs. no arc action selection as well as between the different arcs in terms of
which ones were preferred as compared to the no arc condition.
The initial study was repeated with the same methodology using videos with just the
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agent’s turns spliced together from the original video (the researcher’s actions were re-
moved). This was done to mitigate any bias in the results from the human’s actions, i.e.,
in case the human’s actions contributed positively or negatively to the degree of preference
for a certain type of response from participants. This time, however, the sample size was
increased to be one hundred twenty participants.
Results
The percentage of participants who chose the creative arc-negotiating performances vs. the
random sampling performances for each rated property of the video session are presented
in table 3.7. The properties that participants were asked about included which session
they enjoyed more, in which session did the agent seem more creative, and which session
was more coherent. It is important to note that in this task, a random choice baseline
would score 50% since there are only two choices from which to choose an answer. Clear
trends are present from the table in the relative percentages of preference for creative arc
negotiating performances and random sampling performances.
Table 3.7: Relative preferences between an arc condition and a no arc condition in creative
arc comparison task. Bold is higher between pairs.
Rising Falling Level
Arc No Arc Arc No Arc Arc No Arc
Total 69.35% 30.65% 65.06% 34.94% 28.12% 71.88%
Enjoyment 63.46% 36.54% 62.50% 37.50% 28.57% 71.43%
Agent Creativity 64.08% 35.92% 56.73% 43.27% 31.73% 68.27%
Coherence 80.58% 19.42% 75.96% 24.04% 24.04% 75.96%
A Chi-Squared Test of Independence was used to calculate whether there were sig-
nificant differences in the proportion of creative arcs selected between the different arcs
among the participants. The null hypotheses (H0,1 to H0,5) for the five questions were that
there was no significant difference between the distributions of responses for each arc. The
alternate hypotheses (H1 to H5) stated that significant differences did exist between the
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distributions of responses for the three creative arc-driven performances. The results can
be seen in table 3.8. For properties that found significance during the preceding Chi-Square
Test of Independence, a further Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test was performed to evaluate
whether there were significant results in the preference of one video performance vs. the
other with respect to specific properties about which the question was asked (e.g., about
which one was more enjoyable). The null hypotheses (H0,6 to H0,10) for the five questions
were that there was no significant difference between the distributions of responses for each
arc to the expected outcome in each case. The alternate hypotheses (H6 to H10) stated that
significant differences did exist between the distributions of responses for the three creative
arc-driven performances with respect to the expected outcomes. The results for each rated
property of the session from the Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test are presented in table 3.9.
Table 3.8: Chi-Square test of independence for creative arc comparison task. Bold signifi-
cant at p < 0.5. φ is effect size.
X2 p φ
Total 129.27 < 10−5 0.372
Enjoyment 33.09 < 10−5 0.325
Agent Creativity 23.86 < 10−5 0.277
Coherence 85.35 < 10−5 0.524
Table 3.9: Chi-Square goodness of fit for creative arc comparison task arcs. Bold significant
at p < 0.5. φ is effect size. Agent Creativity contracted for space.
Rising Falling Level
X2 p φ X2 p φ X2 p φ
Total 46.45 < 10−5 0.387 28.32 < 10−5 0.301 59.97 < 10−5 0.438
Enjoyment 7.54 0.00604 0.269 6.5 0.01079 0.250 19.29 < 10−5 0.429
Creativity 8.17 0.00427 0.282 1.89 0.013 0.135 13.89 0.00019 0.365
Coherence 38.53 < 10−5 0.612 28.04 < 10−5 0.519 28.04 < 10−5 0.519
The results of this experiment suggested there were significant, reliably detectable pref-
erences for the creative arc negotiation-driven agents, at least for observers viewing videos
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of performances and comparing it with a random sampling agent baseline. All three prop-
erties (enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence) were significantly different and showed
effect sizes ranging from small to large along with positive (and desirable) differences.
The effects for rising and falling arcs (with the effect stronger in general for rising arcs)
showed that coherence was the most improved with agent creativity and enjoyment follow-
ing closely behind.
The results from the repeat performance of this study with just the agent’s actions
spliced together in the video were analyzed exactly the same way as the previous case.
The results for recognition accuracies across arcs can be seen in table 3.10. After perform-
ing statistical significance testing, the results can be seen in tables 3.11 and 3.12.
Table 3.10: Relative preferences between an arc condition and a no arc condition in creative
arc comparison task with only agent turns (no human turns). Bold is higher between pairs.
Rising Falling Level
Arc No Arc Arc No Arc Arc No Arc
Total 84.44% 15.56% 69.08% 30.92% 21.85% 78.15%
Enjoyment 86.67% 13.33% 70.83% 29.17% 23.53% 76.47%
Agent Creativity 73.33% 26.67% 63.03% 36.97% 25.21% 74.79%
Coherence 93.33% 6.67% 73.33% 26.67% 16.81% 83.19%
Table 3.11: Chi-Square test of independence for creative arc comparison task with only
agent turns (no human turns). Bold significant at p < 0.5. φ is effect size.
X2 p φ
Total 314.01 < 10−5 0.54
Enjoyment 107.75 < 10−5 0.548
Agent Creativity 61.65 < 10−5 0.415
Coherence 158.51 < 10−5 0.664
The results for the repeated observer study with just footage of the agent taking its turns
in order showed an even stronger effect in the same direction as the previous study. This
allowed us to remove the effect of the human on the observed effects. It also allowed us
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Table 3.12: Chi-Square goodness of fit for creative arc comparison task arcs with only
agent turns (no human turns). Bold significant at p < 0.5. φ is effect size. Agent Creativity
contracted for space.
Rising Falling Level
X2 p φ X2 p φ X2 p φ
Total 170.84 < 10−5 0.689 52.28 < 10−5 0.382 113.17 < 10−5 0.563
Enjoyment 64.53 < 10−5 0.733 20.83 < 10−5 0.417 33.35 < 10−5 0.529
Creativity 26.13 < 10−5 0.467 8.08 0.00449 0.261 29.25 < 10−5 0.496
Coherence 90.13 < 10−5 0.867 26.13 < 10−5 0.467 52.45 < 10−5 0.664
to address suspicions of researcher bias, from the previous iteration of the study, in terms
of implicitly shaping the videos for evaluation. This is a valid concern since it is a co-
creative performance with creative responsibilities falling on the shoulders of both human
and computer improviser. It would be natural for there to be researcher bias or error in
constructing the comparison videos. However, the results from the repeated iteration of the
study lay those concerns to rest and improve on the previous results in terms of effect size
and increased preference for the creative arc negotiation versions of the system. Additional
discussion is also found on this topic in section 3.6.1 and how it relates to the claims in my
thesis statement.
3.5.5 Evaluating Creative Arc Improvisation with In-Person Participant Pilot
This pilot, participant study is the final of three that directly evaluates claims made in
my thesis statement (RQ5). The aim of this study was to repeat the previous two stud-
ies conducted for observer ratings and understand how the use of creative arc negotiation
would affect participants in terms of their perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and
coherence. If successful at increasing these perceptions for participants, the results would
provide further evidence for a) the ability of creative arc negotiation to address the im-
provisational action selection problem and b) that using creative arc negotiation increases
perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence.
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Methodology
A pilot, non-expert, participant-rating, laboratory study was conducted to get quantitative
and qualitative feedback about the experience of interacting with the CARNIVAL archi-
tecture in the Robot Improv Circus installation. The study was aimed at understanding
whether participants/interactors could 1) identify whether the qualitative trends of different
properties of an improvised performance matched the specific creative arc that the agent
used to guide action selection and 2) whether they preferred the subjective experience of
interacting with the agent when it was using creative arc action negotiation or random sam-
pling from its action space to guide action selection. Additionally, since the study was
intended as an initial small-scale pilot study, importance was given to both the quantitative
responses that were received and the semi-structured interview content.
A total of 18 participants were recruited for the initial pilot study in two batches of
6 and 12 from a non-expert student population. However, due to differences in the tasks
performed by the two batches of participants, the number of responses for the tasks and
individual questions in the study differed between either 12 or 18 (these differences will
be noted when reporting results). Participants were first given a pre-study experience ques-
tionnaire to complete. They were then given an opportunity to get familiar with how to use
the VR system and the specific installation through a tutorial VR environment and a set
of trial rounds for the installation, respectively. Participants were next placed into one of
three groups at random and continued on to complete the two study tasks. The groups in
which each set of participants were placed will be explained in the individual contexts of
the two study tasks later. Finally, the study concluded after participants were debriefed and
compensated for their participation.
The first of the experimental tasks was creative arc comparison. For this task, the
participant was asked to perform two rounds of improvisation with the agent. The agents
were in different action selection conditions according to the specific task group that the
participant was assigned to for each session. After improvising with the agent twice, the
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participant was asked to compare the two sessions through a survey and a semi-structured
interview. The groups that participants were assigned to for this task were 1) rising arc vs.
no arc/random sampling, 2) falling arc vs. no arc/random sampling, and 3) level arc vs. no
arc/random sampling. The ordering for conditions within each group was randomized as
well.
The session comparison questionnaire for these tasks asked the following two to three
questions depending on which batch of the pilot was being run. “1) Which of the sessions
did you enjoy more?” “2) In which of the sessions would you say your partner was more
creative overall?” “3) Which of the two sessions would you say was more logical over-
all?” The first two questions received 18 responses, while the third question received 12
responses. Additionally, for the second question, participants were asked to reflect on their
own definition of creativity before completing this questionnaire and were asked to clar-
ify that definition during the semi-structured interviews. For both questions, participants
could select between the response options — session 1, session 2, both equally, and not
sure. During the semi-structured interview, participants were asked questions to clarify
their definition of creativity used in the previous questionnaire, memorable reasons or ex-
amples of interactions that led to them picking one session over the other for creativity or
enjoyment, and other reasons why they preferred one session over the other. Participants
were also asked for open-ended feedback on the interaction, experience, or other aspects of
the sessions.
The second experimental task was creative arc identification. For this task, the partic-
ipant performed two rounds of improvisation with the agent and answered questions after
each session about their experience. Each session was evaluated with a questionnaire and
a semi-structured interview. In this task, the three groups that participants were assigned to
at random were 1) rising arc vs. level arc, 2) falling arc vs. level arc, and 3) rising arc vs.
falling arc.
The session evaluation questionnaire for the arc identification task included the fol-
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lowing kinds of questions. 1) Whether novelty, object surprise, action surprise, and user-
defined creativity (with definitions for each property except user-defined creativity pre-
sented to them as defined in section 3.5.2) increased, decreased, or stayed the same over
time. 2) The level of overall quality (with the definition for quality presented to them as de-
fined in section 3.5.2) for the agent’s actions performed from very low quality to very high
quality on a five-point Likert scale. 3) Their level of agreement, on a five-point Likert scale
from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree,’ to the statement, “Over time, my enjoyment of
the experience increased.” The semi-structured interview questions involved asking them
what their definition of creativity was that they used for the questionnaire, whether there
were memorable reasons or examples to explain their responses to the various performance
trend questions. Additionally, participants were also asked for open-ended feedback on the
interaction, experience, or other aspects of the sessions.
Results
The results from the different questionnaires for the two study tasks are summarized and
presented in tables 3.13 and 3.14 as well as table 3.15. The first table summarizes the
relative differences in four possible preferences (creative arc, no arc, both, or neither) be-
tween the two conditions compared in the task (creative arc and no arc). The second table
shows the result of performing a Chi-Square goodness of fit test on the combined data for
comparing creative arc sessions against no arc sessions. Note that for both analyses of the
creative arc comparison task, the sample size was too small to split the conditions feasibly
according to arc type. The sample size for the creative arc identification study was not large
enough to show statistically significant differences in the distributions of results across arcs.
The initial results from the study will be expanded in the future, and the evidence will be
re-reviewed after increasing the sample size to get more confident results. Discussion of
the implications of this study as it relates to the thesis statement for this dissertation can be
found in section ??.
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Table 3.13: Relative preferences for arc, no arc, both, or neither between a creative arc
session and a no creative arc (random action selection) session in the participant-rating
creative arc comparison task. Bold is highest for the row. N is sample size.
Creative Arc No Arc Both Neither N
Enjoyment 38.89% 33.33% 27.78% 0% 18
Agent Creativity 55.56% 27.78% 5.56% 11.11% 18
Coherence 58.33% 8.33% 25% 8.33% 12
Table 3.14: Chi-Square goodness of fit between combined arc and no arc sessions for the
participant rating creative arc comparison task. Bold significant at p < 0.5. φ is effect size.
N is sample size.
X2 p φ N
Enjoyment 6.44 0.09188 0.598 18
Agent Creativity 10.89 0.01234 0.778 18
Coherence 8 0.04601 0.816 12
The qualitative results from the semi-structured interviews are still being analyzed.
However, they have already resulted in some useful questions for guiding the future di-
rections of this research. This includes questions about the implementation of creativity
evaluation models in the future and questions about the installation and interaction design
for an improvisational agent-based interactive installation. Some of the initial questions
that have arisen from reflection about them so far are as follows. 1) How could the in-
teraction design for the user change to better enable access to framing information that
non-experts can understand to explain how the agent’s creative process currently works?
This question became relevant when discussing the participants’ mental models of how the
agent arrived at a particular response. Some initial ideas on this topic can be seen in [220]
2) While some existing works have shown that framing does not have to be truthful, what
are the performative affordances for visualizing the system’s actual reasoning process to an
audience versus a post-hoc explanation? This question arose as a follow up to the previous
question during discussion within the research team. 3) Given how differently people seem
to experience the outputs of the creativity evaluation models, does the model need to local-
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Table 3.15: Session creative arc identification results for participants in pilot study. Four
participants P1 - P4 per creative arc type.
Arc Type + Question P1 P2 P3 P4
Rising Q1: Novelty Rising Level Rising Level
Falling Q1: Novelty Rising Level Rising Rising
Level Q1: Novelty Rising Rising Level Falling
Rising Q2: Object Surprise Rising Level Level Falling
Falling Q2: Object Surprise Falling Level Level Rising
Level Q2: Object Surprise Rising Rising Level Rising
Rising Q3: Action Surprise Rising Rising Rising Falling
Falling Q3: Action Surprise Falling Rising Level Falling
Level Q3: Action Surprise Falling Rising Rising Rising
Rising Q4: Quality Moderate Low Moderate Very Low
Falling Q4: Quality Low Moderate Low Very Low
Level Q4: Quality Low Moderate Low Low
Rising Q5: Creativity Rising Level Level Rising
Falling Q5: Creativity Level Level Rising Rising
Level Q5: Creativity Rising Rising Level Rising
Rising Q6: Enjoyment Increased Agree Agree Neither Strongly Agree
Falling Q6: Enjoyment Increased Agree Neither Agree Strongly Agree
Level Q6: Enjoyment Increased Agree Strongly Agree Agree Agree
ize its computation for the current user to be effective? Initial work in this area from [219]
suggests that it could be an effective strategy when dealing with the variety of human ex-
periences. However, this is difficult to implement when the agent’s expertise is much lower
than the human collaborator’s experience level (see section 3.3.6). 4) Users had conflicting
feedback on why something was good or bad. At least some of the conflict seems to arise
from who is being modeled as the experiencing agent for the creativity evaluation models.
Therefore, the following question arose as a potential direction for future exploration. How
can the agent model and combine multiple perspectives (e.g., audience vs. interactor) for
computationally evaluating creativity? 5) Finally, the discussions with participants resulted
in a fundamental question about the creative goals for the installation. Ultimately, who is
this installation for the audience or the interactor, and how should the design change to
make that clearer? Perhaps if framed for the participants as a performative, rather than,
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participatory, installation, the expectations for the experience would be clearer to a non-
expert (in contrast to a professional improviser who would subtly prioritize the audience’s
entertainment above other considerations). These questions aren’t necessarily easy to an-
swer, but they point to future directions for exploration of this work in the installation and
experience design space.
3.6 Discussion
The preceding set of evaluation studies with observers and participants of improvised per-
formance from the installation aimed to evaluate the claims in my thesis statement. In this
discussion section, results from all three evaluation experiments are synthesized together
in the following subsection. This is followed by a summative discussion subsection that
compares the evidence from these studies against the claims in my thesis statement to draw
conclusions its validity.
3.6.1 Evaluating Improvisation Using Creative Arc Negotiating with Observers and Participants
The aims for the three creative arc improvisation evaluation studies was to understand better
if the creative arc negotiation that the agent was performing actually made a difference to
users of the improvised performance whether as observers or participants. For example,
could observers and installation participants actually understand what kind of creative arc
an agent used in a given performance? Additionally, aside from identifying a difference
between these arcs, would observers or installation participants actually prefer sessions of
improvisation guided by this form of action selection?
The strong results from both of the studies involving observers comparing videos of
improvised performances with different creative arcs or performances with and without
creative arc negotiation were particularly notable to me for several reasons. Firstly, the
results from both studies suggested that despite the perceptual (or conceptual) mismatch
between observer ratings and ratings from the agent’s creativity evaluation models about
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actions within the domain (as evidenced by results in section 3.5.2), the agent was able to
produce a meaningful impact to an observer’s experience based on the presented experi-
mental variations. Secondly, the result that observers strongly preferred sessions where the
improv was guided by creative arc negotiation for action selection in comparison to ran-
dom sampling of the agent’s action space in terms of enjoyment, agent creativity, and co-
herence was a fundamental demonstration that creative arc negotiation did, in fact, address
the improvisational action selection problem, at least for observer ratings of the improvised
performances. Thirdly, the result that observers could identify differences between all three
kinds of arcs and preferred them (in comparison to random sampling) to different degrees
indicated that certain arcs might be better suited for improvised performance than others,
at least for observers. The existence of these preferences makes sense given the large body
of literature on the presence of specific (and limited) sets of arcs across narratives for dra-
matic tension and plot [221, 222, 223] or character affect [224]. Future work might have
creative arcs over longer sessions that rose and then fell accordingly. Fourthly, the result
that observers had a significant preference for random sampling over a flat arc was initially
unexpected. However, this could provide additional support for my dissertation’s thesis that
a continuously evolving experience over time results in increased enjoyment, coherence,
and perceptions of creativity, at least for observers and for the particular medium-level arc
that was evaluated.
The results from the in-person installation participant ratings indicated similar results
for creative arc preference for agent creativity and coherence but not for enjoyment (which
needed more data and study to show a significant preference conclusively in either direc-
tion). Creative arc identification did not yield significant results either, possibly due to
the much smaller sample size and the resulting loss of statistical significance. The sample
size was also too small to split the data according to arc type for the creative arc prefer-
ence/comparison studies, and so the results are presented purely in comparison of creative
arc negotiation (with any arc type) and no arc (i.e., random sampling) action selection.
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The results from the two observer studies demonstrate strong effects in the hypothe-
sized direction and provide strong evidence to verify the claims made in my thesis state-
ment. The claims were also partially supported (to different degrees) by the results of the
pilot in-person installation participant studies (conclusively supporting it, despite the small
sample size, for increases in participant perceptions of agent creativity and coherence but
requiring more study/data to do the same for participant enjoyment). This is quite likely
due to the small sample size; however, there is some evidence from [225, 226] that suggests
that interactors in the midst of an ephemeral improvisational experience may have trouble
keeping track of longer-term effects. Kelso, Weyhrauch, and Bates [225] describes this as a
positive effect of interactive narrative experiences, saying that interactive narratives do not
need to preserve narrative coherence as strongly as other forms of narrative since partici-
pants will not be able to keep track of these longer-term causal links in any case. However,
perhaps the converse also applies to methods that attempt to show meaningful differences
in user experience for participants between different experimental interventions that em-
ploy system ablation. Kelso, Weyhrauch, and Bates’s finding also implies that it could
be more difficult to demonstrate working interventions in the user’s experience based on
longer-term effects in ephemeral, but temporally extended, participatory experiences like
movement improv.
3.6.2 Evaluating Thesis Statement
My thesis statement states that “embodied agents that address the improvisational action
selection problem using ‘creative arc negotiation’ increase perceptions of enjoyment, agent
creativity, and coherence in both observers and participants while performing movement
improv with non-experts.” The preceding section of this chapter presented a set of experi-
ments for evaluating the claims in that thesis statement. Throughout this section, I discuss
the results of those experiments and draw conclusions about the validity of my thesis state-
ment.
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The agent architecture CARNIVAL was designed directly to enable embodied agents
to use creative arc negotiation (albeit tailored to the Props game domain in some aspects).
Additionally, the results of the observer-rating creative arc identification study showed that,
at least for observers, the improvisational partner was able to select actions to follow a cre-
ative arc over the course of the improvised performance. This result was not fully replicated
with statistical significance in the laboratory participant-rating evaluation due to the sam-
ple size constraints on the study. However, at least for observers, my results validate the
claim that embodied agents within CARNIVAL successfully demonstrate the usage of
creative arc negotiation.
It is valid to claim that the agent architecture enabled improvisational agents to select
actions in near real-time, at least within the constraints of the chosen domain to facilitate
successful improvisation, since both participants were able to perform alongside the agent
and observers rated the improvisational performances higher than ‘no arc’ action selec-
tion. Additionally, different versions of the creative arc negotiation agents (with different
creative arcs) showed accurately identifiable differences in observer experiences and dif-
ferent versions of the agents (creative arc negotiation vs. no arc action selection) showed
consistently different preferences for those experiences (at least for observers). Finally,
the improvised sessions with creative arc negotiation were rated better for coherence than
an alternative that did not use creative arc negotiation. Therefore, it is valid to claim that
the improvisational action selection problem is successfully addressed by creative arc
negotiation as an approach, with strongly positive evidence from observers but with
initially positive evidence from participants that needs further study to become more
conclusive.
It has also been shown through public demonstrations/exhibitions, feedback from par-
ticipants, and the participant-rating in-person study of creative arcs that the Robot Improv
Circus is an installation that successfully allows participants to perform movement im-
prov with an embodied improvisational agent. Further audience members can successfully
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watch, cheer, and give supportive feedback to participants within the installation through
the design of the installation. Observers also prefer the version of the installation that per-
forms creative arc negotiation in terms of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence. These
results are partially replicated for in-person participants as well (with more study needed
to show a conclusive preference for enjoyment ratings). Therefore, embodied agents ad-
dressing the improvisational action selection problem using creative arc negotiation
(as shown in the preceding paragraph) can successfully perform movement improv
with non-experts. Furthermore, this interaction with the installation experience can
occur as either a participant or an audience member.
The results from the creative arc identification and creative arc preference/comparison
studies show that, at least for observers, there is conclusive evidence that action selection
using creative arc negotiation is preferred over an alternative that used random sampling
action selection in terms of observer perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coher-
ence. This evidence was even stronger when the human partner’s actions were removed
from the task, and only the agent’s actions were evaluated. Similarly, for participants of
the installation, initial evidence showed that perceptions of agent creativity and coherence
were higher for improvised performances with creative arc negotiating agents (perceptions
of enjoyment require more study to show a preference conclusively in either direction).
Therefore, it is valid to conclusively state that embodied agents addressing the impro-
visational action selection problem using creative arc negotiation (as shown earlier)
can perform movement improv with non-experts so that perceptions of agent creativ-
ity and coherence increase for both participants and audience members, but that per-
ceptions of enjoyment only conclusively increase for observers. More study and data




This chapter of my dissertation presented my research into improvisational agents for
movement improv domains using creative arc negotiation and how that affected differ-
ent aspects of observer and participant experience. This was done with the eventual goal
of enabling unconstrained human-computer embodied narrative improvisation in the fu-
ture. The research presented in this work involved creating a VR interactive installation
for human-computer movement improv in the Props game domain, creating an improvi-
sational agent architecture for addressing the improvisational action selection problem in
movement improv through creative arc negotiation, and evaluating the installation and ar-
chitecture according to the claims in my thesis statement. This section is a discussion of
the opportunities for future research in this area, the limitations of current research, and
future expansions or additions planned for this work.
3.7.1 The CARNIVAL Architecture
The CARNIVAL architecture for controlling improvisational virtual agents while perform-
ing movement improv with people was primarily designed to address the improvisational
action selection problem by creative arcs and creative arc negotiation to follow a trajectory
in its creative space over the course of an improvised performance. This idea was partly
inspired by the different types of arcs that are present in various creative domains and pro-
vide structure for interpreting and (possibly) generating artifacts from those domains. For
example, Aristotelian dramatic arcs [221] or Freytag’s Triangle [222] represent trajectories
of drama and tension within a narrative. It was also partly inspired by interactive narrative
research such as Mateas and Stern’s Façade, which successfully used Aristotelian dramatic
arcs to control the sequencing of story fragments called ‘beats’ together and guide user
experiences to follow a narrative arc over the course of the resulting interactive narrative.
The CARNIVAL architecture primarily used repeated cycles of learning from demon-
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stration and improvisation with that learned knowledge as a way to train a model to perform
affordance-based action variant generation the Props game domain. This process enabled
the use of a deep generative model for action variant generation from the agent’s learned
action space. The training requirements for the deep learning model enforced a cyclical
batch learning approach to training the model. This was an effective strategy for learn-
ing to generate variants from a large, continuous, searchable action space using a batch
of demonstrations. However, it did mean that the system could not perform interactive
learning over the lifetime of the agent, expanding its experience over time.
Future alternatives to the current approach of repeated learning, performance, and re-
training, could instead focus on retraining a copy of the model every N turns and then
swapping it with the original model in order to update the agent’s action space with new
actions perceived from the agent’s human collaborator with an online (rather than offline)
approach. Instead of retraining and then replacing the old model, another approach could
be to use a technique for combining generative networks like Guzdial and Riedl’s Combi-
nets [227] to create a blended network for the agent to use. In all such cases, new questions
arise that would need to be addressed. Firstly, since the system also learns episodic pat-
terns of action over time and the newly replaced or blended models would almost certainly
not map the same conceptual action classes to the same location in the new model’s latent
space, is there a way to procedurally maintain a mapping between the old and new coor-
dinates of the two models that is updated along with each model update? This would also
have to be done without interrupting the flow of execution for the agent.
Secondly, batch learning is done at present in order to allow the agent to replace its
current model of the action space with a new model of the action space without interrupting
the flow of the improvised performance (since it is done between performances). Since new
actions would also need to be segmented correctly and include all the ground truth semantic
interpretation annotations for the newly added gestures, there is an open question about
how best to obtain this new knowledge without interrupting the flow of the improvised
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performance and break the user’s immersion. This is another question that would need to
be addressed before the CARNIVAL architecture can use an online approach to interactive
learning. Acquisition of the segmented gestures and semantically interpreted knowledge
is currently made by human annotators segmenting and annotating the newly collected
data. Any online learning approach would also need to perform this segmentation and
annotation automatically. With enough time, this might be possible using semi-supervised
learning. However, given the open-ended nature of the domain and the relative lack of
knowledge/experience for the agent in comparison to their human collaborator, it might be
best to query them for the appropriate interpretative labels interactively. Users could also
be made to segment gestures better through improved interaction design. This particular
approach is straightforward future work at the moment. The main source of uncertainty
would be the nature of interaction design to best enable this sort of interactive learning
approach without pulling participants out of their improvisational experience too much.
Speech-based inputs have been considered but haven’t been added yet. Speech-based inputs
can suffer from recognition accuracy, however, especially for accented speech. In order to
better segment the action, participants could be trained to hit a buzzer at the start and
end of their turn, rather than only at the end as it currently works. Further segmentation
optimization could occur through advances in automated gesture segmentation (like [2])
tailored to the domain.
An alternative approach that could enable the agent to learn from interactors over its
lifetime in this work without replacing the existing learning pipeline with other interactive
learning approaches (as was the focus of prior work [2]) is to somehow collect more training
data in the form of actions (with both gestural and semantic components). Work on this
approach has already started and is currently being explored further and integrated. A
computer vision pipeline based on [228] has been trained to extract 3D human gestural
data from videos. The current plan is to use this on YouTube videos as a way to extract
gestural data from them. The system does not work with moving cameras at present, so
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video selection will also need to be performed before training or camera movement will
need to be detected and compensated for using additional techniques like [229]. Another
required improvement is that this pipeline does not currently extract semantic data from
the videos in addition to the gestures. Therefore, future work would also investigate the
extraction of descriptive natural language tags for gestures in those videos (similarly to
[230]). Results could potentially be improved by training the action extraction pipeline on
a combination of inputs consisting of matched sets of movies, scripts, and subtitles.
The affordance-based action generation used in this work to conditionally generate ac-
tion variants based on the physical attributes of the object was designed to encode a learned
mapping between the physical attributes of objects and the actions that could be generated
with them. This proved to be a successful strategy for partitioning the action selection
to appropriate objects as well as to generalize the generation to similar objects that the
model was not explicitly trained on but had similar physical attributes. However, the action
variants generated from DeepIMAGINATION have a lot of room to improve in different
ways. There are definite problems with modal collapse to some extent in the network.
This reduces its ability to generate action variants to match the ‘true’ distribution of ap-
propriate action variants from the agent’s action space. Current work on this aspect of the
research focuses on improving the different architectural variants used to implement Deep-
IMAGINATION. Current research suggests that we could combine CVAE with adversarial
approaches similar to [117] to arrive at better action variants. Future work could also add
significant contributions to the field by exploring improvements in the interpretability of
the model’s latent space as well.
The physical attributes representation for objects that was used in the affordance-based
action variant generation was iteratively refined by annotating Whose Line Is It Anyway?
[175] Props game props and refining the schema as challenges were faced. The current
representation conditions the DeepIMAGINATION model to implement affordance-based
action generation. However, the current implementation of this vector representational
140
schema loses the spatial and ordering relationships between the respective parts of the prop.
This could be addressed by using graph embeddings to learn the spatial and ordering encod-
ing of the prop’s parts while successfully being able to condition the DeepIMAGINATION
model with only minimal adaptations to the generative model architecture. Therefore, this
is a near term goal for the future of this representational schema in order to improve the
affordance-based action variant generation.
A long-term goal for the current object representation would be to automatically derive
the formal physical attributes for unfamiliar props based on their 3D models (either mesh-
based or point cloud-based). This could be done by automatically segmenting the parts of
the model and then classifying the segmented parts into their respective attributes (expand-
ing on [231, 232, 233]). This addition remains a long-term goal for the research due to
the significant computer vision challenges for developing a general system to perform this
classification task.
The improvisational response strategies developed to optimize action space search and
follow a creative arc in the agent’s creative space were adapted from prior work in the
LuminAI installation [50]. They were adapted from that research to work directly within
the parameter space of the DeepIMAGINATION latent space. This was done by mapping
strategies to conceptual ‘moves’ or operations within the latent space and utilizing the vec-
tor properties of that latent space. This has resulted in responsive creative arc negotiation
behavior for the agent, that at least for observers and to different degrees for participants as
well, elicits significant increases in perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coher-
ence.
The formalized improvisational response strategies, however, do not cover a full spec-
trum of strategies that improvisers have been known to use [19, 58]. This includes both
strategies that operate longer-term sequences than just the last action for example, being
able to implement longer-term improvisational conventions about procedurally establishing
and violating patterns. This particular example could be implemented using the creative arc
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itself; however, this is certainly not guaranteed to be the case. Therefore, there is a larger
question about how best to conceptualize or modulate interactions between a long-term
action selection mechanism (creative arc negotiation) and the short-term opportunistic se-
lection of actions (using improvisational response strategies). It is particularly important
to balance the (relatively rare) potential experiential benefits of formalizing this knowl-
edge with the amount of engineering and meta-authoring that the implementation process
involves.
Another potential area of future work for adding to the improvisational response strate-
gies is to directly attempt to generate actions with specific values in the agent’s creative
space. An example of this would be an unexpectedness-generation strategy, which would
integrate more closely with the surprise calculation measures to directly generate actions
that were unexpected. Another strategy in this vein would be a novelty-generation strat-
egy. This is already almost possible using the similarity-based recall strategy since it can
choose strategies at a given distance from the current action from the agent’s action space.
However, that is not a direct mapping to novelty, but a measure of gestural similarity (nov-
elty is aggregated similarity compared across all the different aspects of a given action and
bounded by a set of comparable actions). Quality-generation strategies would then need
to integrate with and optimize the agent’s quality metrics to generate actions with a given
quality score directly. These purely theoretical examples of strategies might all be use-
ful to the agent to speed up generation, however, at that point, the architecture potentially
would not need the other strategies since the three of these strategies could directly perform
creative arc negotiation in the agent’s creative space.
Strategy selection to optimize the exploration of regions of the agent’s action space
is a component of CARNIVAL that has been reserved for future research. One possible
method for accomplishing strategy selection toward this end would be to learn a policy for
the relative change in the agent’s position within the creative space, based on the selected
strategy. The application of this learned policy would allow the agent to choose the top N
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strategies that are most likely to move the agent in the direction of the target point on its
current creative arc based on its current location in the creative space.
The CARNIVAL agent’s use of creativity evaluation models is what enables it to follow
a given creative arc. A few different techniques were used to implement evaluation mod-
els for the novelty, unexpectedness, and quality of perceived and generated actions. From
sections 3.5.4 and 3.5.5, it can be seen that the improvisational agent was able to success-
fully influence the perceptions of observers and participants to significantly increase their
perceptions of enjoyment (for observers), agent creativity, and coherence. Additionally,
depending on the creative arc, (at least) observers were able to correctly identify some of
the trends in the creative arc in terms of the properties of novelty, object surprise, action
surprise, quality, and user-defined creativity. However, given the results of the paired com-
parison tasks that directly involved observers identifying which of two actions had a higher
score of those same properties, the models performed badly. More detail is used to under-
stand this finding in section 3.5.2, but from the current results, it is clear that the models
need to be improved. Additional work needs to be done to mitigate the apparent para-
dox between the model’s low prediction (or user recognition) accuracy across individual
actions and the fact that heuristic-guided search using those same models seems to signifi-
cantly positively impact observer perceptions of the resulting experience over longer-term
comparisons of experience.
Future work to improve these models could include the following techniques. All three
sets of models could use user feedback to tailor their recommendations to the individual or
population of individuals over time. For the agent’s model of unexpectedness, in particu-
lar, additional confidence-based modulation (or thresholding) as well as a more thorough
computational affect model based on a validated theory of affect (such as appraisal the-
ory [205] or the somatic marker hypothesis [206]) is required to develop the model into
one that measures surprise (rather than unexpectedness). The model of unexpectedness
could also use mechanisms for interactive learning to incorporate temporal expectations
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across actions over time from the agent’s growing experience (see [1] for some initial
ideas). Alternatively, this temporally-sequential expectation could be learned using nar-
rative knowledge-acquisition system such as [234, 235, 236]. The agent’s quality evalua-
tion model could also gain from incorporating additional quality heuristics for this domain.
This set of heuristics could include the aesthetic pleasantness of an action, learned func-
tions approximating user-generated ratings for actions, investigating computational models
of humor, and adding other measures of action coherence over time.
The main hypothesis guiding the CARNIVAL architecture was that agents could mit-
igate the improvisational action selection problem to create experiences that were more
enjoyable, with agents that seemed more creative, and to improvise performances that
seemed more coherent by using creative arc negotiation for agent action selection. This
approach seems to have been relatively successful, at least to observers of the installation,
given the results of the creative arc identification and creative arc comparison (see sections
3.5.3 and 3.5.4). Initial results suggested that this was also the case, albeit to a lesser ex-
tent, for participants as well with the results from in-person preference studies (see section
3.5.5). This approach was originally conceived as being applicable not only to movement
improv but also as a more general embodied model of improvisational creativity. With
some adaptation, the core ideas of the model could also be distilled into a general model of
improvisational creativity (regardless of the degree of embodiment). The validity of these
claims for generality needs to be evaluated by adapting this model to other domains of
embodied creativity. This is an important direction of future work for this research.
Another direction for improving this model of intrinsically motivated creative arc-
negotiation for action space search could be to expand the number and kinds of spatial
dimensions that the agent can measure and explore. These added dimensions could include
measures of the social cognition like Guckelsberger, Salge, and Colton coupled empower-
ment maximization [160] or models of affect like [237]. However, there is a potential open
question about the process of adding dimensions to the model. At what architectural level
144
would a new dimension be added to the model? Is it merely a measure of quality, or does
it warrant addition as a fully explorable dimension in its own right? Additionally, until
there is a mechanism for the agent to learn which arc to use or to personalize the arc to a
particular individual, designers who create need to be able to map the intended experience
to the dimensions of the arc. Finally, adding more dimensions for the agent to evaluate
for every candidate action could also slow the agent down beyond a reasonable level of
improvisational responsiveness.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter presented my research into improvisational agents for performing movement
improv in the Props game domain with non-experts within the Robot Improv Circus VR
installation. The embodied virtual agents were controlled by the CARNIVAL architecture
to enable them to perform creative arc negotiation for action selection in order to primarily
address the improvisational action selection problem. The chapter discussed the details of
the installation and the architecture before describing a number of validation and evaluation
experiments used to investigate the claims in my thesis statement for this dissertation. The





My dissertation presented the following thesis statement about improvisational agents and
embodied co-creativity for evaluation.
Embodied agents that address the improvisational action selection problem us-
ing creative arc negotiation increase perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity,
and coherence in both observers and participants while performing movement
improv with non-experts.
I described research into building and evaluating a movement improv installation be-
tween embodied improvisational agents and non-expert human participants as well as a
human audience, in order to investigate my thesis statement. I described an interactive
VR installation for playing the Props game with a virtual robot character, called the Robot
Improv Circus, and the Creative ARc Negotiating Improvisational Virtual Agent pLatform
(CARNIVAL) agent architecture, for enabling embodied virtual agents to improvise with
non-expert human collaborators using creative arc negotiation as an action selection mech-
anism.
The improvisational action selection problem and how it could be addressed when situ-
ated within an improvisationally complex and semantically (or narratively) representational
domain like the Props game (in comparison to prior work [50]) was investigated through
this dissertation. The Props game involved representing and reasoning about gestural proto-
narratives (as in prior work [50]) as well as about the objects in the agent’s environment,
and the relationship between affordance, object, and agent as a way to constrain as well
as generalize action selection. Additionally, a novel form of intrinsically-motivated action
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selection was developed called creative arc negotiation to tackle the improvisational action
selection problem head-on in the more complex domain. Creative arc negotiation is ac-
tion selection based on following a specified trajectory through a conceptual creative space
of novelty, unexpectedness, and quality in concert with a fellow improviser’s movements
through that creative space as well. Operationalizing creative arc negotiation required the
agent to evaluate perceived as well as generated actions through computational models of
creativity evaluation as the novelty, unexpectedness, and quality of actions. The architec-
ture also relied on affordance-based action variant generation and improvisational response
strategies in order to perform real-time object-based gestural proto-narrative improvisa-
tion in the Props game with non-expert human collaborators, as required to investigate the
claims in my thesis statement.
The CARNIVAL architecture and the Robot Improv Circus installation were evaluated
using in-person user experience studies and observer rating studies to determine whether
the claims made in my thesis statement were supported by evidence. These experiments
(see section 3.5) demonstrate that the techniques used in the Robot Improv Circus success-
fully address the improvisational action selection problem and enable object-based gestu-
ral proto-narrative improvisation with non-expert human collaborators in the Props game.
Analysis of the evidence produced by the evaluation studies showed that ultimately, it is
valid to conclusively state that embodied agents addressing the improvisational action
selection problem using creative arc negotiation can perform movement improv with
non-experts so that perceptions of agent creativity and coherence increase for both
participants and audience members, but that perceptions of enjoyment only increase
conclusively for observers. More study and data is required to show a conclusive in-
crease in perceptions of enjoyment for participants of the installation.
The evaluation of this research further illuminates where the system succeeds and where
it needs to develop further in order to traverse the path towards unconstrained embodied
narrative improvisation better. The approach used in CARNIVAL is very different from my
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prior work in the LuminAI architecture [50], focusing on techniques from different parts of
the artificial intelligence landscape. In so doing, CARNIVAL succeeds at addressing many
issues that surround real-world, non-expert human-computer improvisation and embodied
co-creativity, through the integration of multiple technical solutions and formalizations of
ideas from human improvisational practice itself. In particular, this dissertation shows
that CARNIVAL is demonstrably adept at generating and evaluating a variety of creative,
coherent, and enjoyable actions over time and makes a definite impact on the experiences of
performance audiences/observers and installation participants (though to a lesser degree).
4.2 Contributions
The contributions of my research in this dissertation are as follows.
• A model of affordance-based action variant generation for parameterized generation
of action variants based on a given objects physical attributes.
• A formalized set of improvisational reasoning strategies for guiding an agents action
space search based on previous experience and the current improvisational context.
• Computational models for evaluating the creativity of perceived and generated action
variants in terms of their novelty, unexpectedness (as a measure of surprise), and
quality (as a measure of value).
• A model of creative arc negotiation for improvisational action selection while per-
forming movement improv with non-experts that increases both participant and ob-
server perceptions of enjoyment, agent creativity, and coherence.
• A publicly disseminated and validated interactive installation where embodied agents
can perform movement improv with non-experts.
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4.3 Toward Unconstrained Embodied Narrative Improvisation
The research presented in this dissertation focuses on the knowledge representations, soft-
ware architectures, and computational processes that can be used to develop improvisa-
tional agents for embodied co-creativity between non-expert humans and embodied virtual
characters. My research on human-computer embodied improvisation in prior work with
the LuminAI installation [50] and the research presented in this dissertation on the Robot
Improv Circus (chapter 3) interactive installations form a body of work that focuses on
addressing the various problems like the improvisational action selection problem that are
inherent in human-computer movement improv. The direction of my research over time
has formed a trajectory that points toward unconstrained embodied narrative improvisa-
tion in the future. In the following section, I present a sampling of significant remaining
challenges and potential directions for continuing research toward unconstrained embodied
narrative improvisation.
Unconstrained embodied narrative improvisation suffers from a severe knowledge-authoring
bottleneck as shown by various previous human-agent improvisational systems [26, 56, 50,
51]. A developmental approach to interactively learning a larger subset of knowledge re-
quired for this improvisation through human-agent co-creativity in virtual environments
was proposed in [1]. The proposed approach described a hierarchical (generalized di-
rected hypergraphical) representation (see figure 4.1) in which the embodied knowledge
of actions performed in the virtual world was perceived, segmented, clustered, interpreted,
and abstracted into increasingly high-level knowledge that is temporally and causally se-
quenced into graphical structures in each layer of the representation over time. Note that
this approach would require a large amount of human interaction for the agent to learn a
realistically large space of knowledge for use in unconstrained embodied narrative impro-
visation with people. Therefore, the improvisational scenarios would need to be diverse
and engaging enough to encourage continued participation.
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Figure 4.1: An example of learned knowledge represented within a proposed hypergraphi-
cal knowledge representation [1].
The hypergraphical knowledge representation proposed in [1] also presents a possible
solution to another significant challenge in the development of improvisational agents for
human-computer unconstrained embodied narrative improvisation — the deep integration
of the embodied knowledge learned by the agent with high-level structured knowledge po-
tentially obtained from mining corpora or from other large-scale knowledge repositories.
Similarly, the hypergraphical knowledge representation could also serve as an integrative
structure for fusing multimodal sensory percepts (speech, gesture, scene contents, images,
etc.) and the resulting combined knowledge at different levels of abstraction. However,
the proposed representation only demonstrated replay capabilities, with limited ability for
transformation and variant generation. Given the useful generational properties of vector
spaces and deep generative models as demonstrated within DeepIMAGINATION (see sec-
tion 3.4.3), it would be useful to investigate how the hypergraphical representations can
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be integrated together with vector spaces and deep generative models to enable knowledge
learning and integration with powerful generative capabilities.
The knowledge-authoring bottleneck in unconstrained embodied narrative improvisa-
tion is exacerbated by the different kinds of knowledge that would be required for it to
be successfully performed even with the use of interactive learning to mitigate the prob-
lem partially. A powerful addition to the interactive learning capabilities of an agent in
this domain would be large-scale mining (that also integrates mined actions into existing
learned knowledge) of required agent knowledge from the large number of videos on pub-
lic repositories online (as briefly mentioned in section 3.7.1). My initial work in this area
adapts [228] into an integrated pipeline for parsing the gestural content from fixed-camera
YouTube videos of a single human figure performing a single action per video. Extensions
to this initial work are necessary, in terms of automating action segmentation, annotating
segmented actions with semantic content from various sources, learning from (or correctly
handling) multiple figures in a single video, and compensating for video artifacts like cam-
era motion. As research in visual scene understanding (such as in [238]) progresses beyond
static, synthetic scenes, it will likely be possible to learn the accompanying 3D scene rep-
resentations of the environments within which the sourced videos are situated. This would
create a diverse set of virtual worlds for situating learned actions for the agent. It would
also provide a diverse set of virtual worlds for situating new improvised scenarios with
people as described above.
A significant focus of the CARNIVAL agent architecture is the creation of meaningful
improvised experiences over time in ill-defined improvisational domains. This works for a
domain like the Props game that has less narrative structure compared to unconstrained em-
bodied narrative improvisation. Taking long-form improv theater as an example of the latter
class of domain, it is likely that there will be strong expectations for coherent goal-driven
behavior interspersed with unexpected or locally-incoherent behavior that is justified by
subsequent actions (e.g., sequences of platform-tilt-justification [129] or finding the game
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of the scene [132]). This requirement for fluidly navigating the spectrum of goal-directed to
exploratory creative action generation is another significant challenge for improvisational
agents performing unconstrained embodied narrative improvisation. The creative arc ne-
gotiation process offers a potential initial and partial solution to this problem as repeated
rising and falling sections of a long, creative arc. However, creative arc negotiation is likely
a complementary mechanism to the reasoning required rather than an exact solution to the
previous problem.
The research presented in this dissertation is an initial exploration in the direction of
unconstrained human-computer embodied narrative improvisation. None of the problems
stated earlier in this section can easily be solved at this time. However, building on the
initial results described in this dissertation and continuing future research along the direc-
tions described in this section, it is possible that unconstrained human-computer embodied
narrative improvisation will someday number among the creative outlets, performing arts,
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afford: A new formalization of affordances toward affordance-based robot control,”
Adaptive Behavior, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 447–472, 2007.
[58] R. Hodson, Interaction, improvisation, and interplay in jazz. Routledge, 2007.
[59] L. Itti and P. Baldi, “Bayesian surprise attracts human attention,” Vision research,
vol. 49, no. 10, pp. 1295–1306, 2009.
[60] L. Macedo and A. Cardoso, “Modeling forms of surprise in an artificial agent,” in
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, vol. 23, 2001.
[61] E. P. Torrance, Torrance tests of creative thinking. Princeton, N.J.: Personnel Press,
Inc., 1968.
[62] H. G. Gough, “A creative personality scale for the adjective check list.,” Journal of
personality and social psychology, vol. 37, no. 8, p. 1398, 1979.
157
[63] D. M. Harrington, J. H. Block, and J. Block, “Testing aspects of carl rogers’s theory
of creative environments: Child-rearing antecedents of creative potential in young
adolescents.,” Journal of personality and social psychology, vol. 52, no. 4, p. 851,
1987.
[64] H. Gardner, Creating minds: An anatomy of creativity seen through the lives of
freud, einstein, picasso, stravinsky, eliot, graham, and ghandi. Basic Civitas Books,
2011.
[65] J. R. Hayes, “Cognitive processes in creativity,” in Handbook of creativity, Springer,
1989, pp. 135–145.
[66] R. K. Sawyer, “Group creativity: Musical performance and collaboration,” Psy-
chology of music, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 148–165, 2006.
[67] R. Arnheim, Visual thinking. Univ of California Press, 1969.
[68] M. Sharples, “An account of writing as creative design,” The science of writing,
pp. 127–148, 1996.
[69] J. S. Gero, “Creativity, emergence and evolution in design,” Knowledge-Based Sys-
tems, vol. 9, no. 7, pp. 435–448, 1996.
[70] Y. Chu and J. N. MacGregor, “Human performance on insight problem solving: A
review,” The Journal of Problem Solving, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 6, 2011.
[71] D. K. Simonton, Creativity in science: Chance, logic, genius, and zeitgeist. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004.
[72] R. Perez y Perez and M. Sharples, “MEXICA: A computer model of a cognitive
account of creative writing,” Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial In-
telligence, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 119–139, 2001.
[73] B Daz-Agudo, P Gervs, and P. Gonzlez-Calero, “Poetry generation in COLIBRI,”
in In Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Advances in Case-Based
Reasoning (ECCBR ’02 ), 2002, pp. 73–87.
[74] J. L. Kolodner and D. B. Leake, “A Tutorial Introduction to Case-Based Reason-
ing,” in Case-Based Reasoning: EXPERIENCES, Lessons, and Future Directions,
D. B. Leake, Ed., 1996.
[75] S. Colton, “The Painting Fool: Stories from Building an Automated Painter,” in
Computers and Creativity, J. McCormack and M. dInverno, Eds., Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 3–38, ISBN: 978-3-642-31726-2.
158
[76] S. Colton and G. a. Wiggins, “Computational creativity: The final frontier?” In
ECAI 2012: 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence: FRONTIERS in
Artificial Intelligence and Applications, L. De Raedt, C. Bessiere, and D. Dubois,
Eds., vol. 242, DOI: 10.3233/978-1-61499-098-7-21, 2012, pp. 21–26, ISBN: 9781614990970.
[77] M. Cook, S. Colton, and J. Gow, “Automating game design in three dimensions,”
in Proceedings of the AISB Symposium on AI and Games, 2014, pp. 20–24.
[78] M. T. Pearce and G. A. Wiggins, “Evaluating cognitive models of musical com-
position,” in Proceedings of the 4th international joint workshop on computational
creativity, Goldsmiths, University of London, 2007, pp. 73–80.
[79] L. Candy and E. a. Edmonds, “Modeling co-creativity in art and technology,” Pro-
ceedings of the 4th conference on Creativity and Cognition, pp. 134–141, 2002.
[80] N. Davis, C.-P. Hsiao, Y. Popova, and B. Magerko, “An enactive model of creativity
for computational collaboration and co-creation,” in Creativity in the Digital Age,
Springer, 2015, pp. 109–133.
[81] P. Karimi, K. Grace, N. Davis, and M. L. Maher, “Creative sketching apprentice:
Supporting conceptual shifts in sketch ideation,” in International Conference on-
Design Computing and Cognition, Springer, 2018, pp. 721–738.
[82] G. Smith, J. Whitehead, and M. Mateas, “Tanagra: Reactive planning and constraint
solving for mixed-initiative level design,” IEEE Transactions on computational in-
telligence and AI in games, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 201–215, 2011.
[83] G. N. Yannakakis, A. Liapis, and C. Alexopoulos, “Mixed-initiative co-creativity.,”
in FDG, 2014.
[84] M. Nelson, S. Colton, E. Powley, S. Gaudl, P. Ivey, R. Saunders, B. Perez Fer-
rer, and M. Cook, “Mixed-initiative approaches to on-device mobile game design,”
2016.
[85] M. Guzdial and M. Riedl, “An interaction framework for studying co-creative ai,”
ArXiv preprint arXiv:1903.09709, 2019.
[86] R. Swanson and A. S. Gordon, “Say anything: Using textual case-based reasoning
to enable open-domain interactive storytelling,” ACM Transactions on Interactive
Intelligent Systems (TiiS), vol. 2, no. 3, p. 16, 2012.
[87] B. Samuel, M. Mateas, and N. Wardrip-Fruin, “The design of writing buddy: A
mixed-initiative approach towards computational story collaboration,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Interactive Digital Storytelling, Springer, 2016, pp. 388–396.
159
[88] R. Damiano, V. Lombardo, and A. Pizzo, “Doppiogioco. playing with the audience
in an interactive storytelling platform,” in Conference on Complex, Intelligent, and
Software Intensive Systems, Springer, 2017, pp. 287–298.
[89] M. Roemmele and A. S. Gordon, “Automated assistance for creative writing with
an rnn language model,” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on
Intelligent User Interfaces Companion, ACM, 2018, p. 21.
[90] J. W. Davidson and N. Jordan, “Private Teaching, Private Learningi: An Explo-
ration of Music Instrument Learning in the Private Studio, Junior and Senior Con-
servatories,” in International Handbook of Research in Arts Education, Springer,
2007, pp. 729–754.
[91] T. W. Calvert, C. Welman, S. Gaudet, T. Schiphorst, and C. Lee, “Composition of
multiple figure sequences for dance and animation,” The Visual Computer, vol. 7,
no. 2-3, pp. 114–121, Mar. 1991.
[92] K. Carlson, T. Schiphorst, and P. Pasquier, “Scuddle: Generating movement cata-
lysts for computer-aided choreography.,” in ICCC, 2011, pp. 123–128.
[93] S. F. Alaoui, K. Carlson, and T. Schiphorst, “Choreography as Mediated through
Compositional Tools for Movement,” Proceedings of the 2014 International Work-
shop on Movement and Computing - MOCO ’14, pp. 1–6, 2014.
[94] K. Carlson, P. Pasquier, H. H. Tsang, J. Phillips, T. Schiphorst, and T. Calvert,
“Cochoreo: A generative feature in idanceforms for creating novel keyframe ani-
mation for choreography,” in Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference
on Computational Creativity, 2016.
[95] L. Crnkovic-Friis and L. Crnkovic-Friis, “Generative choreography using deep
learning,” ArXiv preprint arXiv:1605.06921, 2016.
[96] J. A. Biles, “Genjam: Evolution of a jazz improviser,” Creative evolutionary sys-
tems, vol. 168, p. 2, 2002.
[97] G. Hoffman and G Weinberg, “Shimon: An interactive improvisational robotic
marimba player,” CHI’10 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors \ldots, pp. 3097–
3102, 2010.
[98] B. Thom, “Machine learning techniques for real-time improvisational solo trad-
ing.,” in ICMC, 2001.
[99] R. M. Keller and D. R. Morrison, “A grammatical approach to automatic impro-
visation,” in Proceedings, Fourth Sound and Music Conference, Lefkada, Greece,
July., 2007.
160
[100] D. J Mendona and W. A Wallace, “A cognitive model of improvisation in emer-
gency management,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A,
vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 547–561, 2007.
[101] B. Magerko, P. Dohogne, and C. DeLeon, “Employing Fuzzy Concepts for Digital
Improvisational Theatre,” AIIDE, 2011.
[102] A. Brisson, B. Magerko, and A. Paiva, “A computational model for finding the tilt
in an improvised scene,” in International Conference on Interactive Digital Story-
telling, Springer, 2011, pp. 158–163.
[103] K. W. Mathewson and P. Mirowski, “Improvised theatre alongside artificial intelli-
gences,” in Thirteenth Artificial Intelligence and Interactive Digital Entertainment
Conference, 2017.
[104] N. Davis, C.-P. Hsiao, K. Yashraj Singh, L. Li, and B. Magerko, “Empirically
studying participatory sense-making in abstract drawing with a co-creative cog-
nitive agent,” in Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Intelligent
User Interfaces, ACM, 2016, pp. 196–207.
[105] D. Reidsma, A. Nijholt, R. Rienks, and H. Hondorp, “Interacting with a virtual rap
dancer,” in Intelligent Technologies for Interactive Entertainment, Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 134–143, ISBN: 3540305092.
[106] L. J. Martin, B. Harrison, and M. O. Riedl, “Improvisational computational story-
telling in open worlds,” in Interactive Storytelling: 9th International Conference
on Interactive Digital Storytelling, ICIDS 2016, Los Angeles, CA, USA, November
15–18, 2016, Proceedings 9, Springer, 2016, pp. 73–84.
[107] B. D. Argall, S. Chernova, M. Veloso, and B. Browning, “A survey of robot learning
from demonstration,” Robotics and autonomous systems, vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 469–
483, 2009.
[108] A. G. Billard, S. Calinon, and R. Dillmann, “Learning from humans,” in Springer
Handbook of Robotics, Springer, 2016, pp. 1995–2014.
[109] J. Saunders, C. L. Nehaniv, and K. Dautenhahn, “Teaching robots by moulding be-
havior and scaffolding the environment,” in Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGCHI/SIGART
conference on Human-robot interaction, ACM, 2006, pp. 118–125.
[110] T. Fitzgerald and A. Goel, “A case-based approach to imitation learning in robotic
agents,” in Intl. Conf. on Case-Based Reasoning Workshop on Case-Based Agents,
2014.
161
[111] V. Ng-Thow-Hing, P. Luo, and S. Y. Okita, “Synchronized gesture and speech pro-
duction for humanoid robots,” 2010 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelli-
gent Robots and Systems, pp. 4617–4624, 2010.
[112] T. S. K. Ikeuchi, “Synthesis of dance performance based on analyses of human
motion and music,” 2008.
[113] F. Ofli, E. Erzin, Y. Yemez, and A. M. Tekalp, “Learn2dance: Learning statisti-
cal music-to-dance mappings for choreography synthesis,” IEEE Transactions on
Multimedia, vol. 14, pp. 747–759, 2012.
[114] M. Mancini and G. Castellano, “Real-time analysis and synthesis of emotional ges-
ture expressivity,” 2007.
[115] M. Kipp, M. Neff, K. H. Kipp, and I. Albrecht, “Towards natural gesture synthesis:
Evaluating gesture units in a data-driven approach to gesture synthesis,” in IVA,
2007.
[116] A. Augello, E. Cipolla, I. Infantino, A. Manfré, G. Pilato, and F. Vella, “Creative
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